Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

250. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

Washington, March 24, 1960, 10:57 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Herter
• Secretary Dillon
• Secretary Douglas
• Secretary Irwin
• Mr. McCone
• Mr. Gordon Gray
• Dr. Kistiakowsky
• General Goodpaster

The President began by saying that, with regard to his views on the latest Soviet proposal on nuclear test suspension,¹ he is not, of course, going to do anything that would damage vital interests of the U.S. Neither will he do anything that works to the relative disadvantage of the U.S. vis-à-vis the Soviets. He commented that he does not accept the Soviet formulation sent to him by Khrushchev,² which would call for continuation of discussions regarding inspection below the threshold at the end of any moratorium, but without resuming tests. Also he noted that he will not take any action which has the effect of mortgaging his successor—other than a treaty. On the other hand, the President felt he could not stand out against some kind of reasonable solution on this issue if it can be obtained. His idea is to say that he prefers a moratorium of one year, but would accept a two-year moratorium, if necessary. Any such moratorium would have to be qualified to give an incoming President the right to make his own decision in the matter.

Mr. McCone said the principal point in his mind is that we cannot leave ourselves in a position where the Soviets could conduct tests while we could not. Because we cannot inspect successfully against explosions below the threshold, he thought we would be in this situation with a moratorium. He thought a four- or five-year moratorium, as suggested by the Soviets, is much too long. The President said he is in agreement that there should be a relatively short fixed period, and reiterated that his successor should retain an open hand. Mr. McCone suggested that, rather than a moratorium, there be an undertaking to reduce the threshold as rapidly as we can. It will take three to five years to accomplish this; perhaps it could be accomplished in as little as two years.

The President said he does not see how the moratorium provision can hurt us. The Soviets might try to evade, but they would be running a great risk of being detected. He noted that, within such quota of inspection as may be agreed upon, there will be no limit as to conducting inspections above or below the threshold signal of 4.75. He added that he did not think this action would hurt our security position. His assessment is that the Soviets may be coming toward our position (although he recognized that perhaps this is just a clever gambit). He added that he felt we have got to try to make some progress somewhere in the disarmament area.

At this point Mr. McCone said he felt that Khrushchev is simply going back to the initial Soviet proposal. The President expressed disagreement, and after a further exchange, stated that the position outlined is the way he is going to proceed. Mr. McCone said he would have to state that he believes this is a mistake. The President commented that the only real hazard is that the Soviets test and we do not. But the fact is that we have been doing some experimenting, not involving weapons tests. We cannot be completely sure that the Soviets will not make some small tests, but the risks are very great to them.

Secretary Douglas said one point of concern to Defense is that the U.S. has stated the principle that we will not agree to any measure of disarmament which cannot be inspected. The President acknowledged this, but stated that by pronouncement we have already stopped tests for a year and a half. He commented that the Soviets would not be able to test weapons above 20 KT. Mr. Irwin said that even though the tests are below 20 KT, the Soviets can extrapolate the results upward, and build larger weapons with less danger of technical fault. The President said he realized this. He added that we are preparing tunnels, and could conduct tests ourselves if the Soviets violate the moratorium. He did not think the U.S. can be hurt if the moratorium is held to a short period rather than an indefinite one, or one of four to five years duration. He added that if we cannot agree after the two years of work and negotiations that have been conducted at Geneva, then he thought we would be going back to something hopeless and dangerous, and that there will be severe cracks and ruptures in the Western position. He could not agree that we should break up our whole effort over this remaining question. The idea is to see if we can improve the inspection scheme in two years, through additional stations, etc.

Mr. Irwin returned to the point that the Soviets could test weapons larger than 20 KT through the use of the “big hole,” but that this would be expensive. The alternative scheme is to proceed with smaller shots and then scale those up. This would not be expensive.

The President commented that he recognized the risks in what we are doing, but pointed out that we have great risks now simply because we are in a cold war.

The President then told the group that Prime Minister Macmillan would be coming to Washington at the end of this week for talks with the President on Monday and Tuesday.³ The President intended to tell him just how far we are going. The President said he would, of course, prefer the agreement without the provision relating to the moratorium, but that it is clearly impossible to get an agreement on those terms. He stated he would not go beyond two years, and would try for a one-year term. In any case, the moratorium remains subject to the views of his successor. The President commented that it will take a couple of years to install the inspection system. Mr. Irwin suggested keeping the pressure on the negotiation in the effort to reach a satisfactory inspection system quickly.

The President said he does not like the idea of trying to send a treaty up to the Senate at this time. Mr. Herter stated that we would not be able to get a treaty to the Senate in time for action this year.

The President commented that we can, of course, continue with our experiments. He would not, of course, break an agreement, and there would be no debris that would reach the air.

Mr. Irwin added that it would be helpful to go ahead with joint experiments now incident to the research and development for an improved inspection system. We should not wait for the treaty. Mr. McCone said the Soviets insist that the research must be carried out without nuclear explosions, and that we think it should include nuclear explosions. The President noted that our proposal does call for nuclear explosions.

Mr. Dillon suggested that the moratorium should run from the date on which the offer is made, and Mr. Irwin suggested that the research with nuclear explosions should start then. Mr. Gray proposed that we should make clear that we are not under a test moratorium at the present time. As the group left, the President stated that the period of the moratorium should be not over two years, beginning sixty days after the offer is made.

[Here follows discussion of preparations for Macmillan’s visit.]

G.
Brigadier General, USA

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. The meeting was held after the NSC meeting (see Document 249).
1. See footnote 2, Document 247.
2. See footnote 1, Document 247.
3. March 27 and 28. For the Eisenhower–Macmillan discussion, see Document 251.