Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

68. Memorandum of Discussion at the 414th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, July 23, 1959.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1; NIE 11–4–58; NIE 100–59; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Overseas Internal Security Program”, dated April 10, 1959; NSC Action No. 2079; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Status of Military Mobilization Base Program”, dated April 21, 1959; NSC 5906; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Basic National Security Policy”, dated June 19 and July 6 and 7, 1959; NSC Actions Nos. 2103, 2105 and 2108)

Mr. Gray explained that Paragraph 55 which had originally had in it two splits was now an agreed paragraph. He proceeded to read the agreed wording of Paragraph 55–b as set forth in the attached “Change Sheet”, Paragraphs 55–c–(3) as set forth in NSC 5906 and Paragraph 55–d as set forth in the attached “Change Sheet.”¹ He felt that it was no longer necessary to discuss the differences which had now been resolved in Paragraph 55 but invited comments on the paragraph as a whole from members of the Council. (Copies of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note are filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and attached to this Memorandum.)²

Secretary Dillon said he believed that the new agreed version of Paragraph 55 represented a great improvement, particularly because for the first time in a statement of Basic National Security Policy there was stated that the goal of our domestic economic policy was vigorous, orderly, and sustained economic growth and progress in an appropriate safeguarded context.

Secretary Anderson said that he had no comments to make on Paragraph 55. However, Dr. Saulnier, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, expressed an opinion similar to that of Secretary Dillon that the new agreed version was a distinct improvement. He referred to Paragraph 55–b–(l) which in the newly agreed version read as follows:

“Avoid inflation which could prevent achievement of long-term economic growth, create serious inequities and distortions within the economy and damage our ability to compete in world markets.”

Dr. Saulnier expressed the view that the substitution of the term “could” for “would” in the first line was unwise. He felt that the word “would” expressed more clearly his own view. If we used the term “could” in place of “would”, the change would suggest the possibility that we might be able to have simultaneously both substantial growth and inflation. Dr. Saulnier thought that this was not possible.

Acting Secretary of Commerce Mueller suggested that Dr. Saulnier’s point might be met if the word “impeded” were substituted for the word “prevent” in the first line. The President added by and large he preferred the term “would” but he was not greatly concerned with either of the two words. The Council agreed to the use of the term “would”.

Mr. Gray then called attention to Paragraph 56 on Internal Security. He noted that the paragraph was unchanged from the version which appeared in NSC 5810/1³ but he understood that the Director of the Budget might wish to make some comments on the paragraph. Mr. Stans said that he had no comment to make on this paragraph. Mr. J. Edgar Hoover and Mr. J. Walter Yeagley also said they had no comments to make.

Mr. Gray then turned to Paragraph 57 and said that he would ask Mr. Stans to speak to the deletion proposed by the Bureau of the Budget in Paragraph 57–a reading as follows:

“a. An essential ingredient of our domestic strength is [an improved and strengthened]*⁴ civil defense program which seeks, by both preventive and ameliorative measures, to minimize damage from nuclear attack. An effective civil defense program requires an increasing degree of Federal responsibility, support, and influence on the civil defense activities of the states.”

“*Budget proposes deletion.”

Mr. Stans said that the proposal by the Budget to delete the bracketed language in Paragraph 57–a was in no sense intended to change our existing policy on civil defense. The reason that Budget wished to delete the bracketed language was to call the matter to the President’s attention inasmuch as we generally objected to the inclusion of programmatic words in a policy statement. Mr. Stans thought that the bracketed language was unnecessary in view of the remaining content of the paragraph. Words defining degree, he concluded, were generally undesirable.

The President commented that while this was so, we did not seem to object to using programmatic words or words describing degree when we discussed domestic economic policy in our basic policy statement. Nevertheless he thought we were talking about a distinction without a difference.

Asked for his opinion, Governor Hoegh first pointed out that the phrase that the Budget wished to delete had been included in the previous statement of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5810/1). We had been making some modest progress in our civil defense program and if this phrase were now to be deleted, it would suggest that no further progress was to be considered desirable. Governor Hoegh emphasized that we do not wish to hinder further progress in our civil defense program and he therefore believed that it was very important to retain the bracketed language. Mr. Stans replied that having now made his point, he was very glad to withdraw his proposal for a year.

With respect to Paragraph 58⁵ dealing with the Mobilization Base, Mr. Gray pointed out that the Planning Board had not given formal consideration to this paragraph because it was understood that the Department of Defense was in the process of reviewing the statement of policy on the Mobilization Base and would presently bring in a new version which could be considered by the National Security Council. Secretary Gates confirmed Mr. Gray’s statement and added that the Secretary of Defense has already sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a new draft statement of policy on the Mobilization Base which the Joint Chiefs were now considering.

Mr. Gray likewise pointed out that the Planning Board had not given consideration to Paragraph 59⁶ on Strategic Stockpiling because the Board understood that this matter was now receiving consideration in the Cabinet. Governor Hoegh confirmed this statement and said that the results of Cabinet consideration of our stockpiling policy should be ready in a matter of two or three weeks.

With respect to Paragraph 61 on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, Mr. Gray pointed out that the last two sentences were new.⁷ Mr. McCone said he approved the wording of the new sentences as did Secretary Dillon.

With respect to Paragraph 62,⁸ a new policy statement on Outer Space, Mr. Gray first pointed out that our more detailed policy on Outer Space (NSC 5814/1)⁹ was now undergoing review under the auspices of the Space Council.¹⁰ He understood that at an informal meeting of the Space Council a proposal for modifying Paragraph 62 had been proposed and discussed but not agreed upon.¹¹ (The proposed modification of Paragraph 62 is set forth in the “Change Sheet” attached to this Memorandum.)

Dr. T. Keith Glennan, Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, said that Mr. Gray had stated the case very well. If, as in the case of the exploitation of outer space, there were only two horses in the race, the U.S. could not be a leader and run second. He believed that it should be our policy to establish supremacy for the U.S. in outer space activities. The language in Paragraph 62 of NSC 5906 was acceptable provided it was correctly interpreted.

Mr. Stans pointed out to the Council that Dr. Glennan had called for an interpretation of Paragraph 62 which would direct the U.S. to seek supremacy in outer space activities. If Dr. Glennan meant this, it would involve an actual change in U.S. outer space policy which had hitherto directed that the U.S. was to be “a recognized leader in this field” but did not call for U.S. supremacy. In any event, Mr. Stans suggested that inasmuch as the Space Council was engaged in developing a more general U.S. policy statement on outer space, he would suggest that the Council not now adopt Paragraph 62 and instead wait until the new policy statement from the Space Council had been sent to the NSC for consideration.

Dr. Glennan stated that he had no objection to Mr. Stans’ proposal. The President said that he personally believed that the U.S. must achieve a position of supremacy in outer space activities with some qualifications. As demonstrated earlier (presumably in the case of the Sputnik) the people of the U.S. tended to get rather hysterical when they thought their country was lagging behind the Soviet Union with respect to scientific progress.

Mr. Stans then said that he would plead surprise over the new proposal with respect to supremacy and would like to consider the matter at greater length before he expressed a final view. Certainly the matter had obvious budgetary implications.

The President agreed to delay Council consideration of the paragraph on outer space activity until the Space Council should send to the National Security Council its new detailed policy statement of U.S. outer space activities. Mr. Gray asked Mr. Stans whether he could be ready to express his views at the Council meeting next week. Mr. Stans thought he would. The President stressed the psychological importance of the U.S. achieving supremacy in outer space activities. This was, he thought, perhaps the most important aspect of the attempt by the U.S. to achieve supremacy in this field.

Dr. Glennan said he did not believe that this issue would raise budgetary problems as Mr. Stans had feared. The budget for outer space activities which would be submitted would not be based on a proposal that the U.S. should achieve supremacy in outer space activities.

Mr. Gray concluded the discussion by calling attention briefly to the remaining paragraphs of NSC 5906. None of these occasioned any discussion.

At the conclusion of the discussion the President said that quite apart from NSC 5906 as such, he had a question to put to the Chiefs of Staff on the general problem of our Mobilization Base Requirements. He said that he would like very much to have, although not as a matter of urgency, a study made by military officers of middle rank which would sketch a picture of the kind of war the U.S. would face after a real nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. This was a problem, continued the President, that had bothered him terribly in the past. He insisted that we all still tended to talk about a possible future war in World War II terms. Perhaps, speculated the President, the term “Mobilization Base” is an erroneous term. After a tremendous nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., we will be faced with very severe problems even if there is not more actual fighting in the classical sense. The problems that we will face in this country in such an event will be problems that no one can solve except on a disciplined and controlled basis. In short, the President said, he would like to see what the picture is going to look like at that time insofar as we can imagine it. One would have to assume that both countries would be almost stabilized from the military point of view after the nuclear exchange between ourselves and the Soviets.

Admiral Burke stated that some of the information the President was looking for would come out of the current study of our Mobilization Base Requirements but he warned that that study would have to consist of a number of alternative possibilities. The President said he understood this but urged that we ought to have a clearer common view of what we are all talking about in the National Security Council when we use the term “Mobilization Base.” It seemed to the President that this term no longer applies very cogently to the beginning of a war but only after the nuclear exchange which we must anticipate. Admiral Burke said he agreed with the President’s thought.

The National Security Council:¹²

a. Tentatively adopted Paragraphs 55 through 66 of NSC 5906, subject to the following:

(1) Page 48, paragraph 55–b:

(a) Delete the first sentence of the paragraph (including the split language) and substitute therefor the following:

“The goal of our economic policy is the achievement, within a framework of free competitive enterprise and reasonable price stability, of vigorous, orderly and sustainable economic growth and progress, including the efficient employment of resources at high levels.”

(b) In the first line of subparagraph b–(1), substitute “impede” for “prevent”.

(2) Page 49, paragraph 55–c–(2): Delete the first clause and the footnotes relating thereto, and substitute the following: “Strive for a vigorous, orderly and sustainable economic growth;”

(3) Page 50, paragraph 55–d, line 6: Insert “reasonable” before “price”, and “competitive” after “free”.

(4) Page 50, paragraph 57–a: Include the bracketed words and delete the footnote thereto.

(5) Pages 51–53, paragraphs 58 and 59: Agreed that these paragraphs would be revised in the light of the results of the review thereof now being conducted by the interested departments and agencies and to be reported to the Council at the earliest feasible date.

(6) Pages 54–55, paragraph 62: Deferred action on this paragraph until the next Council meeting, to permit further study of the proposals put forward at an informal meeting of the National Aeronautics and Space Council (circulated in the enclosure to the reference memorandum of July 6, 1959) and the discussion at this meeting.

b. Agreed to continue at the next Council meeting further consideration of Paragraphs 10, 12–a, 15, 16, 23, 24 and 62 of NSC 5906.

c. Noted the President’s request that an informal study be made by military staff officers of the Department of Defense, with appropriate staff participation from the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, analyzing the nature of the wartime situation which would probably exist following an exchange between the United States and the USSR of their nuclear stockpiles.

Note: The action in c above, as approved by the President together with his further instructions regarding the study, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Director, OCDM, by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for appropriate implementation.

[Here follow Agenda Items 2. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security,” 3. “Definition of ‘Defectors’,” and 4. “U.S. Policy Toward Finland.”]

Marion W. Boggs¹³

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs.
1. For text, see the Supplement.
2. Dated July 22, not printed.
3. Reference is to paragraph 44 of NSC 5810/1.
4. All brackets are in the source text.
5. Identical to paragraph 47 of NSC 5810/1.
6. Identical to paragraph 48 of NSC 5810/1.
7. Amended version of paragraph 33 of NSC 5810/1. As discussed at this meeting, identical to paragraph 62 of NSC 5906/1.
8. As eventually adopted, paragraph 63 of NSC 5906/1.
9. See footnote 1, Document 32.
10. NSC 5814/1 was superseded by a Report by the National Aeronautics and Space Council, January 26, 1960. For text, see vol. II, pp. 920–936.
11. The first sentence of paragraph 62 in NSC 5906 reads: “The United States should continue actively to develop and exploit outer space as needed to achieve scientific, military and political purposes and to insure that the United States is a leader in this field.” The modification, as quoted in Gray’s briefing note, reads: “The U.S. should continue actively and with a sense of urgency to pursue programs to develop and exploit outer space capabilities as needed to insure the attainment of national objectives in scientific, military and political areas. These programs should be designed to secure and maintain for the U.S. a position of supremacy in outer space activities without requiring that the U.S. be the leader in every phase of space exploration.”
12. The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2110, approved by the President on July 27. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
13. Boggs signed over Gleason’s typed signature.