Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

63. Memorandum of Meeting Between President Eisenhower and His Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray)⁰

Washington, July 6, 1959, 11:10 a.m.

1. I indicated to the President that I felt that we needed further to discuss certain military paragraphs in the Basic Policy paper following the meeting in his office on July 2d.

First of all, I reported to him that following the meeting in his office, the same group met for a while in the Conference Room, less Mr. Herter. I reported that Mr. McElroy still insisted that the first question is whether the President wants the policy changed. However, I also reported that Mr. McElroy acknowledged that the President had said that a change in language is not necessarily a change in policy. I also reported that Mr. Gerard Smith had frankly stated that the State Department does indeed want the policy changed.

I then said the question is: How do we now proceed? My first recommendation was with respect to paragraph 10.¹ I recommended that he consider accepting the language as written in the old paper and that the concerns by the State Department be taken care of by the President’s approval of the change in language in the strategic concept which the President had approved while Charles E. Wilson was Secretary of Defense. I indicated to the President that Secretary McElroy agrees that such a change of language is appropriate so that it makes clear that general war exists only when sizable or substantial U.S. and USSR forces are engaged and not when just any such forces are engaged. The President seemed to think well of this suggestion although he said that he felt that general war would exist when the Soviets were obviously engaged in an all-out effort against us.

Paragraph 12 a. I presented to the President a draft of paragraph 12 a, attached. I told the President that I proposed to have this draft in his hands at the time of the Council meeting and he could either use it there, or if he decided in the Council not to make final decisions, this could be the basis for the language he would later adopt. We discussed it in considerable detail and as a result of the discussion, I have now redrafted the paragraph as in the attached.²

Paragraph 16.³ I presented a suggested draft of paragraph 16, which is attached.⁴ After some discussion in which I pointed out that two of the four issues discussed in the July 2d meeting were involved in this paragraph, the President made suggestions which are incorporated in a redraft of paragraph 16, 2d paragraph, Page 13, which is also attached.

I pointed out to the President that this paragraph really set the stage for planning in Defense and State Departments and should not be construed to define a situation such as would be involved in hostilities in connection with Berlin. I also had pointed out to him that it seemed impossible to me for a military commander to do other than to seek to defeat local aggression once he became engaged in hostilities.

I then pointed out to the President that there were other split paragraphs in the military section. The first was paragraph 13⁵ relating to CW and BW. I indicated that the Budget Bureau effort was to get us off dead center as a result of a feeling that we were spending too little or too much on these weapons. The President understood the issue.

I also pointed out the split in paragraph 17⁵ relating to the use of the term “cold war” and expressed the view to the President that we could not abandon the use of this phrase any more than people would agree to refer to the White House as the Executive Mansion.

I also referred to paragraph 23⁶ but indicated that as a result of discussion with the consultants, the Planning Board had had some second thoughts and that we hoped to have some new language from the State Department.

[Here follows brief discussion of administrative matters.]

Gordon Gray

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Project Clean Up. Top Secret. Drafted by Gray on July 9.
1. Paragraph 10 of NSC 5906 was based on paragraph 8 of NSC 5810/1, unchanged except for a suggested AEC–Department of State amendment to the first sentence (in brackets): “A central aim of U.S. policy must be to deter the Communists from use of their military power, remaining prepared to fight general war, [a war in which the survival of the United States is at stake,] should one be forced upon the United States.”
2. This redraft is quoted in full in Document 64. The modifications mentioned were made in the first sentence of Gray’s original draft, which reads: “It is the policy of the United States to place main, but not sole, reliance on nuclear weapons; to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States; and to use them when required to achieve (military) objectives.”
3. Paragraph 16 of NSC 5906 is identical to paragraph 14 of NSC 5810/1. The annex to NSC 5906 is a suggested Department of State redraft of paragraph 16, partially quoted in Document 64.
4. Not printed. This redraft contains minor revisions of Gray’s draft.
5. This paragraph is quoted in full in Document 64.
5. This paragraph is quoted in full in Document 64.
6. A revised version of this paragraph was discussed and quoted at the NSC meeting on July 16; see Document 67.