Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

579. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, July 6, 1960

SUBJECT

• Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations—Meeting of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

• See attached list

Mr. Dillon expressed his appreciation to Mr. McCone for returning from California to be present at this meeting. The purpose of the discussion would be consideration of how we proceed regarding opening to inspection older-type nuclear devices to be detonated in connection with the research program. The proposal to open the devices for inspection on condition that an approximately equal number be made available by the U.S., the U.K. and the USSR, (as forwarded to the delegation in NUSUP 919) caused great consternation in the British Government. Lord Hood had told the Department that this alternative was unlikely to be accepted and represented a step backward from the move which Secretary Herter had mentioned to Ambassador Caccia (i.e., obtaining Congressional authority to open old devices to inspection, without condition of reciprocity), and that the “ultimatum” aspect might force the Soviets to break off the talks under conditions highly unfavorable to the Western powers. In view of the firm U.K. stand, it is likely that we will be on our own if we persist in the approach set out in NUSUP 919. Secretary Gates asked why the U.K. could accept the approach calling for “quid pro quo” on inspection of devices if they believe it to be unacceptable to the Soviets. Mr. Dillon replied that they believe such an approach would not be vulnerable, from a world public opinion standpoint, if not coupled with the statement of intention to go ahead on our own even though it were rejected. Mr. Farley commented that the U.K. desire for continuation of the negotiations is the key to their reactions.

Mr. Dillon expressed belief that a U.S. decision to go ahead with our own research program after a maximum effort by the U.S. to find an answer to the safeguards problem would have a good chance of acceptance by public opinion, but that otherwise we would be very vulnerable.

Mr. Gray reported that, in a telephone conversation, General Persons had expressed concern about our putting forward at Geneva, in the face of present Congressional views and without indication of Congressional support, any safeguards proposal which would require some Congressional authorization.

Mr. McCone reviewed the discussions which had taken place with members of Congress in regard to a joint resolution, prepared by the Department of State and the AEC, authorizing the revealing of a number of older-type devices in connection with the research program. During the week beginning June 20, he had talked to Senators Johnson and Anderson and Representatives Rayburn, McCormack, Holifield and Halleck, and had met with unanimously favorable response. He was advised that the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy should report out the resolution. At a closed hearing on June 24, the Committee appeared prepared to endorse the resolution, on condition that the text would limit inspection to “visual and manual examination”, and would contain a proviso that each of the other nations would accord similar rights of examination to devices it might use in the program. On the succeeding Monday, June 27, however, perhaps as a result of informal Congressional discussions over the weekend, the atmosphere had changed. It was obvious that the Committee would not approve the original resolution because of fear that political opponents of members running in the coming elections would charge them with having given away nuclear weapons information to the Soviets without any return. Thereupon we had developed our “pool” proposal. Mr. McCone had not, however, told these members of the plan to state that, in case of rejection by the Soviet Government, we would go ahead on our own. The Atomic Energy Commission also had reconsidered declassification of devices but arrived at a negative conclusion as before.

In light of this background information, Mr. McCone recommended that the delegation be instructed to advance the alternative proposal, calling for the pooling arrangement and omitting the language objectionable to the U.K. Government. He warned against advancing the original proposal, at this time since the Joint Committee opposed it. He quoted Senator Hickenlooper as still favoring the original resolution but as warning him against proceeding on it without support of the other committee members. If this proposal were advanced, and accepted by Soviets, we might be in serious trouble with the Committee, perhaps made vindictive by the political climate. Mr. Dillon commented that the progress in the negotiations which would ensue from finding an answer to the safeguards problem might spur popular demand for Congress to pass the needed resolution. He stated that the addition of the “ultimatum” represented a departure from the proposal the Joint Committee was considering and might affect the Joint Committee’s attitude towards it. Secretary Gates commented that the words “We would face strong compulsion to” hardly constituted an ultimatum.

After further discussion, Mr. Dillon agreed that the alternative proposal be advanced, as suggested by Mr. McCone. If it is turned down by the Soviets, the Administration might then be in a stronger position to go back to the Congress for authorization as required under the original proposal. Secretary Gates expressed concern at elimination of the language announcing our intentions to proceed unilaterally with the research program, including nuclear experiments, if the Soviets do not accept the alternative proposal. He called for a clear decision that there will be nuclear detonations for purposes of improving the underground detection system, during the term of this Administration, and recommended that this decision be clearly communicated to the other parties to this treaty. He urged that further long negotiation, under a de facto moratorium, be avoided. Mr. Dillon replied that such a communication should be connected to a plan which world opinion would consider to be good, such as an offer to open the devices which will be used. Attaching such a communication to the alternative proposal, with its compulsory “quid pro quo” features, would be likely to lead to the collapse of the talks under circumstances very unfavorable for us. Secretary Gates urged that the Principals recommend to the President that the nuclear aspects of the research program go forward, if the Soviets do not accept our proposal. Mr. Dillon said that the statement of our intention to go ahead with the testing program might be attached to our “fall-back position” offer. He re-emphasized his view that the U.K. would consider this a reasonable approach. Secretary Gates and Mr. McCone stated it appears that the U.K. basic objectives in these negotiations are different from ours. They even appear to be agreeable to a comprehensive treaty without adequate controls. Secretary Gates agreed that the caveat might be left out, as long as the Administration has a clear position on its own objective.

After a discussion, it was decided not to make an informal approach to the Joint Committee at this time as to either of the alternatives. Secretary Gates and Mr. McCone recommended that the proposal be advanced in Geneva as soon as possible, in order to avoid a Soviet walk-out accompanied by an announcement that “We’ll never test again.”

Mr. Dillon proposed that we first advance the alternative proposal now, devote our best efforts to obtaining it acceptance, and second, if this fails, go back to the Joint Committee in August with a request for a joint resolution enabling us to put forward the original proposal, together with a caveat about intention to go ahead on our own. Mr. Sullivan suggested that the House Foreign Affairs Committee also be consulted. Mr. McCone expressed belief that it would be preferable to make the second move without seeking Congressional authority, because of the possibility that some of the members of the Committee might remain away from Washington and that those who come back might again refuse to give favorable consideration. Mr. Dillon suggested that the second move, if necessary, might be made before the August session begins. Mr. McCone conceded that there is an element of chance in the second move; but he urged that, in view of the danger of leaks to the press, we go ahead as rapidly as possible. He cautioned against expanding the inspection concept beyond the permissible limits set by the Joint Committee. He recalled that the Joint Committee had been unusually concerned about showing drawings or blueprints to the Soviets.

Mr. McCone expressed his understanding that, in the event the original proposal is eventually advanced, it will be accompanied by a caveat phrased as originally proposed by Secretary Gates. Mr. Dillon suggested that extensive thought be given to the domestic political implications before setting a nuclear detonation date for inclusion in the caveat. Secretary Gates said that the President and Vice President must certainly be consulted as to this question, but if they do not consider the move unwise, we should include a very strong statement. Mr. Dillon replied that consideration should even then be given to the form of presentation of the proposal. Inserting a date might give the Soviets the opportunity to break up the Conference with a big propaganda blast. Mr. Kohler agreed that inclusion of a date would ensure an adverse reaction.

Secretary Gates reiterated that there would be no question of considering that an ultimatum or a threat is involved here. We are merely trying to go ahead with explosions for research proposes, to improve the capabilities of the system. Mr. Dillon pointed out that there seemed to be some experimentation for military purposes involved. Mr. McCone denied this. The tunnel linings which had been constructed would have the purpose of providing information useful for civil defense. It has nothing to do with weapons development. Mr. Dillon pointed out that military application could be made of the results. Secretary Gates and Mr. McCone insisted that, at a time when the Soviets are firing rockets into the Pacific, no one should object to that. Mr. Dillon said that the problem was not so great if the results of all the experimentation were made generally available. Secretary Gates said this would be the case. Mr. McCone noted that the tunnel could simply be filled in if the problems this experiment would create were too great.

In answer to a question by Mr. McCone, Mr. Farley mentioned that Sir Michael Wright had suggested that, in order to make the pooling proposal more palatable to the Soviets, the pool might be used for both research devices and peaceful uses devices, so that the Soviets could have a rationale for agreeing to contribute to it. Mr. McCone expressed opposition to this since some Plowshare devices are of such sophisticated design that they cannot even be shared with the U.K.

The Principals agreed to pass their recommendations to the President on July 7.

PARTICIPANTS OF MEETING OF PRINCIPALS ON NUCLEAR TEST NEGOTIATIONS HELD JULY 6, 1960

• • Department of State:
  • Acting Secretary Dillon
  • EUR—Mr. Kohler
  • S/AE—Mr. Farley
  • S/AE—Messrs. Sullivan, Spiers, Gotzlinger
  • SOV—Mr. Dubs
• • Department of Defense:
  • Secretary Gates
  • Mr. Knight
  • General Fox
  • Mr. Lanier
• • White House:
  • Dr. Kistiakowsky
  • Lt. Col. Eisenhower
  • Mr. Gordon Gray
  • Mr. Keeney
• • AEC:
  • Chairman McCone
  • General Starbird
  • Dr. English
• • CIA:
  • Mr. Dulles
  • Dr. Scoville

1. Source: Opening nuclear weapons for seismic research program to inspection. Secret. 5 pp. Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Office of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Panel-Disarmament-NT-Policy, 1960.