Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

251. Memorandum of Discussion⁰

Camp David, Maryland, March 28, 1960, 2:45–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Nuclear Test Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

• British Side
  • Prime Minister Harold Macmillan
  • Sir Norman Brooks
  • Ambassador Sir Harold Caccia
  • Mr. C. D. W. O’Neill
  • Mr. Philip F. de Zulueta
• U.S. Side
  • The President
  • Under Secretary Dillon
  • Assistant Secretary Kohler
  • General Goodpaster

The Prime Minister opened this phase of the discussion by commenting on the US paper on nuclear testing. He expressed his appreciation for the paper, which he felt was in general conformity with British ideas.¹ He referred to the morning discussions² and to the fact that the experts were today discussing and clarifying some of the technical questions. As he saw it, the problem for the President and himself would be to consider the political aspects—the question of the tactics and presentation.

The President said that the thing which he always kept in mind was that there should be no agreement with the Soviets so loosely drawn as to put us at their mercy. For example, Khrushchev had earlier proposed simply to keep on talking without testing, which would enable him to engage indefinitely in dilatory tactics. The President did not believe in our being hoodwinked. If a sensible agreement could be reached, he would go as far as anyone. It seemed to him that the gist of our position should be that any agreement must have language in it which would enable us to get out of it if satisfactory progress were not being made. Another point was that the Stale Department lawyers told him that he could legally make a commitment only to January 20, 1961. However, he thought that this would probably present no real problem since any successor would almost certainly go along. Of course, if it happened to be Humphrey, he would probably give the whole works away.³ However, the important point was that we must determine what would be a reasonable period for a moratorium. In this connection, he said he had some opposition within the US Government to any moratorium at all, but he had simply told them that this was the policy.⁴

The Prime Minister said he thought it was important that our presentation and our public posture should be positive. The most important substantive question remaining to be settled was that of a quota. He felt we should call upon the Soviets to expedite the negotiations and to conclude a treaty within a couple of months. He thought this should be said in a joint declaration.⁵

The President said he accepted this proposal subject to two conditions: First, that the remaining technical questions should be settled and second, that a reasonable time period should be agreed upon.⁶

The Prime Minister indicated his agreement, and then reverted to the question of a joint declaration. He said he had worked on a couple of drafts, and went on to indicate the principal points which would be contained in the declaration, as follows:

(1) Affirmation of desire to achieve ultimate objective of controlled prohibition of all tests.

(2) Reference to technological difficulties emerging since conference began 17 months ago and need for coordinated research program.

(3) Need to expedite negotiations on remaining points in proposed treaty.

(4) Intention to suspend tests below threshold for agreed period.

(5) Reference to constitutional processes involved in treaty ratification.

Later the British delegation provided the text of a declaration, copy of which was forwarded to the Department in Mr. Kohler’s memorandum to the Secretary of March 28.⁷

The President, after indicating his general agreement with the proposed line of the declaration, said he wanted to mention another point. Specifically, he wanted to say that the coordinated research program must include actual nuclear testing if it is to be real and productive. He also wanted to say that the agreement period for the moratorium should be not “a period of years” but “a period of time”.

The Prime Minister then started briefly to speculate about what Khrushchev’s motives might be with respect to the nuclear test negotiations, remarking that if he were trying to divide the British and the Americans this was something he couldn’t do.⁸

Mr. Dillon then drew attention to the very important questions connected with the treaty with which the Conference had not yet come to grips, such as Control Commission membership, and which remained to be negotiated.

The President, commenting on the Prime Minister’s speculation, said he was perhaps alone in this feeling but he thought the Soviets would agree to almost anything if in return they got assurances on the East German borders. He felt the Soviets were really scared of a reunited, armed Germany. In fact, they might have some reason for this. When he had made his recent visit to Germany, he was faced on all sides with placards demanding the return of the lost German provinces in the East.

The Prime Minister mentioned that President de Gaulle had already made a statement recognizing the permanence of the post-war German frontiers and suggested that this might be something which could be thought about in connection with the Summit conference.

The Prime Minister said it was his own view that the Russians were not planning to hold any further tests, but did not debate the matter. Reverting to the question of a joint declaration, he repeated that he agreed to this, and proposed that the staff get a draft together.

The Prime Minister said that the British would submit their draft as a starter, and assumed that we would also want to have our staff work out agreed instructions to our delegations in Geneva.

Concluding the immediate discussion on nuclear test questions, the President said he was relieved to find the British and our own views close together. From what he had read and been told, he feared that the Prime Minister was coming over here to try to sell him the full Russian line.⁹

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Macmillan, Vol. II. Secret. Drafted by Kohler.
1. Macmillan was apparently referring to a summary paper entitled “The Need for Nuclear Detonations in a Seismic Research Program,” March 28, and an undated talking paper on a “Coordinated Effort in the Seismic Improvement Program.” (Both ibid.) See the Supplement.
2. At the morning meeting, Macmillan and his party met with Herter, Douglas, McCone, and others to discuss the issues raised in the U.S. papers cited in footnote 1 above. (Memorandum of conversation by Farley, March 28; Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) See the Supplement.
3. The characterization of Democratic candidate Hubert Humphrey was crossed out by Goodpaster when he reviewed the memorandum.
4. Goodpaster added the following handwritten addendum at this point: “He would not go to a term of 4 or 5 years, however.”
5. At this point Goodpaster added the following addition to Macmillan’s remarks: “With regard to the moratorium, he thought that, if at the end of the period the technical problem of inspecting for small underground shots had been solved, we should make a treaty; if good progress is being made, we might extend the moratorium; but if it is proved no inspection is possible, we should be released from the moratorium obligation, and face the problem afresh.”
6. At this point Goodpaster added the following addendum: “He will not go beyond a finite period of 2 years maximum.”
7. There is a draft of a March 29 joint statement, with minor revisions in Herter’s hand, in the Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Miscellaneous 1960. For text of the joint statement as released on March 29, see Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 77–78.
8. Goodpaster added an addendum to the paragraph: “The President commented that he might be striving to divide both of us from the French.”
9. There was another meeting between Eisenhower and Macmillan and their advisers and experts on March 29 to discuss in more detail the technical issues raised at this meeting. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Miscellaneous Series, Macmillan, Vol. II) See the Supplement.