Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

580. Telegram 219 to London¹

Washington, July 9, 1960, 2:45 p.m.

219. Please deliver following message from President to Prime Minister. Advise date and time delivery.

QUOTE: July 9, 1960

Dear Harold:

I have been giving considerable thought to the handling of the nuclear detonations in the seismic research program. This program is essential if we are to reach an agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing of the kind you and I proposed on March 29, and if the moratorium which we are prepared to agree to is to provide us answers on the underground detection problem.

We have explored here, and with your people, various ways of dealing with the safeguards for these nuclear detonations. One possibility is a pool approach whereby devices of the U.K., the U.S., and the USSR would be used on a reciprocal basis. Another approach would be an offer by the United States to open its seismic research devices to inspection by representatives of the U.K. and the USSR. Either approach would, as you know, require Congressional authorization.

With respect to the first proposal it is probable that the Soviets will reject it inasmuch as they have already stated that they have no intention of using nuclear explosions in seismic research. In spite of this I feel it is important that we put the pool idea forward as a proposal. It will be another evidence of our desire to find a cooperative solution. A further reason that I believe it is desirable to put this forward is the strong feeling expressed by certain members of the Congress that a safeguards arrangement should be reciprocal. Having made this proposal, we would then be in a better position to obtain Congressional support for the second course of action. I have concluded that we should not put forward this proposal accompanied by any sort of warning of possible unilateral action in the event of Soviet rejection.

If the Soviets reject the pool proposal in spite of our best persuasion, we plan to offer to open devices used in the United States seismic research program for examination by the United Kingdom and the USSR. This proposal would also be put forward without a warning of possible unilateral action in event of Soviet rejection. Implementation of this proposal would of course be subject to Congressional action which I could request in August if the Soviets show any likelihood of accepting.

However, should the Soviets reject this reasonable proposal or should they delay their response for an unreasonable period it would be our intention to announce that we are proceeding with the U.S. seismic research program and that we intend to invite United Nations or other international observation of these experiments. If this proposal does not satisfy the Soviets I doubt that there is anything we can devise which would, and under those circumstances I believe our action in going ahead would be widely understood and supported.

As for timing, it is our objective to put forward these proposals and be prepared in the event of Soviet rejection or undue delay to make the above mentioned announcement sometime during August.

To protect our negotiating position we are limiting knowledge of the second proposal and our future intentions to the smallest possible group.

With warm personal regard,

As ever,

Dwight D. Eisenhower UNQUOTE

Herter

1. Source: Transmits letter to Macmillan from Eisenhower on opening nuclear weapons for seismic research to inspection. Secret; Presidential Handling. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Central Files, 711.5611/7–960.