Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

52. Memorandum of Discussion at the 398th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, March 5, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Item 1. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.”]

2. Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies 1958–1959 (NIE 11–4–58) and Estimate of the World Situation (NIE 100–59)¹ and Present Trends in Communist China (NIE 13–2-59)²

(Copies of the briefing note used by Mr. Gray are filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and attached to this Memorandum.)³

(The President joined the meeting in the course of Mr. Allen Dulles’s briefing on this subject.)

The Director of Central Intelligence reminded the National Security Council that it was customary in the intelligence community at the end of each calendar year to prepare or revise certain basic Intelligence Estimates, particularly the three which he was summarizing this morning. Thereafter Mr. Dulles summarized and commented on the major conclusions reached in the three National Intelligence Estimates in order, as he said, to provide a basis for Council discussion this morning.

In the course of his remarks on the three Estimates, Mr. Allen Dulles stressed the new assertiveness of the Communist Bloc despite the fact that in the last year Communism had met with certain reverses, particularly in Western Europe. He pointed out that the intelligence community felt that the Communist Bloc had suffered a certain loss of influence in the United Arab Republic, in Burma, and in Argentina. Likewise notable in the last year was the new note of confidence in the Soviet Union based on the country’s significant economic and industrial growth, a rate of growth twice as much as that of the U.S. in terms of Gross National Product. In this connection Mr. Dulles also pointed out that the extent of the Soviet defense effort was roughly equal to the U.S. in terms of military hardware and in terms of men under arms.

Mr. Dulles also pointed out that the Soviets would obtain their initial capability with ICBM’s sometime in the course of the current year. They have already achieved such a capability with respect to the IRBM. At the same time the intelligence community believed that the Soviets would be able to maintain and modernize massive conventional military forces.

Continuing, Mr. Dulles stated that the Estimates indicated in the Calendar Year 1958 that the Sino-Soviet Bloc had tripled the amount of its credits to nations outside the Bloc although the total aid to such nations was still far behind that provided to these nations by the U.S. Obviously the Soviets had a great advantage in their freedom to select the means to achieve their objectives in non-Bloc countries.

The Estimates indicated that the achievement of Communist China in the course of the first year of the “Great Leap Forward” had been remarkable. The Chinese Communists confidently expected to maintain a high growth rate for their economy although the commune program was still a great question mark.

While the intelligence community continued to estimate that the Soviet Union would try to avoid the deliberate provocation of general war the community also noted some increased danger of wars in peripheral areas. At this point Mr. Dulles actually quoted from Paragraph 16 of NIE 100–59 which involved a dissent from the majority of the intelligence community by the Joint Staff (JCS) and the Air Force. Mr. Dulles briefly explained the nature of the disagreement but pointed out that by and large it was really not very great.⁴

Noting that the strength of the Atlantic Community had increased in the past year and that the countries which composed it were still committed to NATO, Mr. Dulles did warn that there were certain countervailing tendencies in the Atlantic Community which could be serious. There was also some questioning in Western Europe of the current NATO strategic concept. There was also the problem of De Gaulle’s intransigence and his plan for withdrawing the French Mediterranean Fleet from NATO. The Fleet had not yet actually been withdrawn. Finally in this context there were many Europeans still strongly favoring some form of disengagement in Central Europe. Protagonists of this view were strongest in Germany and especially among the German Socialists although supporters of the view could also be found in the opposition ranks in other Western Governments.

In the underdeveloped countries of the world Mr. Dulles said that the intelligence community, while noting improvements in certain underdeveloped countries, estimated that their overall situation had generally become worse. It seemed quite clear that parliamentary democracy was not an exportable commodity to the underdeveloped nations. After citing specific illustrations Mr. Dulles indicated that this could be a very severe problem for the U.S. to which he himself saw no clear answer. He speculated, however, that the U.S. might well have to reconcile itself to the growth of other systems of government such as Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy” in Indonesia.

After touching briefly on the rapid acceleration of nationalist sentiment in black Africa, Mr. Dulles undertook to summarize the situation in one sentence. He stated that the outlook over the next few years was for a heightened aggressiveness in the realm of foreign policy by the Bloc leaders which of course entailed a greater risk of war.

When Mr. Dulles had finished his summary and comments Mr. Gray informed the Council that there had been some disagreement in the Planning Board with respect to the measurements used by the intelligence community in reaching their estimates as to the comparative size of the defense effort being made by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. He described the meeting of the Planning Board with experts from the Central Intelligence Agency on this subject and asked the Director of the Bureau of the Budget whether his questions about the accuracy of the intelligence community’s methodology had been satisfactorily answered by the CIA experts. Mr. Stans said that he still entertained some doubts about the arithmetic used by the Central Intelligence Agency in this area but he felt that rather than to discuss this complicated matter here he would address his further questions to the Director of Central Intelligence and members of Mr. Dulles’s own staff.

Secretary McElroy pointed out that this particular issue was of very considerable importance in view of the estimated greater increase in defense expenditures by the U.S.S.R. by 1963. Pointing out that such expenditures were estimated to be nearly 50 per cent greater in 1963 than in 1958, Secretary McElroy said that the problem was obviously all the more serious if at the present time we agreed that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are spending approximately equal amounts on their national defense.

After a certain exchange of views on this subject between Mr. Stans and Mr. Allen Dulles, the President intervened to suggest that the subject was not precisely suitable for argument at an NSC meeting and that the two protagonists should get together privately and try to resolve their differences. The President said, however, that he did agree with Secretary McElroy that the issue at stake was a highly important.

At this point Mr. Gordon Gray inquired whether there were any further questions which members of the Council wished to address to Mr. Allen Dulles, particularly with respect to the dissent in NIE 100–59 entered by the Joint Staff and the Air Force with regard to the likelihood of increased peripheral wars. There were no further questions but the President said that he went along with the minority (the Joint Staff and the Air Force) with respect to this issue. Secretary McElroy said he could not believe that this dissent was a matter of very great importance.

The National Security Council:⁵

Noted and discussed the subject National Intelligence Estimates, in the light of summaries thereof by the Director of Central Intelligence.

3. NSC 5904⁶ (NSC 5410/1; NSC 5810/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1077, 1102 and 2039; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 7 and March 3, 1959⁷)

(A copy of the briefing note used by Mr. Gordon Gray to describe NSC 5904 to the Council is included in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum.)⁸

In dealing with the paper Mr. Gray pointed out that there had been no disagreement on the first Objective in NSC 5904 with respect to general war with the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This Objective read as follows:

“1. To prevail, and survive as a nation capable of controlling its own destiny.”

On the other hand he pointed out that the Objective in Paragraph 2 of NSC 5904 was a subject of considerable disagreement. He read Paragraph 2 as follows:

“2. To reduce, by military and other measures, the capabilities of:

• “a. The USSR;
• “b. And Communist China [if involved in the hostilities]⁹
• “c. And European Bloc countries [if involved in the hostilities]*
• “d. And non-European Bloc countries [if involved in the hostilities]*

to the point where they have lost their will or ability to wage war against the United States and its allies.”

“*Defense, Treasury, and JCS propose deletion.”

After explaining his understanding of the disagreement among the Planning Board members on the appropriate content of Paragraph 2, Mr. Gray invited the comment of the Acting Secretary of State.

Secretary Herter pointed out initially that the issue in disagreement appeared both in Paragraph 2 of the Objectives and in Paragraph 6 of the Policy Guidance of NSC 5904. He said that of course there could be no doubt that in the event of general war with the U.S.S.R. it would be our objective to reduce by the means mentioned above the capabilities of the U.S.S.R. The State Department, however, felt that an automatic decision likewise to reduce by military and other measures the capabilities of Communist China and other Bloc countries would tie the hands of the U.S. in advance and would result in war on Communist China and the Bloc countries might actually take the opportunity of general war to rebel against the U.S. on the side of the Soviet Union. In fact some of these Bloc countries might actually take the opportunity of general war to rebel against Soviet domination in the event of a war in which they are not attacked by the U.S. The same reasoning, continued Secretary Herter, applied to the similar statement in Paragraph 6 of the Policy Guidance.¹⁰

The President immediately expressed disagreement with Secretary Herter and invited him once again to consider carefully what Paragraph 2 actually said. Particularly insofar as Communist China is concerned, the President did not think that Secretary Herter’s case for including the bracketed language was at all a good case. If the U.S., said the President, got into a disastrous nuclear war with the Soviet Union and in the course of the war simply ignored Communist China, we would end up in a “hell of a fix.” The President added that he was inclined to agree with Secretary Herter that we should not attack the European Bloc countries if they were not involved in the hostilities but this proviso should certainly not apply to Communist China. With respect to Secretary Herter’s point that Paragraph 2 without the bracketed language would involve automatic attack on Communist China, the President pointed out that the language in Paragraph 2 stated that we should reduce by military and other measures. Accordingly, there was no directive in Paragraph 2 which compelled an automatic military attack on Communist China once the U.S. was involved in general war with the U.S.S.R.

In the same connection Mr. Gray pointed out the significance of the phrase “all requisite forces” which occurred in Paragraph 6. According to Mr. Gray’s interpretation, he said, this language in Paragraph 6 indicated that U.S. attack on Communist China or other Sino-Soviet Bloc countries would not be an indiscriminate attack. Mr. Gray also reminded the Council of views expressed on the general subject of U.S. Policy in the Event of General War at earlier Council discussions of the problem. At this earlier meeting a clear distinction had been made between the manner in which we would deal with Communist China in the event of general war and the manner in which we would deal with other European or non-European Bloc countries.

The President indicated that he recalled this distinction and still strongly agreed with it. He said he simply could not envisage the U.S. becoming involved in an all-out nuclear war with the Soviet Union while at the same time permitting Communist China to stay on the sidelines and develop, after perhaps forty years, into another Soviet Union.

Secretary Herter said he heartily agreed on this last point but that the question which bothered him was whether we wanted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to plan now to strike Communist China automatically if the U.S. became involved in a general war with the U.S.S.R.

The President said he saw the problem in this fashion. Our real enemy in the world is International Communism. Communist China was certainly a willing partner in this International Communist grouping thus occupying a different position from the European Bloc countries which had been compelled by the U.S.S.R. to join in the International Communist grouping. The President again repeated his view that even a U.S. attack on Communist China need not necessarily be indiscriminate.

Secretary Herter said that it would be helpful if Defense or the Joint Chiefs could speak to this problem but it still seemed to him that if the bracketed language in Paragraphs 2 and 6 were deleted, the U.S. would automatically hit Communist China in the event that the U.S. became involved in general war with the U.S.S.R. The President still insisted that such a course of action was not automatic and that pressure on China could involve other than military measures.

In responding to Secretary Herter’s invitation, General Twining stated that targets in Communist China were certainly on our list for attack in the event of general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. but the question whether we would actually attack these targets in Communist China would depend on circumstances existing at the time. Obviously, however, the U.S. must be prepared to attack such targets in Communist China. The President commented that in the event of general war the U.S. would obviously attack its worse enemy first; that is, it would put all the weight of its attack on the U.S.S.R. In illustrating his point he reminded the Council that in the Second World War Germany was the first priority enemy and Japan the second.

General Twining pointed out that one of the difficult aspects of this problem was our ignorance of what the Soviets would do with regard to Communist China in the event that the Soviets became involved in war against the U.S. We simply had to be prepared for all eventualities. Secretary Herter replied that so far as he could see the issue in question here was whether or not Communist China participated in the war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Turning to General Twining he said that General Twining concluded that Chinese participation with the U.S.S.R. was a virtual certainty. To Secretary Herter, however, it was not absolutely certain.

The President suggested that we assume that a general war has occurred and we have succeeded in defeating Soviet Russia. Throughout the war China has, let us assume, remained quiescent. In this [source text illegible—connection?]the President added that we would certainly take political measures to disarm and remove the threat of Communist China. We simply could not just ignore a Communist China which remained untouched and intact after a terrible war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. To do so would be unrealistic in the extreme.

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget suggested that the dilemma might be solved if the phrase “by military and other measures” were changed to read “by military or other measures.” However, Secretary McElroy stated that such a change would gravely weaken the statement of Objectives and that such a change had been considered in the Department of Defense and had been rejected. After the President had again repeated his argument with respect to the inclusion of Communist China, Secretary McElroy went on to say that in his view the U.S. must be prepared to make use of military measures against Communist China. The President commented that it was virtually certain that in general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Communist China would be an ally of the U.S.S.R. The same could not be said for other Bloc countries but it certainly could be said about Communist China. Agreeing with the President, Secretary McElroy said that while he would greatly prefer to drop all the bracketed language in Paragraphs 2 and 6, he would be willing to settle for retaining the bracketed language as it applies to the Bloc countries other than Communist China.

The President then enunciated clearly the distinction between objectives and tactics in the Council discussion and repeated his views on Communist China. He illustrated his point by reference to the role of Italy in World War I, noting that after an interval, Italy joined with Germany’s enemies. He also reiterated the necessity that the policy statement now under consideration should see to it that both the U.S.S.R. and Communist China are incapable of further harming the U.S. after the end of hostilities. The Vice President agreed with the President and said that the U.S. should undertake to see to this by all necessary means. The President continued by stating that the point he was making was the objective of the policy and that the objective was very clear.

Turning to General Twining he indicated that our military plans ought not to indicate that we must hit China in the very first hours and days of the war with the Soviet Union. We should concentrate our initial attacks on the U.S.S.R.

General Twining agreed with the President’s last point and said that presumably our intelligence information would tell us what the precise situation was between the U.S.S.R. and Communist China and whether the Soviets had deployed weapons for use against the U.S. in Communist China. He insisted that there was no military intention to strike Communist China at once and automatically in the event of general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

At this point Secretary Herter suggested that the problem of Communist China might be settled to everyone’s satisfaction if the phrase “as necessary” were inserted before the words “Communist China” in Paragraphs 2 and 6 and the bracketed language removed. The President said he could perceive no objection to this proposal as regards Paragraph 6 and Secretary McElroy likewise found it acceptable.¹¹

The President then suggested that in his view the countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc other than Communist China actually constituted a weakness for the U.S.S.R. They would like nothing better than to have the opportunity to revolt against the U.S.S.R. if an opportunity were provided by the outbreak of general war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Secretary McElroy expressed agreement with this point made by the President but warned of the likelihood that the U.S.S.R. would have created missile batteries and sites within the Bloc countries. Secretary Herter agreed with Secretary McElroy that we would have to destroy such targets in the Bloc countries.

The President referred to our experience in World War II with respect to bombing targets in France even though that country was an enemy of the Axis Powers. He would therefore suggest the inclusion of the term “military targets” in Paragraphs 2–c and 2–d. Obviously while we might have to attack military targets in Poland, the U.S. certainly did not want to fight the Poles as a nation.

Mr. Gray then suggested appropriate language for changing Paragraph 6 to which the Council responded favorably. The President said that he would suggest the elimination of subparagraphs 2–c and 2–d inasmuch as guidance for the European Bloc and the non-European Bloc countries was covered by Paragraph 6 and also because these countries were under the control of the Soviet Union. General Twining stated that he would just as soon see Paragraphs 2–c and 2–d eliminated because he thought the only real problem was presented by the involvement of Communist China. Both Secretary McElroy and the Vice President agreed in turn with the proposal to drop subparagraphs 2–c and 2–d.

Mr. Gray then read Paragraph 3 as follows:

“3. To render ineffective the control structure by which the enemy regimes have been able to exert ideological and disciplinary authority over their own peoples and over individual citizens or groups of citizens in other countries.

He pointed out that the only change in this paragraph from the statement on the same subject in the previous policy paper consisted of the insertion of the phrase “over their own peoples.”

Mr. Gray then read Paragraph 5 as follows:

“5. So far as consistent with the above objectives, to avoid unnecessary destruction and casualties in all countries not involved in the war.”

The President asked at once why it had been thought desirable to include the term “unnecessary” in Paragraph 5. Obviously we would avoid unnecessary destruction in the countries not involved in the war. The Council agreed with the President that the word should be deleted.

Mr. Gray then invited the Council’s attention to Paragraph 7 reading as follows:

“[7. Since ultimate victory in all-out nuclear war will go to the nation which retains the greater residual power and the greater capacity for quick recovery from nuclear assault, the United States should develop and maintain such a capacity.]**

“**State–OCDM proposal.”

He pointed out that there was no particular difference of view in the Planning Board as to the actual substance of Paragraph 7. On the other hand, most of the Planning Board had questioned whether such a paragraph belonged in a policy dealing with what the U.S. should do after general war broke out. It seemed to them that retaining residual power and capacity for quick recovery belonged in a policy paper, such as our Basic Policy, which concerned itself with what the U.S. should do prior to the outbreak of war.

The President said that wherever it belonged, he was sure that the substance of Paragraph 7 belonged somewhere in our policy. It seemed perfectly clear to him, he said, that the U.S. must have this kind of residual power and capacity for quick recovery. Governor Hoegh then proposed new and simplified language for Paragraph 7 which he said might appeal to the Council. His language was “the U.S. should maintain a capacity for quick recovery from nuclear assault.”

Secretary Herter said that he and his colleagues were perfectly willing to have the substance of Paragraph 7 contained in our Basic National Security Policy paper. Mr. Gray also expressed the opinion that the Basic Policy was the best place for such a statement although he professed no objection to Governor Hoegh’s suggested new language. Mr. Stans said that the Bureau of the Budget believed likewise that the question ought to be debated in a different context from a paper such as this dealing with our policy in the event of war. The President again said he rather liked Governor Hoegh’s suggestion and thought it made very good sense. Secretary Herter also approved the language suggested by the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization but suggested that it be included in the section of the paper dealing with Objectives rather than as now set forth, in a section dealing with Policy Guidance. Secretary McElroy agreed with this suggestion of Secretary Herter. Mr. Gray then suggested that Governor Hoegh’s proposed new language be inserted as a new Paragraph 6 at the end of the present section entitled Objectives. The President gave his consent to this change and insisted that if the U.S. did not have such a capacity for quick recovery from nuclear assault, the U.S. would have lost the war.

Mr. Gray then read Paragraph 8 as follows:

“8. If, in the course of the hostilities, an enemy country asks the United States for peace terms, the United States should not accept any terms unless they remove the threat to U.S. security posed by such country”

He noted that this paragraph was a new paragraph which had no counterpart in the earlier policy paper on “U.S. Objectives in General War.” It was put in, he said, to reflect discussion at the prior Council meeting on the subject of our war objectives. The President expressed the view that the new Paragraphs was just about as useful as the fifth wheel on a wagon even though the statements it made were perfectly true. On the other hand, he thought that the inclusion of Paragraph 8 would do no harm. To the President it simply meant, he said, if you get into a fight you try to shoot your enemy before he shoots you. At this point the President also repeated his dislike of the formula and concept of unconditional surrender and Mr. Gray pointed out that Paragraph 8 had been included in part to avoid adherence by the U.S. to a concept of unconditional surrender in a future war.

There being no difficulties about the paragraphs on Post-War Objectives,¹² Mr. Gray asked the Council to turn to Section B of NSC 5904 which set forth Objectives and Policy Guidance for limited war as opposed to general war. He pointed out that the first disagreement in this Section applied to the very title of Section B. The majority preferred the title: “U.S. Policy in the Event of War with a Sino-Soviet Bloc State (or States) other than the USSR*”. The JCS preferred the following version on the right hand of the page: “U.S. Policy in the Event of a War in which the USSR does not Participate*.” (“*Present U.S. policy is based upon the assumption that any war with the USSR would be general war. The validity of the foregoing assumption is not an issue in this paper, but will be susceptible of re-examination in the course of the review of Basic Policy (NSC 5810/1).”

Mr. Gray pointed out in explanation that the Joint Chiefs felt that the title of Section B proposed by the majority was not wholly acceptable because it did not cover limited wars with states which were not in the Sino-Soviet Bloc as for example a war with Egypt. Mr. Gray said he would come back to the problem of the title later.

With respect to Paragraph 13¹³ Mr. Gray pointed out that the Joint Chiefs had agreed to its deletion and also pointed out that there was no problem with respect to the first three sentences of Paragraph 15 since the Joint Chiefs had likewise withdrawn their proposal for the inclusion of the bracketed language in Paragraph 15 which paragraph Mr. Gray proceeded to read.¹⁴ After explaining to the best of his ability the three different versions of the latter portion of Paragraph 15 as set forth on Page 5, Mr. Gray pointed out that we now had in hand a further alternative which had been agreed to between Defense and the Joint Chiefs and copies of which had just been handed to members of the Council.¹⁵ Mr. Gray expressed the view that the new Defense–JCS alternative had much to recommend it in comparison with the others.¹⁶

The President said that he was frankly very confused by these differing versions. If we think, he said, of some course of action that is necessary to gain our war objectives and take such action, we would certainly in the course of so doing have considered the possibility that the Soviets would come into the war. We have gone into this course of action with our eyes open and we would certainly have to take the consequences. Citing South Korea as a further example, the President insisted that we could not retreat from our objectives in that area once our forces were actually committed.

In response to the President General Twining defended the new Defense–JCS version of the latter portion of Paragraph 15 (a copy of the Defense–JCS version is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum). General Twining suggested that if in the course of limited hostilities general war with the Soviet Union became clearly probable, we might have to decide to change our objectives in the light of the circumstances existing at the time. The President said that this was all right with him if our purpose was to change our objectives but he was strongly opposed to abandoning our objectives under Soviet pressure, a thought which seemed to him to be suggested by the new Defense–JCS proposal for the latter portion of Paragraph 15. General Twining assured the President that such was not the intent of the new version. Secretary Herter on the other hand suggested the willingness of the State Department to buy the original version of the latter part of Paragraph 15 suggested by the Department of Defense and included on Page 5 of NSC 5904.

Certain suggestions for language were next made by the President who explained them by stating that he was afraid of a war in which we would be sticking our toe into the water and if we found the water cold would pull it out again. Secretary McElroy commented that all the difficulties of trying to reach an agreed version of Paragraph 15 both in the Planning Board and at the Council meeting simply illustrated the difficulty of trying to write policy guidance for limited wars. He queried whether we really wanted or needed or indeed could write a reasonable policy paper on limited wars in view of all the possible combinations and permutations of possible limited wars in the future. In response to Secretary McElroy’s point, Mr. Gray stressed that certain members of the Planning Board felt that it was not possible or right to confine ourselves in this paper to problem of general war alone.

General Twining then stated that if the Joint Chiefs could have exactly what they wanted, what they really wished was their own original alternative set forth in NSC 5904. At this point Secretary Herter suggested that perhaps the most sensible solution was to strike all of Paragraph 15 which was in dispute and which appeared on Page 5, contenting ourselves with that portion of Paragraph 15 which appeared on Page 4. Mr. Gray suggested that if the portions of Paragraph 15 on Page 5 were left out, the remainder of the paragraph on Page 4 seemed to him pretty well to cover the situation. Secretary McElroy expressed himself as being extremely happy with this proposal as did Secretary Anderson who said that the guidance in the earlier portion of Paragraph 15 was what was going to happen anyway. Secretary Herter, however, expressed some concern as to whether his suggestion would mean that we would pursue our objectives “come hell or high water.” Would there be a danger of tieing the President’s hands? The Vice President did not think so in view of the statement in the earlier part of Paragraph 15 as to the risk of general war. The President finally stated that he was willing to delete that portion of Paragraph 15 which was set forth on Page 5 of NSC 5904. To Secretary Herter’s expression of concern about the view which historians might later take if this paper seemed to tie the President’s hands, the President said that he was not concerned and again suggested the deletion of the language on Page 5.

Mr. Gray then reverted to the problem of the title of Section B which he had stated earlier he would have to come back to. He again repeated the anxiety of the Joint Chiefs that the majority title was too restricted and deprived the military of policy guidance to be followed in the event of hostilities with countries which were not members of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. After a brief discussion Secretary Herter agreed with the version of the title to Section B which was proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The National Security Council:¹⁷

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject, contained in NSC 5904, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 2039–b and in the light of the discussion at the 394th NSC Meeting; in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, transmitted by the reference memorandum of March 3, 1959.

b. Tentatively adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5904, subject to certain amendments.

Note: Subsequent to this Council meeting, the Departments of State and Defense proposed further revisions in the draft statement of policy in NSC 5904 of a substantive nature which had not been discussed at this meeting. The President, after reviewing these proposals, authorized further consideration at the next Council meeting of NSC 5904 as tentatively adopted in b above, in the light of the State and Defense proposed revisions.

[Here follows a brief note about a special meeting the President held with the NSC about Germany, immediately after this meeting.]

S. Everett Gleason

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason.
1. Dated February 17. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files) See the Supplement.
2. Dated February 10. For text of the Conclusions section, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. XIX, pp. 520–523.
3. See the Supplement.
4. Paragraph 16 includes language stating that the “Increase of Soviet nuclear capabilities has made the Soviet leaders feel freer to adopt an aggressive posture in peripheral areas, and probably somewhat freer to encourage or instigate armed conflict in these areas, although probably not initially with overt Soviet forces.” Footnotes indicate that the Joint Staff and the Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence wanted the sentence to end with the first use of the word “areas,” on the grounds that there was no evidence that Soviet leaders were as yet either more willing or more able than previously to risk limited war.
5. The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 2055, approved by the President on March 12. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
6. Entitled “U.S. Policy in the Event of War,” dated February 19. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5904 Series)
7. Regarding the January 7 memorandum, see footnote 2, Document 47. The March 3 memorandum encloses a memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, dated March 2, giving the Chiefs’ views on NSC 5904. (Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1) See the Supplement.
8. Dated March 4. For text, see the Supplement.
9. All brackets are in the source text.

10. Paragraph 6 reads as follows:

    “The United States should utilize all requisite force against selected targets in waging war against:

    • “a. The USSR;
    • “b. And Communist China [if involved in the hostilities];
    • “c. And as necessary European Bloc countries [if involved in the hostilities];
    • “d. And as necessary non-European Bloc countries [if involved in the hostilities];

    “to attain the above objectives.”

    Footnotes to the text state that the Departments of Defense and the Treasury and the JCS wanted the bracketed portions deleted.

11. Subsequent to the meeting a difference of interpretation arose as to whether the President’s approval of the insertion of the phrase “as necessary” applied only to Paragraph 6 or to Paragraphs 2 and 6. The issue will be decided at a subsequent NSC meeting. [Footnote in the source text.]
12. Paragraphs 9–12 are identical to paragraphs 9–12 of NSC 5904/1, Document 55.
13. This paragraph reads: “Armed force should be used only for the attainment of established national objectives.”
14. The first part of paragraph 15 with the bracketed language reads: “Any decision to commit U.S. forces to war [with any state other than the Soviet Union] should be taken only after full consideration of all factors, including probable Soviet reaction and the risk of general war. The United States should be prepared to utilize all requisite force to attain its objectives. Force will be applied in a manner and on a scale best calculated to avoid hostilities from broadening into general war.”
15. The first alternative version, “Majority Proposal,” reads: “However, the objectives may not be fully realizable without causing the USSR to initiate general war. Therefore, it may be in the U.S. interest to terminate hostilities before the objectives are fully achieved.” The “JCS Alternative” reads: “Once committed, the clear and immediate danger of general war with the USSR must not deter the United States from taking the actions necessary to achieve its objectives.” The “Defense Alternative” reads: “The original objectives, however, may not be fully realized without causing the USSR to initiate general war. Therefore, if during the course of hostilities general war becomes a clear probability, the U.S. will have to decide in the light of the circumstances then existing whether it is in the U.S. interest to pursue its original objectives.”
16. This language reads: “Recognizing that the prompt and resolute application of the degree of force necessary to defeat local aggression is the best means to keep such hostilities from broadening into general war and that any decision to commit U.S. forces to war would be taken only after consideration of all factors, the United States should, with clear determination, utilize all requisite forces to obtain its objectives. If, however, during the course of hostilities general war becomes a clear probability, the U.S. will have to decide in the light of the circumstances then existing whether it is in the U.S. interest to alter its original objectives.”
17. The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2056, approved by the President on March 12. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)