Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Volume III, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Microfiche Supplement

577. Memorandum of Conversation Among Principals of Geneva Test Group¹

Washington, June 30, 1960, 10:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations (Meeting of Principals)

PARTICIPANTS

• • State Dept.
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Dillon
  • Mr. Farley
• • CIA
  • Gen. Cabell
  • Dr. Scoville
• • DOD
  • Mr. Gates
  • Mr. Irwin
  • Gen. Dabney
  • Mr. Lanier
• • AEC
  • Mr. McCone
  • Dr. English
  • Col. Sherrill
  • Col. Anderson
• • White House
  • Dr. Kistiakowsky
  • Mr. Gordon Gray
  • Gen. Persons
  • Mr. Keeny

Mr. Herter reviewed the Geneva discussions of a coordinated research program and the arrangements for use of nuclear devices in seismic research. In view of the Soviet shift in position regarding seismic research and Soviet unwillingness to use nuclear devices of their own, the United States is faced with the problem whether to go ahead on its own. If we do go ahead, the “black box” approach permits suspicion that we are doing something of possible weapons advantage. To avoid this situation, Mr. McCone explored with Congressional leaders the possibility of a congressional resolution permitting us to open certain devices for U.K. and Soviet examination. The eventual congressional reaction was that this should only be done if there was a reciprocal opening of Soviet devices. AEC also explored declassification possibilities. General declassification was impractical since it would result in the information being made available to Nth countries. Limited declassification restricting dissemination of the information on the specific devices involved also appeared undesirable.

Mr. McCone said that limited declassification would be objectionable to the Joint Committee since it would establish a precedent whereby the Congress would lose control over restricted data. For example, the Executive Branch would be able to handle transmission of nuclear weapons or nuclear submarine information to selected allies by this procedure without having to submit an agreement for cooperation for Congressional review. Mr. Gray said that perhaps the Joint Committee wouldn’t like it, but limited declassification apparently was feasible under the law. Mr. McCone said that the congressional objections would be bipartisan and would probably lead to legislative action shutting off this course of action.

Mr. Herter said that we had to find an answer. As things now stand, the Geneva talks are likely to end not because of Soviet obduracy but because of United States unwillingness to remove a valid basis for suspicion of our nuclear explosions under the seismic research program.

Mr. McCone said that he thought a possibility would be for us to reemphasize the necessity for seismic research and use of nuclear explosions for this purpose, emphasize that we were going ahead with this program, and propose that we and the Soviets each put in 4 to 6 nuclear devices for use in the program and open them up for examination. Congress would buy this reciprocal approach in his judgment. The Soviets would probably turn such an offer down. We could then invite UN observers to check our use of “black boxes”. Mr. Herter asked if this meant we would go ahead with Vela even if the Geneva negotiations collapse. Mr. McCone said a modified version of Vela would be desirable. He thought that there would be a controlled underground test ban someday and we do not know enough now without further research to design the requisite controls. He did not dispute Mr. Herter’s belief that the “black box” approach was not persuasive enough to world opinion, though it would satisfy objective scientists like Nils Bohr.

Mr. Herter asked whether AEC had concluded firmly that Soviet devices could be brought into the United States and used in the research program. He recalled that such a proposal had been vigorously rejected on a previous occasion. Mr. McCone said that he needed to discuss the practical aspects with his laboratories and that this idea had come to him just on the preceding evening.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that continuing discussions among the U.S. technical people had developed a new list of nuclear explosions for Vela cutting out two shots below 1 kiloton. Of course, any initial list would be subject to review in the light of actual results from early shots.

Mr. Dillon said that another possible course would be for the President to take the initiative and offer the Soviets the opportunity to examine the U.S. nuclear devices used in Vela upon condition of Congressional approval. If accepted, the President could send this to Congress in August. The Presidential lead would somewhat protect the Congressmen from the political dangers they feared by shifting responsibility to him, and they would be hard put to refuse the President the authorization he asked. There was considerable discussion of the sensitivity of information on gun-type devices and its possible value to the Soviets or to the French.

Mr. Herter stressed the importance of proceeding without delay. Mr. McCone emphasized his view that the limited declassification approach would draw Congressional counter-action promptly in August and that we should avoid facing the Congress with a fait accompli if possible. He believed he could get an answer as to the technical and safety aspects of his reciprocal proposal by noon, July 1. Mr. Gates urged that any such conditional proposal be accompanied by the statement that the United States will go ahead on August 15 if the Soviets do not accept. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that such a statement, while it would bring the issue to a head, was not necessary on technical grounds since Vela could proceed for awhile using chemical explosions and the first nuclear test would not be ready much before October 1. Mr. Dillon pointed out that if Congress convenes August 8, then the August 15 deadline would be too close. Mr. Gates said that he believed the earliest possible date should be set and he did not see why, if a decision was made, we could not be ready to act August 15.

Mr. Gray asked whether, if we go ahead unilaterally, UN observers would accept an invitation to observe our “black box” detonations; he referred to past invitations to UN observers which showed their reluctance. Mr. Dillon said that probably they would not come, but the offer would be worth something as evidence of our good intentions.

Mr. Dillon said that when we came to make a decision we should face the fact that the requirements for reciprocal Soviet participation will not appear reasonable and the Soviets will simply reiterate that they do not believe nuclear detonations are needed and will not contribute any. The simplest and most direct course would be opening U.S. devices for examination. Mr. Herter and Mr. McCone thought that these objections were at least partially met by past instances of Soviet admission of detection limitations and the need for research.

Mr. McCone said that, in a frank talk on the previous evening, Ambassador Caccia had told him that he thought the Soviets would shortly walk out of the Geneva negotiations, attempting to throw the blame on the U.S., and declaring that they would not conduct nuclear tests unless the United States held nuclear explosions (of any kind, including Vela or Plowshare) in which case they would consider themselves free to conduct whatever tests they felt necessary.

It was agreed that, while Mr. McCone was checking out the technical and safety problems of bringing Soviet devices into the United States, the staffs of the interested agencies would draft on a contingency basis instructions to Ambassador Wadsworth to put forward a proposal of the kind suggested by Mr. McCone.

1. Source: Use of nuclear explosions in seismic research. Secret. 4 pp. NARA, RG 59, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.