55. National Security Council Report0
NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY IN THE EVENT OF WAR
REFERENCES
- A. NSC 5410/1
- B. Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject: “Basic Military Planning Concept to Govern Planning and Development of the Mobilization Base”, dated March 1, 19571
- C. NSC 5810/1
- D. Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Review of NSC 5410/1”, dated January 7, 1959
- E. NSC Action No. 2039
- F. Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “NSC 5904”, dated March 3 and 9, 1959
- G. NSC Action No. 2056
- H. NSC 5904
- I. NSC Action No. 2057
The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Acting Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, at the 398th and 399th NSC Meetings on March 5 and 12, 1959, adopted the statement of policy in NSC 5904, as amended by NSC Actions Nos. 2056–b and 2057–b.
The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5904, as adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith as NSC 5904/1; and directed its use as a planning guide by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, subject to the understanding that it will be reviewed annually.
The enclosed statement of policy, as adopted and approved, supersedes NSC 5410/1.
It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosure, and that access to it be strictly limited on a need-to-know basis.
- Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 5904 Series. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. A cover sheet is not printed.↩
- This memorandum enclosed a memorandum dated February 25, 1957, from Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson to Lay. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XIX, pp. 419–424.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩
- Paragraph 7 contains the controlling policy guidance with respect to military action to attain the foregoing objectives. [Footnote in the source text.]↩
- Present U.S. policy is based upon the assumption that any war with the USSR would be general war. The validity of the foregoing assumption is not an issue in this paper, but will be susceptible of re-examination in the course of review of basic policy (NSC 5810/1). [Footnote in the source text. This footnote was later deleted; see Document 95.]↩