Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

64. Memorandum of Discussion at the 412th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, July 9, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting (34) and Agenda Item 1. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.”]

2. Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1; NIE 11–4–58; NIE 100–59; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Overseas Internal Security Program”, dated April 10, 1959; NSC Action No. 2079; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Status of Military Mobilization Base Program”, dated April 21, 1959; NSC 5906; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Basic National Security Policy” dated June 19 and July 6¹ and 7,² 1959; NSC Action No. 2103)

Mr. Gray introduced the subject. (A copy of Briefing Note, only portions of which were actually used at the Meeting by Mr. Gray are filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and attached to this Memorandum.)³

Mr. Gray began by presenting the views of General Twining on the military paragraphs of NSC 5906 which views had been sent in a memorandum to Mr. Gray from General Twining.⁴ The general gist of these views was strong opposition by General Twining to any change in our present policy with respect to the use of nuclear and conventional armaments. For obvious reasons, therefore, General Twining also expressed himself as strongly opposed to any change in the present wording of the military paragraphs in our current Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1). Mr. Gray added that he understood that this last view of General Twining’s was essentially the view of the Secretary of Defense which fact Secretary McElroy then confirmed.

The President commented that General Twining appeared to perceive the possibility of a much more radical change in our military policy, as suggested by various proposals for rewording the military paragraphs, than the President judged to be the case. The President added that he had read very carefully the suggested changes in the wording of the most important military paragraphs.

Secretary McElroy said that he himself could not subscribe to every word in General Twining’s memorandum as read by Mr. Gray. Secretary McElroy thought that General Twining was more apprehensive about the dangers of changes in the policy than he was; but Secretary McElroy said he did feel that our basic military policy should not be changed and accordingly the wording of the key paragraphs should likewise remain as written. Basically, he continued, both he and General White were convinced that our capability to deter war derived not only from our great capability for nuclear retaliation but also from our policy of using tactical nuclear weapons whenever the use of such weapons was required to achieve our national objectives. Secretary McElroy felt that any change in our present military policy would constitute an invitation for the outbreak of war. Moreover, the budgetary implications of a change in our military policy were both implicit and clear. He strongly doubted the wisdom of a policy which would tend to reduce our strategic delivery capability in order to provide additional funds for building up our conventional military capabilities. At any rate, complete unanimity existed among the Chiefs of Staff on the vital necessity of maintaining our nuclear deterrent to general war. Secretary McElroy said that it was his own feeling, in talking over these matters with officials of different views, was that the difference was less in some cases than in others. One detected evidence of extremes in some cases and of moderation in others. He felt that the real issue to be discussed was not the wording in the paragraphs describing our military policy but rather the question whether to change our military policy at this time or not.

The President observed that more and more he was receiving recommendations from the Department of Defense that we deploy nuclear weapons of every type and that we increasingly disperse such weapons and that we also provide for [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] use nuclear weapons. The President could understand therefore why the Department of State was worried by these developments. The President added that he had no intention at all of closing down production of those weapons on which we depended to deter war. This however did not appear to the President to be a policy issue. We certainly did not intend to change our fundamental military policy and program which we had been pursuing for the last six years.

Contrary to the President’s view, Secretary Herter expressed the opinion that there was indeed a high policy matter involved in the military portions of our Basic National Security Policy. Indeed State and Defense had been considering these policy problems for a considerable period of time. The State Department had one basic fear about our existing policy with respect to the use of nuclear weapons. This fear was that we might find ourselves in a situation where even in waging small limited wars, we would have no choice but to resort to the use of nuclear weapons because we would have no other weapons available to use in such wars.

Secretary Herter then went on to state that he agreed one hundred per cent with the necessity of maintaining intact our nuclear deterrent capability. He likewise agreed that all U.S. Forces should possess nuclear capabilities. However, he emphasized that he did not wish to see the nuclear capability as the inevitable concomitant of every kind of military engagement. There was widespread in the world a genuine fear that the use of nuclear weapons would lead to general war. For certain types of limited military operations the State Department did not think that nuclear weapons need to be used at once or necessarily at all. We may well have to engage in limited wars in the future. If it were necessary in such wars to use nuclear weapons, Secretary Herter said that of course he agreed that we should do so but he insisted that we should also have an alternative to the use of nuclear weapons under certain conditions.

The President reverted to the illustration used last week in the discussion of these problems in his office, namely, Cuba. The President stated that if we were asked by the Organization of American States to intervene in Cuba, it was perfectly obvious to him that we would not have recourse to the use of nuclear weapons in such an intervention.

Secretary McElroy pointed out that in the future we were not going to have long-range non-nuclear artillery, say of a range of fifteen miles. We would, however, continue to have short-range, non-nuclear artillery with a range of say two or three miles. As far as he was concerned, Secretary McElroy argued, a twenty-ton nuclear weapon produced about the same bang as a twenty-ton conventional weapon. In short, we were in a position to carry out police actions with only conventional weapons, but with respect to those of our military missions which were more effectively performed with nuclear weapons, we were proposing to cut out the use of conventional weapons. If for no other than budgetary reasons, we could not afford to have both capabilities for such military missions.

The President inquired of Secretary McElroy whether we had as yet adopted a policy in the Defense Department that our fighter-bombers would not be provided with a conventional capability. Secretary McElroy replied in the negative. The President then went on to say that when you are talking about carrying out operations against all a nation’s airfields and military depots, of course you would use nuclear weapons. What was concerning State, however, was the use of these weapons in much more limited actions and the President indicated that this seemed to him justly a matter of concern.

Turning to Secretary McElroy, Secretary Anderson said that it seemed to him that the crux of the issue we were talking about was the economics of warfare. If the State Department could be convinced that we had all the weapons we needed to fight every kind of a war that might confront us, State of course would be very happy. Did it not, however, get down to this, if we were going to have all the military capabilities that Secretary Herter was talking about, we would simply have to spend more money? Can we have both what the State Department says it wants and what General Twining and the Chiefs say we need for the same number of dollars? Or are we going to be obliged to rearrange our dollars or add to them?

The President was disinclined to believe that Secretary Anderson’s point was indeed the crux of the issue. He pointed out that as far back as 1953 we had publicly stated that if the Korean War continued the U.S. would make use of nuclear weapons. This was the kind of a war in which we would obviously use nuclear weapons. Nevertheless the President expressed sympathy with the State Department position that the U.S. must have the reputation of being able to stabilize small situations without being obliged to have recourse to nuclear weapons. The President added that we must try to keep up with all the latest techniques of weaponry.

Mr. Gray stated that he was prepared to suggest possible language to meet this issue posed in Paragraph 12–a but said that perhaps before doing so the Council ought to hear from Admiral Burke as spokesman for the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps.

Admiral Burke explained that the basic area of disagreement among the Chiefs was the use of nuclear weapons in general war and in local wars. He felt that the wording in the crucial paragraphs of our Basic Policy (Paragraphs 10, 13, and 14 of NSC 5810/1 or Paragraphs 12, 15, 16 of NSC 5906) had come to mean something rather different from the thought conveyed originally by these paragraphs. This change was marked by some overemphasis in our reliance on nuclear weapons. What he and his Army and Marine Corps colleagues feared was that the U.S. was getting into a position where it could not use anything but nuclear weapons or else face the serious political liability involved in losing the fight with the enemy. He and his colleagues of course insisted on the absolute necessity of maintaining our nuclear deterrent capability. However, they did not feel that we needed to have more large nuclear weapons than were necessary to knock out Soviet Russia in the event of war. We should have the kind of nuclear capability we needed to accomplish this mission but not more than this. The resources thus saved by not having more than we needed could be devoted to the development of other capabilities which we needed in view of the possibilities of limited wars.

Admiral Burke also said that there appeared to be a good deal of evidence that Khrushchev was now feeling that it was much safer for the Soviet Union to risk indulging in limited wars than had been the case earlier. To illustrate his argument Admiral Burke asked permission to read from a message from General Norstad⁵ with respect to the size and type of forces which we would have to use in Berlin if we were genuinely to test the intentions of the Soviet Union to bar Allied access to Berlin. General Norstad felt that an effective test of Soviet intentions would require sizable Allied forces and not mere token forces. Inasmuch as these forces did not have nuclear armament, Admiral Burke believed that the situation that might confront us in Berlin illustrated military situations which might well confront us elsewhere all around the world. It was his view and that of the Army and Marine Corps Chiefs of Staff that if we continue to put more and more of our resources into the development of our nuclear capabilities, we will have less and less such resources for maintaining our conventional capabilities. What we really needed were balanced military forces and capabilities.

The President commented that at some future time when our weapons become much more effective, the character of our retaliatory capability would obviously change but this time is not yet. Accordingly, we have no alternative but to calculate what was necessary for our retaliatory forces at the present time on a very generous scale. Later on perhaps we might be able to reduce the size of this retaliatory force.

Mr. Gray then directed the Council’s attention to the split wording of Paragraph 12–a in NSC 5906 reading as follows:⁶

“Majority Proposal [Par. 10–a of NSC 5810/1, unchanged]

“State-OCDM Proposal [Par. 10–a of NSC 5810/1, amended]

12. a. It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States; to consider them as conventional weapons from a military point of view; and to use them when required to achieve national objectives. Advance authorization for their use is as determined by the President.”

12. a. It is the policy of the United States to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States; and to place main reliance on nuclear weapons in general war, remaining prepared to fight limited war with or without such weapons. Nuclear weapons will be used when required to achieve national objectives. Advance authorization for their use in either general or limited war is as determined by the President.”

Mr. Gray next suggested that he had language available as a possible substitute for the above versions of Paragraph 12–a which might conceivably be satisfactory to all concerned. He gave copies of his text to the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense and to Admiral Burke. He then read his proposed revision of Paragraph 12–a as follows:

“12. a. It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the Armed Forces of the United States; and to use them when required to meet the nation’s war objectives. Planning should contemplate situations short of general war where the use of nuclear weapons would manifestly not be militarily necessary nor appropriate to the accomplishment of national objectives, particularly in those areas where main Communist power will not be brought to bear. All deployed organized units will be prepared to use nuclear weapons when required in defense of the command. Advance authorization for the use or nuclear weapons is as determined by the President.”

When Mr. Gray had finished his proposed redraft of Paragraph 12–a, the President commented that it was what he understood we were really trying to do. Mr. Gray added the comment that he did not think this text represented a major change in our military policy with respect to nuclear and conventional weapons but of course he would have to let the military people pass judgment on this point.

Secretary Herter said that the proposed new text certainly went a considerable way toward meeting the objections which the State Department perceived in the old Paragraph 10–a of NSC 5810/1 or the Majority Proposal for Paragraph 12–a in NSC 5906. Nevertheless, Secretary Herter believed that the new text of the paragraph ought not to be considered in isolation but only in relation to the other relevant military paragraphs; for example, the paragraph containing the definition of general war,⁷ before the Council made any decision as to the final text of the paragraph.

With respect to Secretary Herter’s point about the definition of general war, Mr. Gray briefly discussed prior definitions of general war and called attention to the need now to refine these earlier definitions. The President inquired whether one could not say that when there had been a national decision to go into general mobilization, we could then state that we were going into general war, that is, we would define general war as a war which would compel national decision to proceed to general mobilization. Mr. Gray pointed out to the President that in future general war there might not be time to go into general mobilization. He suggested that the definition of general war which had been accepted in the past, namely, that a general war was a war in which U.S. and Soviet forces were overtly engaged would be more realistic if it were changed to read “where sizable U.S. and Soviet forces are overtly engaged.”⁸ The President commented that this still left us in the dilemma of trying to determine what was meant by “sizable” forces and returned to his point about general war and general mobilization. He added that he felt that Mr. Gray was in his suggested language actually trying to describe a situation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. which would require a general mobilization.

Secretary Anderson wondered whether we were not all talking about something that, regardless of the words we used, the President himself would have to decide. The President agreed that this was a decision which the President would have to take. Nevertheless, the military staff planners would require guidance with respect to the definition of general war and that is why we needed these words. While the President must make the decision, staff planners must in the meantime make plans. In that case, said Secretary Anderson, should not the words say that for planning purposes a sizable engagement between the U.S. and Soviet forces meant general war.

At this point the President referred back to Admiral Burke’s earlier statement on behalf of himself and the Army and Marine Corps Chiefs. He said he felt obliged to disagree with Admiral Burke’s estimate that we may in the future be confronted with a lot of little wars all around the globe. On the contrary, the President felt that the real danger derived from Soviet political and economic aggression against us and the Free World.

Attorney General Rogers wondered whether, if the Council were to agree to remove from the Majority text of Paragraph 12–a the clause “to consider them as conventional weapons from a military point of view”, we would not have gone a long way to solve our problem and resolve the issue. Secretary McElroy said he did not object to the recommended removal of this clause but the real issue seemed to him to be whether we proposed to fight a vigorous limited military engagement with Soviet Russia or Communist China without having recourse to the use of nuclear weapons.

In replying to Secretary McElroy’s point, the President said that if the Chinese Communists simply went after the little Off-Shore Islands, such a military engagement would not involve a nuclear war. On the other hand, if the Chinese Communists launched a major attack on Formosa, the result would be general war. With considerable warmth the President insisted that it was nonsense to imagine that we could invade the vast land mass of China, with a population of 600 million people, without making use of nuclear weapons. If anyone thought differently on this subject, then he, the President, would recommend that such an individual cease to act as one of the President’s advisers. It seemed inconceivable to the President that we could engage Communist China in full-scale war without depending on nuclear weapons.

Mr. Gray next suggested that Dr. Killian probably wished to be heard on these issues. Dr. Killian referred to Secretary Herter’s earlier comments and misgivings about undue dependence on nuclear weapons. He added that our scientists were likewise troubled by the apparent falling off of interest in the improvement and perfecting of our conventional weapons. He believed that there was in the present wording of the military paragraphs language which seemed to militate against vigorous research and development in the field of our conventional weapons. He believed that much could be done to make our conventional weapons more effective without necessarily involving an increase in our conventional forces.

The President inquired of Secretary McElroy whether Dr. Killian’s fears were justified. Secretary McElroy replied that he knew of no policy to reduce conventional weapons. The relation of conventional to nuclear weapons was a budgetary problem rather than a policy problem.

The President went on to say that at least it seemed to him that the language in our policy papers actually does influence planning in the Department of Defense. Obvious fear had been manifest in the discussion that we are putting all our eggs, or nearly all of them, in one basket. We are currently going through a phase, said the President, in the course of which we were not yet ready to put all our eggs in the nuclear basket, that is, a phase where we still needed balanced military forces. He expressed the conviction that what we were doing at the present time with respect to our military capabilities was “pretty good” but we should certainly clarify our language as to what we were actually doing in this regard.

Secretary McElroy commented that it was for this reason that he was quite prepared to omit the phrase “to consider them as conventional weapons from a military point of view.”

The President then asked if Admiral Radford would provide the Council with his views on these questions. Admiral Radford replied that he thought he understood the thinking that lay behind General Twining’s statement which had been read earlier by Mr. Gray. What General Twining feared was a definite change in our current military policy. Admiral Radford added that it was his feeling that this country had not yet reached the point when we could not handle certain military situations without recourse to using nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Admiral Radford believed that whenever the U.S. forces came into contact with the main elements of Communist military power, we would have to use nuclear weapons.

The President at this point expressed the view that the proposed redraft of Paragraph 12–a as read by Mr. Gray and on which he himself had worked, was designed to do what was needed to resolve the issue the Council had been discussing. Admiral Radford added the comment that if the conventional capabilities of the U.S. were not now being maintained, then we were not living up to the military policy which was set forth in our Basic National Security Policy.

The President inquired whether, if agreement could be reached on the wording of Paragraph 12–a, all the other disputed points in the military paragraphs would, so to speak, automatically fall into line. Mr. Gray replied in the negative and pointed out that even if agreement could be reached on Paragraph 12–a, there were two other difficult issues posed in Paragraph 16⁹ as well as the point earlier raised by Secretary Herter with respect to the appropriate definition of general war. Mr. Gray pointed out the two issues raised in Paragraph 16, reading the latter half of the paragraph as follows:

“Local aggression as used in this paragraph refers only to conflicts occurring in less developed areas of the world, in which limited U.S. forces participate because U.S. interests are involved. The prompt and resolute application of the degree of force necessary to defeat such local aggression is considered the best means to keep hostilities from broadening into general war. Therefore, military planning for U.S. forces to oppose local aggression will be based on the development of a flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability for use as authorized by the President. When the use of U.S. forces is required to oppose local aggression, force will be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid hostilities from broadening into general war.”

Mr. Gray explained that the first issue was posed by the belief of many people that local aggression might occur in other parts of the world than in less developed areas, whereas local aggression in Paragraph 16 was defined as referring only to conflicts occurring in less developed areas of the world.

The President wondered whether this issue could not be met by inserting language to the effect that apart from exceptional circumstances, local aggression referred only to conflicts occurring in less developed areas of the world.

Mr. Gray then went on to explain that the second major issue raised in this portion of Paragraph 16 related to the manner in which local aggression was to be met by the U.S. Was it to be our policy that, to quote Paragraph 16, “the prompt and resolute application of the degree of force necessary to defeat such local aggression is considered the best means to keep hostilities from broadening into general war” or, on the contrary, would we be confronted by certain situations where it would be in the best U.S. interest to apply “only that degree of force necessary to achieve the objectives of limiting the area and scope of the hostilities and restoring the status quo ante …” (See Department of State proposal for revision of Paragraph 16 in Annex to NSC 5906.)

The President commented that he thought the idea of trying to say exactly what was going to happen in such circumstances, when no one really knew, was foolish.

Secretary McElroy expressed the view that whether it should be our policy in a given circumstance to defeat local aggression or alternatively simply to limit the area and scope of hostilities and restore the status quo ante, would be a decision which would have to be made by the President with the Secretaries of State and Defense. On the other hand, to plan to organize our military forces other than to win a war seemed wrong to Secretary McElroy, even though we might modify our plans when these plans were put into practice.

The President once again asked if there were any objections in the Council to the redraft of Paragraph 12–a which Mr. Gray had read. Could the Council accept this version? The Chiefs of Staff seemed to be agreeable to it. If so, could we not use this new version of Paragraph 12–a as a guide for the solution of other issues posed in the military paragraphs? Secretary McElroy said that at least he had felt we had achieved a clear understanding that there could be no such thing as a limited war in the NATO area or in Communist China. The President said that Secretary McElroy was right unless the President and his chief advisers made a different decision. He repeated his view that the period or phase in which we now found ourselves was still one which required balanced military forces and capabilities. The President confessed that he did not know when our new missiles would really prove themselves to be reliable and we could thus place much greater reliance on them.

Secretary Herter returned to a point implied earlier by Secretary McElroy that some of the lower echelons of the State Department had ideas at variance with the ideas at the top level of the State Department. Secretary Herter insisted that there was no division on these matters in the State Department although he admitted that sometimes we overstated the State Department case. Turning his attention to Paragraph 16, Secretary Herter said he very much liked the sentence with respect to military planning for U.S. forces to oppose local aggression which was to be based on development of a flexible and selective capability, including nuclear capability, for use as authorized by the President. On the other hand, Secretary Herter felt that he detected a contradiction between the sentence in Paragraph 16 which stated “that the prompt and resolute application of the degree of force necessary to defeat such local aggression is considered the best means to keep hostilities from broadening into general war, and the last sentence of the paragraph which stated that “When the use of U.S. forces is required to oppose local aggression, force will be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid hostilities from broadening into general war.”

The President replied that any military commander is naturally inclined to think that the best way to defeat any aggression was the prompt and resolute application of the necessary degree of force. He again wondered whether the objections of Secretary Herter could be met by the insertion in this sentence of phraseology along the lines of “except in unusual circumstances.”

Mr. Gray expressed the view that the other disputed paragraphs would manage to fall into place if the Council could agree on the redraft text of Paragraph 12–a. However, Secretary McElroy asked that the Defense Department be allowed more time to look at the new language of Paragraph 12–a even though he thought, off the cuff, that it was O.K.

The Council agreed to Secretary McElroy’s request and Mr. Gray suggested that the Council move on to consider other paragraphs in the military section of the paper.

However, the President interposed to explain that many of the people in this room at this time who had been working with him over the years realized that he was occasionally given to the use of strong language and the expression of strong sentiments. The fact that he did so, the President emphasized, was not intended in the slightest to prevent anyone from standing up and making his views known and understood.

(The President’s remark seemed to be directed to his rather strongly expressed views about the folly of contemplating a limited war in Communist China.)

Mr. Gray directed the Council’s attention to Paragraph 15 of NSC 5906 which was unchanged from Paragraph 13 of NSC 5810/1 and which had not been at issue in the Planning Board. On the other hand, Mr. Gray said that he had been informed that the Chiefs of Staff had a proposal for certain changes in Paragraph 15. He then called on Admiral Burke who said he felt that the issue which had concerned the Chiefs with respect to Paragraph 15 had been adequately covered by the earlier discussion this morning of the varieties of retaliatory capabilities and power.

Mr. Gray then directed the Council’s attention to Paragraph 13 reading as follows:

“13. [Par. 11 of NSC 5810/1, amended.] The United States will be prepared to use chemical and biological weapons to the extent that such use will enhance the military effectiveness of the armed forces. The decision as to their [stock piling and]* use will be made by the President.

“*Budget–Treasury proposal”

Mr. Gray explained that he understood that the reason the Budget and Treasury wished to have the decision as to the stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons made by the President as well as the decision as to their use, was that these two departments felt that either too much money was being spent on the development of chemical and biological weapons if we did not actually plan to use them in war, or that too little money was being spent on these weapons if we did plan to use them in war. Mr. Gray then called on Director Stans for further elucidation.

Mr. Stans expressed the view that the whole U.S. policy with respect to chemical and biological weapons should be reconsidered. He repeated that we have spent too much money on these weapons if we do not intend to use them and too little money if we do plan to use them. He thought that there should be in the near future a full-scale presentation by the Department of Defense on chemical and biological weapons.

The President observed that what this government had always done with respect to these weapons was first of all to make sure that we had a good defense against their employment by the enemy and, second, that we had sufficient chemical and biological weapons to retaliate if the enemy used them on us. This was the policy, said the President, that he had lived with ever since 1918. However, he added, he would certainly like to see a study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject.

Dr. Killian asked to be heard on this issue and stated that this was another example where it would be prudent to give more research and development attention to a problem if we could obtain a clear policy directive to do so. There were great possibilities in developing disabling chemical agents which showed great promise of being able temporarily to incapacitate the enemy without actually having lethal effects. For this reason Dr. Killian expressed opposition to the inclusion of the phrase proposed by the Budget and Treasury because inclusion of the phrase would tend to put a damper on further efforts in research and development on chemical and biological agents. Mr. Stans denied that the phraseology he was proposing was designed to put a damper on further research and development on chemical weapons. What he wanted, said Mr. Stans, was no further procurement of chemical and biological weapons until U.S. policy on their use had been clarified. Dr. Killian answered that he had no objection to the inclusion of the phraseology proposed by Budget and Treasury if this was all the words were intended to convey, but he repeated that he did not wish to retard research and development work on these weapons and would object to the inclusion of the phrase if this was its intention.

Secretary McElroy observed that the problem of chemical and biological weapons had been reviewed with him at a high level in the Department of Defense and he would be glad to present the results to the National Security Council if this were desired. On the other hand, he opposed including the phraseology proposed by the Treasury and Budget because it would add one more burden to the many burdens that the President was already carrying. The President in turn commented that he supposed that the decision on stockpiling these weapons would depend largely on the results of research and development in this field.

Mr. Gray suggested that Paragraph 13 be included without the Budget and Treasury proposal at least until such time as the Defense Department made its presentation to the Council on chemical and biological weapons. Thereafter, he directed the Council’s attention to Paragraph 17 reading as follows:

“17. [Par. 15 of NSC 5810/1, amended.] [In order to maximize the cold war contribution of U.S. military power,]* to the extent consistent with primary missions, the capabilities of U.S. military forces should be utilized in appropriate ways to reinforce and support overt and covert political, economic, psychological, technological, and cultural measures m order to achieve national objectives.”

He pointed out that the U.S. Information Agency proposed the deletion of the bracketed language at the beginning of the paragraph and called on the Director, U.S.I.A., to explain his objection to this language.

Mr. Allen stated that his desire to remove the bracketed language was not intended in any way to minimize the type of activity called for in the paragraph as a whole, quite the contrary. He would be glad to see such activities increased but . . . . The President interrupted to suggest dropping the two words “cold war” and leaving the rest of the paragraph as it was. Mr. Allen went on to explain his objections to the bracketed phrase because it seemed to lump all the humanitarian activities of our military forces under the heading of cold war activities.

Secretary McElroy said that he did not care about the particular words cold war but that the Defense Department did wish the language in Paragraph 17 to emphasize the kind of activity which the paragraph described.

After further discussion agreement followed on wording to take the place of the bracketed language to which Mr. Allen had objected. This read:

“In order to maximize the contribution of U.S. military power to the achievement of over-all national objectives,”

Mr. Gray invited the Council’s attention to Paragraph 18 dealing largely with U.S. military bases overseas but also including language with respect to the positioning of IRBMs around the Sino-Soviet periphery. Mr. Gray said that he felt that the U.S. base system was something separate and distinct from the problem of stationing of IRBMs in the territory of our Allies and that he was therefore proposing that the IRBM problem be made the subject of a separate paragraph and handed out copies of a text of a proposed new paragraph dealing with IRBMs and reading as follows:

“Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) will be positioned only in those NATO and other Free World nations which demonstrate a desire to have them, and pressure will not be exerted by the U.S. to persuade reluctant nations to accept them. Proposals for the positioning of IRBMs outside the NATO area will be subject to approval by the President.”

When Mr. Gray had finished reading his proposed new paragraph, the President said that it seemed to him rudimentary common sense not to pressure other nations to accept these weapons.

Secretary McElroy said he would be glad to accept Mr. Gray’s proposed new paragraph provided the phrase “and pressure will not be exerted by the U.S. to persuade reluctant nations to accept them” was deleted. He explained that while he too disapproved of exerting pressure on reluctant nations to accept these weapons, there was going to be a problem as to what precisely was meant by pressure. He went on further to say that once a nation had willingly accepted these IRBMs, the negotiations for their installation involved lots of problems and difficulties which could conceivably be misinterpreted as pressure by the U.S. although not intended to be such. He cited the negotiations with Italy on the positioning of IRBMs in that country as an example. Thus he said he was fully in accord with the first clause of the first sentence of Mr. Gray’s proposed paragraph but not with the second.

After further discussion the President suggested the deletion of the clause to which Secretary McElroy objected and the substitution therefor of the phrase “and officially request them.”

It being after eleven o’clock Mr. Gray suggested that the President adjourn the meeting. The President agreed and stated that this had been the most interesting meeting of the National Security Council for some considerable time.

The National Security Council:¹⁰

a. Discussed paragraphs 10 through 18 of NSC 5906 in the light of the written views of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the views of the Chiefs of Staff as presented orally at the meeting, and of the State Department “Summary Statement of Foreign Policy Requirements Bearing Upon U.S. Strategy” enclosed with the reference memorandum of July 7, 1959.

b. Considered possible redrafts of paragraph 12–a of NSC 5906, and deferred action thereon pending further study by the Department of Defense.

c. Referred paragraphs 10, 12–a, 15 and 16 to the NSC Planning Board for further study and recommendation in the light of the discussion at this meeting of the results of the study by the Department of Defense referred to in b above, and of further study by other interested departments and agencies.

d. Agreed that paragraph 13 should remain as stated in existing policy (paragraph 11 of NSC 5810/1) pending a presentation to the Council at an early date by the Department of Defense, in collaboration with the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, on the subject of chemical and biological weapons.¹¹

e. Tentatively adopted the following amendments to NSC 5906:

(1) Paragraph 17, page 14: Substitute for the bracketed phrase and the footnote thereto the following words: “In order to maximize the contribution of U.S. military power to the achievement of over-all national objectives.”

(2) Paragraph 18, page 14: Delete the last sentence thereto and insert a new numbered paragraph immediately thereafter, reading as follows:

“Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM’s) will be positioned only in those NATO and other Free World nations which demonstrate a desire to have them and officially request them. Proposals for the positioning of IRBM’s outside the NATO areas will be subject to approval by the President.”

f. Agreed to continue consideration of NSC 5906 at the next Council meeting.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate study.

The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, for appropriate implementation.

S. Everett Gleason

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason.
1. This memorandum enclosed a July 2 memorandum from Franklyn W. Phillips, Acting Secretary of the NASC, giving NASC views on paragraph 62 of NSC 5906. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5906 Series) See the Supplement. Paragraph 62 was discussed at NSC meetings on July 23 and July 30; see Documents 68 and 69.
2. Not further identified.
3. For text, see the Supplement.
4. Twining’s views are enclosed with a July 8 memorandum from his Special Assistant, Brigadier General James F. Wisenand, to Gray. A note indicates that the views had been provided to McElroy on May 8. Twining wrote that in limited war situations the changes in policy then “being advanced” could result in decisions to use nuclear weapons coming too late; cause unacceptably heavy attrition of limited U.S. forces in conditions which, from a military standpoint, called for early use of nuclear weapons; and, when they became public, weaken U.S. posture for deterrence of Soviet-inspired local aggression. Strategically, assuming no increase in defense budget ceilings, the policy changes would result in reduction of the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent relative to the Soviet Union in order to pay for a conventional force buildup that would still be inadequate to counter Soviet bloc forces. (Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Disaster File) See the Supplement.
5. Not further identified.
6. All brackets are in the source text.
7. Apparent reference to paragraph 10 of NSC 5906; see footnote 1, Document 63.
8. See paragraph 1a of Appendix A to the memorandum from Secretary of Defense Wilson to Lay, February 25, 1957, in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XIX, p. 421.
9. See footnote 3, Document 63.
10. The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2105, approved by the President on July 13. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
11. The presentation was made to the Council by Dr. York and General Lemnitzer on February 18, 1960. See Document 92.