Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

578. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 30, 1960

SUBJECT

• Nuclear Testing

PARTICIPANTS

• • U.K.—Sir Harold Caccia, The British Ambassador
  • The Viscount Hood, Minister, The British Embassy
  • Mr. Charles Wiggin, First Secretary, The British Embassy
• • U.S.—Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State
  • Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
  • James D. Swihart, OIC, U.K., Ireland and B.I Affairs

The Ambassador inquired as to our latest thinking about the Nuclear Testing Conference developments. The Secretary responded that we presently had under discussion some of the complicated legal aspects. He understood the Ambassador had recently had a conversation with Mr. McCone regarding some of the problems. At the moment, we were working on alternative proposals that would be more acceptable to the Congressional leaders concerned. He would probably have no objections if something along a reciprocal basis could be worked out. There would remain some technical questions, such as whether the Atomic Energy Commission could shoot off someone else’s device. The Ambassador observed that even under our new thinking, we would have still the difficulty that the Soviets have gone on record that they are opposed to inspection. The Secretary remarked that if the Soviets were to turn us down, then the moratorium would be out the window. The Ambassador felt that it was a pity that our first proposals were not practical from a U.S. domestic political standpoint. The Secretary observed this was a question involving the inspection problem. Lord Hood asked whether it was correct to state that our new idea would mean the Soviets could inspect our explosions here and that we, theirs in the Soviet Union? The Secretary said that this was not correct. Under our proposal, we would all exchange a certain number of devices and then test each others. Lord Hood wondered whether this would not raise legal complications from our standpoint. The Secretary replied we are trying to see how we can get around these difficulties including the problems of how to declassify, which, in turn, might raise difficulties here and with our Allies. Lord Hood felt one of the hazards might be that the Soviets would not turn down our proposal completely. The Secretary said that our position would be to full back on the 1958 scientific experts’ report. He commented further that in putting forward any such proposals, we may have to state they are subject to subsequent legislative approval. The Ambassador remarked that in the event we decide to go down this road, he would like to warn his own people as soon as possible. The Secretary said that we should know where we’re going by tomorrow and would let the British know as quickly as possible. The Ambassador inquired whether we had given any further thought about the Tsarapkin package. The Secretary said we have, but unless some of the other problems are settled the moratorium will be over. He remarked that the quota and the moratorium were two separate issues. The Ambassador agreed, but pointed out that during the moratorium period we could inspect. The Secretary said this was so in theory, but as a practical matter, the appropriate instrumentation may not be ready during the two-year moratorium period. The Ambassador summarized that it would appear we felt this problem should be taken step by step; i.e., inspection first, quota second, and finally, moratorium.

[text not declassified]

1. Source: Seismic testing. Secret. 2 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.