Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

68. NSC Report¹

NSC 5816

Washington, July 1, 1958

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

to the

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on

A NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

REFERENCE

• NSC 5728

The President, on the recommendation of the Chairman, Net Evaluation Subcommittee, approved on June 25, 1958, the withdrawal of NSC 5728 and the issuance, on a special limited-distribution basis, of the amended Directive enclosed herewith as NSC 5816. The amendment consists of the deletion of the last two sentences of paragraph 3 and of subparagraphs 3–a, b and c of NSC 5728, and the substitution therefore of a new paragraph 3.

The enclosed Directive has also been revised in paragraph 5, to include on the membership of the Subcommittee the Director of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization in place of the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Administration, in accordance with Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, effective July 1, 1958.

NSC 5816, as approved by the President is transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council, and is being referred to the members of the Subcommittee for appropriate implementation.

The enclosed Directive supersedes NSC 5728.

Special security precautions should be observed in the handling of the enclosure, with access thereto limited to those individuals having a strict “need to know” in the performance of their official duties.

James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury

The Attorney General

The Director, Bureau of the Budget

The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director of Central Intelligence

The Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

The Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

Enclosure

DIRECTIVE

on

A NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

1. Pursuant to the recommendations of the National Security Council in NSC Action No. 1260–b (November 4, 1954) and my subsequent approval thereof, I hereby establish the following permanent procedure (superseding NSC 5605) to provide integrated evaluations of the net capabilities of the USSR, in the event of general war, to inflict direct injury upon the continental United States and to provide a continual watch for changes which would significantly alter those net capabilities.

2. Each integrated evaluation should:

a. Cover all types of attack, overt or clandestine;

b. Include consideration of the several courses of action which the USSR is capable of executing; and

c. Take into account the estimated future status of approved military and non-military U.S. defense programs.

3. Each integrated evaluation report should estimate, from the practical standpoint, the extent and effect of direct injury, including radioactive fall-out, upon the continental United States, resulting from the most probable types and weights of attacks which the USSR is capable of delivering during the nuclear phase of a general war (i.e., the period during which the Soviet nuclear weapon stockpile or means of delivery of nuclear weapons on the United States would be substantially expended). Military operations overseas should be considered only in so far as they (a) require a diversion of Soviet resources from attack on the continental United States, or (b) affect U.S. capabilities to execute the Bravo mission and consequently the Soviet capability to attack the continental United States. Each report should consider, in so far as damage to the USSR is concerned, the effects of U.S. attacks on the USSR which would affect their capability to damage the United States. In addition, a general estimate should be made of the over-all effects of the U.S. attacks against the USSR which would show the general order of magnitude of destruction, disruption of communications and government, and loss of life in the USSR. In arriving at this general estimate, it is not expected or anticipated that detailed analyses will be undertaken. An evaluation will be made annually on the basis of an assumption or assumptions of conditions under which a general nuclear war might be initiated. Such assumption(s) should be developed by the Subcommittee after careful consideration of the implication of the world situation, and submitted for my approval.

4. Integrated evaluations should be submitted to the Council on or before November 15 of each year, and relate to the situation on a critical date normally about three years in the future. In addition to these annual integrated evaluations, an integrated evaluation should be submitted to the Council at such times as the Subcommittee feels that a change has become apparent that would significantly alter the net capabilities of the USSR to inflict direct injury upon the continental United States.

5. In order to prepare these integrated evaluations I hereby establish a Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council, composed of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who will serve as Chairman, the Director of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. Each Subcommittee member shall be consulted regarding and given ample opportunity to review the following prior to adoption by the Subcommittee: (a) subsidiary terms of reference, (b) the assumptions to be used as a basis for each evaluation report, (c) the complete evaluation report (less background material, which shall be made available only on a “need-to-know” basis), and (d) any recommendations which the Subcommittee may choose to submit. If the Director of the Subcommittee Staff, after adoption of the evaluation report by the Subcommittee, has any additional comments which he believes should be presented to the NSC, such comments may be submitted to the President, through the Chairman of the Subcommittee, for consideration. The Chairman of the Subcommittee, in consultation with the Director of the Subcommittee Staff, will prepare regulations and establish procedures for the handling of highly sensitive information² required in the preparation of an evaluation report so as to safeguard its security on a strict “need-to-know” basis and to preclude the assembly of an unwarranted amount of sensitive information in one document. Such regulations and procedures shall not be finally adopted until the other members of the Subcommittee have been consulted concerning them.

6. Subcommittee members are designated to act as individuals, but each shall have the right to consult, at his discretion and under appropriate security safeguards, with his agency or committee prior to Subcommittee action on matters normally within the cognizance of his committee or agency. In subscribing to the reports and recommendations of the Subcommittee the individual members shall not be expected to assume responsibility for technical matters or conclusions not normally within the cognizance of his own parent committee or agency. Reports as submitted to the Council should show, so far as possible by textual footnotes, any dissents by Subcommittee members.

7. The Subcommittee will have a Staff, composed of individuals assigned by member agencies, as required by the Director, and under the direction of a Director whom I shall designate. The Director may be compensated through the National Security Council from contributions by the member agencies. Individuals assigned to the Staff from each military service and by the Central Intelligence Agency should normally serve for two years and be so appointed that, to insure continuity, not more than fifty per cent will vacate each year.

8. The Net Evaluation Subcommittee hereby established is empowered under the terms of this Directive to call on any agency of the Government for relevant information, evaluations, and estimates, subject only to establishment of appropriate security regulations and procedures for the handling of highly sensitive information as provided under paragraph 5 above.

9. Distribution of each completed Subcommittee report will be determined at the time by me.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

1. Source: “Directive on Net Evaluation Subcommittee.” Top Secret; Special Limited Distribution. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5816 Series.
2. Information such as that relating to war plans, new weapons and equipment, techniques and tactics for their employment, the vulnerability of U.S. defenses, and domestic and foreign intelligence sources and methods. [Footnote is in the original.]