Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

71. Memorandum of Discussion at 372d NSC Meeting¹

Washington, July 14, 1958

SUBJECT

• Discussion at the 372nd Meeting of the National Security Council, Monday, July 14, 1958

Present at the 372nd NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; Gerard C. Smith for the Secretary of State; and the Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Special Assistants to the President for Science and Technology and for Public Workd Planning; the President, National Academy of Sciences; Dr. Willard F. Libby, Member, Atomic Energy Commission; Lt. Gen. Charles P. Cabell for the Director of Central Intelligence; The Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Special Assistants to the President for the Atoms for Peace Program, for Information Projects, for National Security Affairs, and for Security Operations Coordination; the White House Staff Secretary; the Deputy Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization; Huntington Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency; Gordon Gray, NSC Consultant; Charles A. Haskins, Member, NSC Special Staff; Dr. Lauriston Taylor, National Bureau of Standards; Richard Park, National Academy of Sciences; William L. White, Rogers Cannell, and George Hopkins, Stanford Research Institute; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. ADEQUACY OF GOVERNMENT RESEARCH PROGRAMS IN NON-MILITARY DEFENSE

(NSC Action No. 1882; NSC 5807/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 1, 1958)

General Cutler briefed the Council on this and the following three studies. (A copy of General Cutler’s briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.) He then called on Dr. Lauriston Taylor to summarize the contents of the subject report.

Dr. Taylor’s summary was related to the seven Conclusions set forth in the Summary at the beginning of the written report. (A copy of the report is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

At the conclusion of Dr. Taylor’s presentation, General Cutler suggested, by way of Council action, that the above-mentioned report be referred to Governor Hoegh for study and such recommendation to the Council as he might deem appropriate.

General Cutler next called upon the Director, Bureau of the Budget. Mr. Stans pointed out that, as the report itself said, there was certainly a lack of coordination in some of the areas of research in non-military defense programs. The most effective use to which the report could be put would be to fill in these gaps in coordination.

The President counseled Governor Hoegh to pay particular attention to the 6th and 7th Conclusions, which seemed to him to deal largely with procedural problems.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the report on the subject prepared, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1882–b–(1)–(2), by the Advisory Committee on Civil Defense of the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, with the advice and assistance of personnel from a number of other committees of the Academy-Research Council and of individual consultants, and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 1, 1958; as summarized at the meeting by Dr. Lauriston Taylor.

b. Referred the aforementioned report on the subject to the Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization, for study of the Conclusions contained therein (especially Conclusions Nos. 6 and 7 on page 2 of the Summary), and such recommendations to the Council as he may deem appropriate.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization, for implementation.

2. THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH MIGHT BE TOLERABLE TO WORLD POPULATIONS

(NSC Action No. 1882; NSC 5807/1; Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 7, 1958)

After a further short briefing by General Cutler, Dr. Libby was called upon to comment on the written report. He pointed out that the world-wide effect of a nuclear war fought with “dirty” bombs having a megatonnage of 15,000, would result in serious effects on the health of the non-combatant peoples of the world, but would not actually lead to the end of life on the earth. The main point was that these effects depend particularly on whether the bombs detonated are “dirty” or “clean”, because the world-wide effects of the nuclear exchange (as opposed to the effects on the combatant nations) derive from radioactive fallout. Certainly a nuclear exchange involving the detonation of 15,000 megatons would push the people of the world toward the limit of tolerance.

Dr. Libby went on to point out that it was extremely difficult to estimate the biological effects of such a detonation on the peoples of the non-combatant nations, simply because we do not know enough about such biological effects. On the other hand, with respect to the physical effects of such a holocaust, these were easier to establish, on the basis of some experience—for example, in the field of weather. Dr. Libby stated that the physical effects of such a detonation of nuclear weapons would be quite minor.

General Cutler pointed out the Planning Board’s fear that the concentrated explosion of 15,000 megatons would have particularly grave effects because of concentration. As a result of Dr. Libby’s statements and the conclusions of the written study, the Planning Board was now less fearful. General Cutler then asked Dr. Killian if he had any comments to make.

Dr. Killian stated that he and his people had not participated in the making of this study, but he was inclined to agree that Dr. Libby’s views were certainly conservative and perhaps even pessimistic. At the very least, it was a reasonable statement of the problem.

The President inquired as to the assumptions in the study regarding the mix between “clean” and “dirty” bombs. Dr. Libby replied that the assumed mix had been 50–50 between fission and fusion.

Secretary Anderson inquired the reason behind the apparent lack of Russian concern about “clean” nuclear weapons. Does this lack of concern derive from the Soviets’ realization of our superior knowledge in the field of making “clean” weapons? Dr. Libby stated that we did not know the reason for the apparent lack of concern, a statement in which Admiral Strauss concurred, adding, however, that the apparent lack of concern in the Soviet Union over the “clean” bomb may reflect merely what is said in Soviet public statements and not what the Soviets are thinking about in their laboratories.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed the report on the subject showing the radiation effects on non-combatant population of a massive, concentrated exchange of nuclear weapons, prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission pursuant to NSC Action No. 1882–b–(1)–(b) and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 7, 1958; as summarized at the meeting by Dr. Willard F. Libby, Member of the Atomic Energy Commission.

3. SURVIVAL OF POPULATION FOLLOWING A MASSIVE NUCLEAR EXCHANGE

(NSC Action No. 1882; NSC 5807/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 27, 1958)

After a short briefing, General Cutler called on Mr. Rogers Cannell, of the Stanford Research Institute, to summarize the contents of the written report by the Stanford Research Institute. (A copy of the SRI report is filed in the minutes of the meeting.) After Mr. Cannell had set forth the general conclusion that both survival and recovery were possible if the nation possessed fallout shelter in 1965, General Cutler noted that the qualified optimism of the report rested on two assumptions: First, that the Soviets would make a single nuclear attack only on the United States, with no repeats; and second, that 90% of the American people who were not killed by blast and thermal effects would make effective use of the fallout shelter provided.

The President inquired as to the ways and means of decontamination, to which question Mr. Cannell provided an answer.

The President then inquired whether it was fair to conclude from the Stanford study that if we do undertake to create a fallout shelter system in the United States, every American should do his best to provide the shelter with emergency food rations and emergency fuel storage. The President thought that every industrial plant should have underground fuel storage and each American household ought to store up food for use in a shelter in the event of an emergency. Mr. Cannell agreed with the President, and pointed out that it would be extremely difficult for the average American to know how much food or fuel to store, inasmuch as he would not know whether he would have to stay in his shelter for as little as three days or as much as thirteen weeks. As a result, many people would simply give no thought to the problem.

Governor Hoegh commented that the FCDA had advocated that every individual stockpile in his own home a supply of food and other necessities designed to last for two weeks. The requirements thereafter should be taken care of by the public authorities of the community.

Secretary Anderson asked how, with so many people in shelter, anyone would know when to come out. Governor Hoegh and General Cutler attempted to answer Secretary Anderson’s question.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed the report on the subject (including its assumptions) prepared, pursuant to paragraph I–b–(3) of NSC 5807/1 (“Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Shelter”), by the Stanford Research Institute and transmitted by the reference memorandum of June 27, 1958; as summarized at the meeting by Mr. Rogers Cannell, of the Stanford Research Institute.

4. STATUS OF SHELTER MEASURES AS OF JUNE 30, 1958

(NSC Action No. 1882; NSC 5807/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 1, 1958)

Governor Hoegh stressed that it was the note of prudence rather than the note of alarm which had been emphasized in the FCDA program on shelter measures. The program had been given to the American people in a low key. He then went on to summarize the contents of his report, a copy of which is filed in the minutes of the meeting. After concluding his summary, Governor Hoegh stressed the importance of Congressional provision of sufficient funds if the shelter program was to be carried forward along the lines suggested. Governor Hoegh felt that the program could be successfully accomplished if Congress provided $13 million. After Congress had acted on the appropriation, Governor Hoegh indicated his desire to present to the Council a supplementary status report.

The President asked several questions about the construction characteristics of shelters, particularly as to means of entrance and exit. These questions were answered by Governor Hoegh.

The National Security Council:

a. Noted and discussed the report on the subject prepared by the Federal Civil Defense Administration pursuant to NSC Action No. 1882–c and transmitted by the reference memorandum of July 1, 1958; as summarized at the meeting by the Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization.

b. Noted that the Director, Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization, would submit to the Council a supplementary status report following Congressional action on FY 1959 appropriations, and appropriate recommendations on shelter measures (including those on which action was deferred by NSC Action No. 1882–d) in the light of Congressional action on appropriations and of further study of the reports presented in Items 1 through 3 above.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, ODCM, for appropriate action.

5. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND NSC PLANNING BOARD MEETINGS, SEPTEMBER 1947 THROUGH JULY 21, 1958

General Cutler asked the President’s indulgence while he briefly explained a tabulation comparing the number of meetings of the National Security Council and the NSC Planning Board during the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations. General Cutler stated that he realized that more important than the number of meetings was the quality of the actions taken by the Council, but, being possessed of a finite mind, he could not resist giving the Council members this tabulation. There was no comment. (A copy of General Cutler’s tabulation of Council and Planning Board meetings from September 1947 through July 21, 1958, is filed in the minutes of the meeting; another is attached to this memorandum.)

The National Security Council:

Noted the tabulation of Council and Planning Board meetings, from the establishment of the Council in 1947 through July 21, 1958, as distributed at the meeting by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

* * * * * * *

NOTE: Following completion of Item 5 above, the President held a special meeting in his office to consider current developments in the Near East, in the light of a briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence. In attendance at this meeting were the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Acting Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Mr. Gordon Gray, and other staff officials.

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Agenda item 1: Adequacy of Government Research Programs in Non-military Defense; Agenda item 2: The Number of Nuclear Weapons Which Might Be Tolerable to World Populations; Agenda item 3: Survival of Population Following a Massive Nuclear Exchange; Agenda item 4: Status of Shelter Measures as of June 30, 1958; Agenda item 5: National Security Council and NSC Planning Board Meetings, September 1947 Through July 21, 1958. Top Secret; Eyes Only. 6 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.