Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

72. Memorandum From Smith (S/P) to John Foster Dulles¹

Washington, July 15, 1958

SUBJECT

• Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1): NSC Review of Military Paragraphs 13 and 14 Scheduled on July 24, 1958

I

Your concept of main reliance on a capability for massive retaliation to deter Communist aggression has served the free world well. You have, however, recently expressed doubts as to the continuing validity of this concept. These doubts are shared by W, C, ARA, FE, NEA and IO which believe that the time has come to adopt a new concept placing greater emphasis on varied and flexible capabilities. (See Tabs A–F.)

Doubt has arisen because:

1. Given present and prospective Soviet nuclear capability, our decision to launch massive retaliation would also be a decision to commit national suicide. (The JCS February 1957 statement, “Strategic Concept”, attributes to both the US and the USSR “the capability to destroy each other even after a surprise attack.”)

2. Our allies, and in time the Communists, will become increasingly doubtful that we would launch massive retaliation unless nuclear attack on the US itself had taken place or was imminent.

3. Our allies (and in time perhaps our own people) will also become increasingly doubtful that massive retaliation is a rational response to anything less than Communist aggression on a scale that clearly threatens major free world areas—e.g. Western Europe as a whole.

4. Communist aggression is likely to be of an ambiguous nature which neither our allies nor our own people would recognize as warranting massive retaliation.

5. Our capability for massive retaliation will continue to be improved at the expense of other capabilities with the result that we shall become increasingly dependent upon a capability which we shall be increasingly inhibited from using.

EUR, while recognizing the force of some of the preceding considerations and sharing the concern of other offices at the growing inflexibility of US capabilities, believe that “a possible revision of the US strategic concept requires far more consideration than the Department has yet been able to give.” (See Tab G)

II

I believe that continued main reliance on a capability for massive retaliation entails unacceptable risks to the US. This reliance is gradually limiting our freedom of action to two choices: total nuclear war with unimaginable death and devastation, or cumulative retreat before Communist menace and subversion ending in the isolation of the United States and the perversion of “its fundamental values and institutions.”

In certain Far Eastern situations we may already be limited to a choice between total nuclear war and retreat. You will recall that the recent State-Defense study of capabilities for limited military operations projected immediate US nuclear retaliation in the hypothetical event of substantial Communist aggression against Quemoy and Matsu, Taiwan or the ROK. Nuclear retaliation of the magnitude indicated in the study would, in the opinion of a number of qualified State and CIA officers, entail grave risk of nuclear counter-strikes by the Communists which could lead to progressive expansion of the hostilities to general war. The President has directed the preparation of an NIE evaluating this risk.

III

The NSC agenda for July 24 includes reconsideration of the military strategy paragraphs of Basic National Security Policy (paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1).² If as a result of Council discussion the President confirms those paragraphs, your concept will continue to shape military plans and weapons development. Unless you take the lead, it seems likely that the paragraphs will be confirmed and movement toward a new concept deferred at least until mid-1959.

Delay would, I believe, be unfortunate. Although your recent discussions with Secretary McElroy on the strategic concept produced no tangible result, there is considerable evidence that your initiative has stimulated new thinking in the Pentagon, particularly in the Army, Navy and Marine Corps. If we could move quickly to a joint State-Defense review of an alternative concept (in contrast to the unilateral Defense review which presumably took place between your two meetings with Secretary McElroy), a practicable new concept might emerge.

You will recall that General Cutler circulated to the NSC an alternative version of paragraph 14 of NSC 5810/1. (See Tab I.) W, C, FE and IO specifically endorse the Cutler alternative. I understand, however, that Defense and the JCS strongly oppose that version. I accordingly do not recommend that you seek NSC agreement to Cutler’s paragraph 14 on July 24.

Recommendations

It is recommended that

1. You inform the Secretary of Defense that you have concluded that we must now begin to move toward a new strategic concept.

2. You suggest to the Secretary of Defense that you jointly propose to the President that (a) NSC consideration of paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5810/1 be deferred until early October and (b) State and Defense immediately undertake a Joint study of an alternative strategic concept on the basis of which the two Departments will prepare, and circulate to the NSC by the end of September, an agreed revision of paragraphs 13 and 14.

Approved___ JFD______

Disapproved___________

Date___________

1. Source: NSC review of military paragraphs of NSC 5810/1; recommendation for a new strategic concept. Top Secret. 3 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1.
2. (See Tab H). [Footnote is in the original.]