Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

70. Briefing note for the 372d NSC meeting¹

Washington, July 14, 1958

1. This meeting is chiefly concerned with the problem of shelter against radioactive fallout in case of nuclear attack—three studies previously requested by the Council and an interim report by Governor Hoegh on the status of shelter measures.

2. Following the meeting of the Council on January 16, the President approved a modification of then-existing civil defense policy by incorporating the concept of fallout shelter for protection of the civil population against radiation hazard, subject to certain specified conditions. One of these conditions was that the implementation of the concept be deferred pending Council consideration of a report by an Interdepartmental Committee as to appropriate measures to carry out the concept.

3. On March 27 the Council considered the measures recommended by this Committee, together with recommendations by the Planning Board for certain further studies. Thereafter, the President approved (1) the taking of six specific measures (to be mentioned later) to carry out the concept of fallout shelter; (2) the submission of a report by Governor Hoegh on the status of these measures through July 1; (3) the making of the three studies recommended by the Planning Board; and (4) the deferring of action on five other measures proposed by the Interdepartmental Committee, pending consideration by the Council of the studies and the report.

4. Today, there will be presented the three studies and Governor Hoegh’s report. The Council is not being asked to take any policy decision on these items at this time.

5.

a. The first study was to make a special assessment as to (1) the adequacy of present research efforts by the several agencies of Government on the design and testing of shelters and on the effects of nuclear attack on humans; and (2) whether such research efforts should be better coordinated, integrated, or accelerated.

b. The second study was to appraise the upper limit of massive, concentrated nuclear detonations which could be tolerated by the peoples of the earth and, in fact, by the earth itself.

c. The third study was to explore the problem of survival of populations in the period following their coming out of shelter, after a massive nuclear exchange.

d. The fourth item is Governor Hoegh’s status report.

6. First, then, the report on the “Adequacy of Government Research Programs in Non-Military Defense”—a study prepared by the Advisory Committee on Civil Defense of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Research Council, under the chairmanship of Dr. Lauriston Taylor of the Bureau of Standards, with the assistance of consultants from within and without the Government. The study lists research areas in which the initiation or acceleration of projects might save lives or enable survivors better to cope with their environment. One of the principal conclusions of the Committee appears to be that the low priority hitherto placed on civil defense makes it difficult to attract high calibre scientists into civil defense research projects.

DR. TAYLOR

MR. STANS—Comment.

7.

a. The purpose of the second Study, to have been made by AEC in consultation with Dr. Killian, was to appraise the upper limits of massive concentrated nuclear detonations and their by-products which could be tolerated by the peoples of the world and by the world itself. The question had arisen in the minds of laymen as to whether a massive nuclear exchange, involving the detonation simultaneously or within a few hours of many millions of kilotons, could be sustained by the peoples of the earth and by the earth itself. It was desired to have the most qualified scientific opinion upon this question.

b. The formal study prepared by AEC assumes four instances of massive nuclear exchanges in the Northern Hemisphere (varying in intensity from 10,000 MTs to 1 million MTs) and examines the average effect of the radiation fallout therefrom on all peoples in the Northern Hemisphere outside of the areas in which the nuclear weapons were actually detonated. This study, although a partial answer to the question, does not deal with all aspects of the problems. Therefore, Dr. Libby has agreed to make a broader statement, to be followed by Dr. Killian.

DR. LIBBY

DR. KILLIAN

8.

a. The third study is concerned with the survival of populations in the period following their coming out of shelter, after a massive nuclear exchange. ODM and FCDA requested Stanford Research Institute to undertake this study within the terms of an existing research contract. Three representatives from Stanford who worked on the study are here this morning.

b. The study conclusions have not been approved or disapproved by ODM and FCDA; and are still being evaluated by the successor agency, OCDM.

c. The study assumes (1) a hypothetical attack initiated by the Soviet Union upon the United States in 1965, directed at both military and industrial targets; (2) that there will be one nuclear exchange only; (3) that fallout shelter will be available for the population of the United States, and that 90% of the people not killed by blast and thermal effects will enter and stay in shelter for the necessary periods of time (which will vary from a few hours to as many as 13 weeks); (4) that no assistance (food, medicine, etc.) will be available from outside the United States.

d. Because the assumed attack (a) takes place in 1965 (when more weapons, including ICBMs, will be available), and (b) uses more than one weapon per target, the severity of the attack—and the resulting fallout and casualties from fallout—is greater than we have seen in other hypothetical attacks (98 million fatal American casualties).

e. The details of the attack assumed are covered in Chapter II of the Study and form a framework for the later chapters, which deal with the problems faced by survivors in a post-attack environment.

MR. CANNELL, of the Stanford Research Institute, will speak on the problems of survival and recovery.

Questions.

9. The last of the four items is the report to be given by Governor Hoegh on the status of the six approved measures to carry out the concept of shelter. Those measures are: (a) research on shelter design, shelter habitation, shelter equipment, weapons effects on animals, etc.; (b) a limited progress of construction of shelter prototypes; (c) a sampling survey of existing structures; (d) a program of public education; (e) a “shelf” of emergency plans; and (f) incorporation of fallout shelter in appropriate new Federal civilian construction. At the time the President approved these measures in March, it was estimated that the cost to FCDA in FY 1959 of the first five items would approximate $28.5 million. I now understand that the FCDA program for these five measures, as agreed upon with the Budget Bureau in late June, comes to only about $11 million.

10. Action on five other measures proposed by the Interdepartmental Committee in March was deferred pending consideration by the Council of the reports you are hearing this morning (NSC Action No. 1882-d). Those five measures are further shelter prototype construction, pilot studies in selected communities, shelters in existing civilian Federal buildings, and shelters in existing and new military construction. I understand that OCDM is not seeking Council approval now for those additional measures, but will come back to the Council later in this calendar year after further evaluation of the studies presented today.

GOVERNOR HOEGH

cc: Mr. Harr

Mr. Lay

Dr. Gleason

Mr. Haskins

1. Source: Problem of shelter against fallout. Top Secret. 3 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.