Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

51. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

Washington, March 4, 1959, 2:30 p.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Quarles, General Twining, Admiral Sides, Dr. Killian, Dr. Kistiakowsky, Dr. McMillan, Mr. Gordon Gray, General Goodpaster, Major Eisenhower

Dr. Killian said he had asked for this opportunity to present a study by a panel from the Science Advisory Committee,¹ following up on the work of the Technological Capabilities Panel in 1954. He had asked that Defense representatives be present. The purpose of the study was to consider technical aspects of our ballistic missile program, including the warning factor. A first point is that Nike–Zeus cannot become a factor in Defense against missiles before 1964 or 1965. Accordingly, such measures as dispersal, hardening and improved warning and reaction all seem more promising than active defense, at least for the near future. He thought that passive tactics were cheaper than active, and should be a basic element in the protection of our retaliatory force.

He said there is need for greater stability in our missile position and for new principles and concepts to be considered. We need to attain greater assurance of a secure retaliatory capability. Some increase in expenditures may be involved, but the effect of this can be lessened through establishing priorities. Finally, Dr. Killian mentioned that a proposal for hardening, and comment concerning uncertainties, have been in every Science Advisory Committee report.

Dr. McMillan then made the presentation of defense of the striking force. A first question is what targets the enemy would have to knock out, and a second, what retaliatory force we could muster if the Soviets were to employ their best capabilities. Analysis shows that our strategic power will be subject to uncertainty in the years ahead, and this fact is likely to lead to instability through proposals for crash changes in the program. He then showed charts on the estimated Soviet missile capability, comparison with U.S. programs, and estimated Soviet strategic needs for missiles (based upon total number of aiming points in the United States). He said he was impressed by the effect of passive measures. For example, hardening to 100 pounds per square inch would require the Soviets to use 200 weapons to destroy one target, as against five weapons against an unprotected target. He then showed what the effect of reasonable hardening would be in multiplying Soviet needs—the effect was to raise them by a factor of 10 to 15.

A second question is what part of our force we could get off the ground under various conditions of warning, it being assumed that the Soviets could deal with our forces overseas. He showed a chart on U.S. retaliatory forces surviving attack in the period 1959–1963.

Dr. McMillan cited uncertainties affecting these estimates. They are greatly dependent upon warning and response readiness. Delay would cost us at the rate of forty aircraft per minute. There is also, however, the problem of Soviet coordination. If they had perfect coordination, they could destroy a large portion of our force; in other words, we offer the Soviets a great premium for good operational coordination. Another uncertainty is as to Soviet air defense—this may be highly effective against our aircraft. All of this emphasizes the importance of reliable warning and quick response time. At the same time we cannot be hasty, because of the consequences, and must reduce the need for extreme haste.

For the protection of U.S. aircraft he proposed: to provide shelter for some of our aircraft; to provide better warning, perhaps including an airborne infra-red system; to provide an automatic bomb alarm system, now planned but not funded; and to increase SAC’s ability to take off rapidly. Over the longer term we will be dependent upon protected forces of ICBMs in hardened and dispersed locations; in the present period we should protect our aircraft.

The President commented that we are predicting Soviet missile production for five years. Sometimes he is impelled to look at our difficulties in such production. The Soviets may be having the same. While the presentation gave a range of possible values, still we are assuming that we know what they are going to decide to do. He added that if we ever get to the place where these missiles will rain down out of the skies on the United States, much of what we are planning will be useless anyhow.

He asked what the underground protection for missiles would be like. Mr. Quarles said that a protection to twenty-five pounds per square inch would be achieved by putting the missile on its side and raising it to fire. Protection to 100 pounds per square inch would be achieved in a silo-type hole in the ground. It would probably take the Soviets nine missiles to knock out one site protected to twenty-five pounds per square inch, and twenty-seven against one protected to 100 pounds per square inch. He said the Defense people question Soviet ability to make the firing simultaneous. Mr. Quarles added that we expect to obtain fifteen-minute reaction time with the IRBMs, and even to reduce this in vertically hardened facilities. For solid missiles reaction could be almost instantaneous. Mr. Quarles would recognize, however, that if the Soviets maintain a missile force in this status they could thus have all of them arrive on a fixed schedule. The President next asked how the B–52 and B–58 facilities can be hardened, but there was no detailed discussion other than an indication that this could be done. The President commented that once we have proved out Polaris and know that it works, we ought to consider doubling the number of these because of its concealment and mobility. Dr. Killian agreed that, for dispersal, mobility and concealment, it has great advantages.

Mr. Quarles said that the indications from the study are impressive evidence that something could be done. He thought hardening would be particularly significant. He added that Defense has been considering all of these measures intensively and trying to apply resources in what seems to be the best way.

The President commented that the United States, being on the defensive, must achieve stalemate in one mode of possible combat after another. The Soviets then can shift to other forms. The President commented during the discussion that if we really got into a war we should get off our striking power as quickly as possible.

Dr. Killian said that looking ahead there seemed to be grounds for re-examining the B–70 program, the F–108 program and the nuclear-powered aircraft program in order to put resources where they would have better results. The President agreed, and commented that the presentation stresses the need for hardening dispersal and mobility. General Twining, however, said the Chiefs think it is too late to harden our bomber facilities. Also, it seems to take three or four years to build a dispersal base. They all agreed, however, that it is desirable to harden our missile facilities. Dr. Killian thought there would be great gain in hardening a few SAC bombers on each base. General Twining commented that it would take a long time to clean up and repair runways in case of attack. Dr. Killian replied that it takes a much better hit by the enemy to knock out a runway than an airplane.

The President commented again that when we begin talking of weapons up to certain very great figures, the discussion loses all meaning since we would really be destroying civilization.

Dr. Killian next spoke in favor of a bomb alarm system and General Twining said it will be provided in the FY–60 budget. Dr. Killian said we should move as fast as we can on BMEWS and provide a back-up system. The President agreed that we should do what is vitally necessary, but should give less effort to frills. Dr. Killian also asked that the importance of adding to our numbers of missiles not be overlooked. The President asked when Minuteman would be ready, and Mr. Quarles indicated the end of 1963 by our best estimate. The President said it would be unwise to standardize (i.e., procure in large numbers) earlier missile systems.

General Twining stated strongly that missiles are no better than their launchers. He said that he would not buy additional Atlases, because we would simply buy them to put them in warehouses. He said that Congress, which calls for buying more missiles, fights the military to a standstill on sites for launchers.

Dr. Killian recalled that an additional runway—perhaps a special “take off” runway, would help to get added aircraft in the air, and General Twining said this is being studied.

Finally, the President asked that this information be gotten into the planning staffs for a review to see if priorities have been established so that first things come first. Admiral commented that all of this analysis is extremely dependent upon the estimates provided by intelligence. If any answers could be gotten they could be extremely valuable. Dr. Killian commented that data processing techniques may prove to be of help on intelligence indicators and these are now being examined.

G.
Brigadier General, USA

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on March 17.
1. Killian spoke from “Notes by J.R. Killian, Jr., for Presentation to the President.” Macmillan spoke from “An Analysis of Technical Factors in the Strategic Posture of the United States—1956–64,” both dated March 4. (Both ibid., White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology 1957–1961)