Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

67. Briefing note for the 370th NSC meeting¹

Washington, June 26, 1958

1. The principal item today is the 250-page State-Defense Study on “U.S. and Allied Capabilities for Limited Military Operations to July 1, 1961”, based on the examination of 12 hypothetical situations in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East.

2. This Study grew out of a recommendation of the Gaither Panel last November (classified by the Panel as a “highest value measure”) that U.S. and allied forces for limited military operations be augmented and that a Study be undertaken to develop current doctrine on when and how nuclear weapons could contribute to such limited operations.

3. State and Defense prepared terms of reference for a limited was Study covering the entire range of U.S. and allied capabilities for limited military operations (NSC Action No. 1844–b).
The terms of reference, as approved by the Council (NSC Action No. 1881, March 20) anticipated that recommendations as to U.S. national security policy and U.S. and allied capabilities for limited military operations would result from the Study.
The terms of reference precisely defined limited military operations, Study assumptions, and the scope of the Study—matters which will be covered in the presentation of the Study by Admiral Triebel.

4. The written memorandum of the Secretaries of State and Defense, submitting the Study to the Council, summarized 14 Study findings which they deemed significant, made 8 additional observations, and stressed 5 Study limitations. While listening to the presentation of the Study, the Council should keep in mind these 5 limitations:

(1) The Study does not contemplate limited military operations against Soviet armed forces; because, under the current U.S. strategic concept, overt military engagement of USSR and U.S. armed forces is deemed to be general war.

(2) The Study does not cover enemy use of nuclear weapons in limited military operations; because such use of nuclear weapons up to July 1, 1961, would be construed as overt employment of Soviet armed forces. (However, I should point out that some of the 12 hypothetical cases call for use by the U.S. of nuclear weapons.)

(3) The Study does not examine U.S. capabilities for covert limited military operations.

(4) The Study assumes—as a working assumption—“that the U.S. could engage in effective military action against Mainland China without undue risk of initiating general war.”

(5) The Study should not be used for determining the size and nature of U.S. forces required for limited military operations; and its conclusions and recommendations are not to be considered definitive.

5. The two Secretaries state in their memorandum, as a significant finding of the Study, that, within the foregoing limitations and if the use of nuclear weapons as required to achieve military objectives is authorized, U.S. capabilities for limited military operations are adequate to undertake and carry out limited operations of the nature examined.

6. The Secretaries’ memorandum makes three recommendations (par. 5, page 4):

a. A National Intelligence Estimate should be prepared on world reactions and Sino-Soviet military reactions to U.S. use of nuclear weapons in limited military operations against Communist (non-Soviet) forces in the Far East.

b. The review of 1962 force goals of nations receiving U.S. military assistance—to be presented to the Council on September 1 (NSC Action No. 1908)—should take into account the findings of the Study as to the availability of allied forces for employment outside their national territories.

c. Greater effort should be made to clarify to the Free World U.S. intentions with respect to the use of nuclear weapons, and to inform the Free World of the radiation effects of low-yield weapons and their relative efficiency in certain limited military operations.

7. Because of the importance of this fine Study and of the submissions by the two Secretaries, and before the Council takes positive action on the recommendations in the Study and the submission, it is suggested that, after today’s presentation of the Study, the Planning Board be asked to prepare comments and recommendations on the subject for future consideration by the Council.

Admiral Triebel will present the Study.

1. Source: U.S. and Allied capabilities for limited military operations. Top Secret. 2 pp. Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records.