Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

249. Memorandum of Discussion at the 438th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, March 24, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Item 1. “U.S. Strategic Striking Force.”]

2. The Feasibility and National Security Implications of a Monitored Agreement To Stop or Limit Ballistic Missile Testing and/or Production (NSC Action No. 1840–c;¹ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Monitoring a Long-Range Rocket Test Agreement”, dated March 28, 1958;²NSC Action No. 2161–b;³ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 21, 1960⁴)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on the background of this subject. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another is attached to this Memorandum.)⁵ He then called on Dr. Kistiakowsky.

Dr. Kistiakowsky said that three years ago an ad hoc group had reported its findings on this subject to the effect that a moratorium on the flight testing of long-range missiles, while technically possible, would be to our disadvantage because our development of ballistic missiles was at that time not sufficiently far advanced to permit a cessation of our testing. Now another ad hoc group under the chairmanship of Dr. Ling⁶ had made another study of the subject, the results of which would be presented by Dr. Ling. Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed out that this study, as indeed any study of this nature, was limited in scope and based on a number of assumptions.

Dr. Ling reported that the purpose of the study made by the ad hoc group was to determine the feasibility and the national security implications of a monitored multilateral agreement to ban or limit the flight testing or production of long-range ballistic missiles. The dates January 1961 and January 1963, which would figure prominently in the presentation, were arbitrarily singled out. The ad hoc group had examined the question of limiting ballistic missile testing in relation to outer space activities on the assumption that such activities would continue, although possibly under international control. It was not easy to define long-range ballistic missiles. Radar was the only “high confidence” method of detecting missile flights. Dr. Ling then displayed a chart of radar detection indicating that the trajectory of a missile has to rise to a certain height before there is a certainty of detection by radar. The ad hoc group considered that an apogee of 75 nautical miles was a reasonable figure which would enable all full-range ICBM firings to be detected and would also enable many shorter-range firings to be detected. The choice of a 75 nautical mile apogee automatically determined the number of radars required and also made it possible to detect the firing of any missile with a range of more than 300 miles under normal conditions. He pointed out, however, that a nation determined to evade a limitation on missile testing could flatten the trajectory of its missiles, causing them to skim along under the 75 mile apogee and hence under radar coverage. Such an evasion was a marginally feasible operation. In any case, however, Dr. Ling believed that even with a flattened trajectory a missile could not be fired beyond a range of 3000 miles without being detected. Dr. Ling then said the deliberations of the ad hoc group had rested on a body of factual data which he would summarize in three charts:⁷

(1) U.S. Ballistic Missile Operational Deployment Schedules

(2) USSR ICBM Operational Deployment Schedules

(3) U.S. and USSR ICBM Deployments Compared

Dr. Ling characterized the last-named chart as the “jumping off” place for the study. He said the study had particularly emphasized two factors: (1) the preservation of a secure U.S. retaliatory capability; and (2) an adequately stable deterrent, by which he meant a deterrent force capable of inflicting such unavoidable and serious damage to a country making the first strike that no country would think of attacking. He said that hardening and mobility as related to U.S. missile launching sites had played an important role in the study, as had Polaris.

Dr. Ling then listed as follows certain key considerations which had exercised a constant effect on the study.

(1) The first of these was a basic dissymmetry arising from the fact that our missile sites are well-known to the enemy, while the enemy’s missile sites are wholly unknown or only partly known to us. Consequently, the USSR would target our retaliatory capability, while our targets would be industrial and urban complexes.

(2) In the second place, since the USSR must destroy hardened U.S. launching sites, guidance accuracy, i.e., CEP, is a more precious commodity to the Soviet Union than it is to us. In fact, the Soviet CEP turned out to be the most sensitive parameter of the study.CEP is translatable into numbers of missiles by way of the exchange ratio, i.e., the number of Soviet missiles required to destroy one U.S. missile. The exchange rate for hardened sites is sensitive to CEP so that a two to one improvement in the Soviet CEP is equivalent to a four to one augmentation of Soviet missiles targeted for U.S. hardened sites. Dr. Ling added the study group had considered variations of the Soviet CEP from the figures given in NIE 11–8–59.⁸ The group believed that an alternative set of Soviet CEP’s would be attainable with radio guidance.

(3) In the third place, Dr. Ling brought up what he called “a clouded crystal ball.” He said that developments now completely unforeseen could invalidate the conclusions of the report. For example, the USSR might—although this was unlikely—develop anti-submarine warfare or anti-ballistic missile capabilities within a few years adequate to nullify our Polaris. If such capabilities were developed, they would alter the established balance of forces. As another example, a test ban on ballistic missiles might lead to a resurgence of interest in aero-dynamic missiles, especially low altitude vehicles. It was thus apparent that a test ban on ballistic missiles would have serious side effects.

Dr. Ling then displayed a chart⁹ showing the Soviet missiles required for a surprise attack on the U.S. with a 90 per cent probability of producing a specified over-pressure at each aim point in the U.S. He said this chart had been prepared by the ad hoc group and was not based on a formal intelligence position. The chart indicated that if the Soviet ICBM had the CEP referred to in the NIE, the USSR would require 700 ICBMs for a surprise attack on the U.S. by mid-1962. It also showed that a Soviet CEP equal to the U.S. potential would cause the Soviets to need 700 ICBMs by mid-1963. Finally, the chart indicated that the number of ICBMs required by the USSR would rise steeply from a figure of 200 after mid-1961 as U.S. launching sites were hardened. Dr. Ling then presented an overlay on this chart which indicated that the Soviets would not have sufficient missiles for a surprise attack on the U.S. after U.S. hardening began. He remarked that hardening could affect a qualitative as well as a quantitative change in the situation, but cautioned that the curve on the chart needed to be cautiously interpreted.

Dr. Ling reported that many studies related to the main study prepared by the ad hoc group had remained undone or had been carried only as far as necessary to validate some of the conclusions. The following were among the omissions of the report:

(1) the implications of the abrogation of any missile testing agreements;

(2) the relationship of arms control measures discussed in the report to others, including general disarmament;

(3) the implications of inhibiting the attainment of nuclear delivery capabilities by nations other than the U.S., the U.K. and the USSR;

(4) the detailed inspection requirements and cost of monitoring a production ban; and

(5) specific controls on space programs, including an international

Dr. Ling then said he would read and comment on the conclusions of the report. He read Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the enclosure to the reference Memorandum of March 21. (A copy of the Conclusions of the study is attached.) Referring to the alternative flight detection systems mentioned in Paragraph 5, Dr. Ling said he meant acoustic and radio back-scatter systems which together constituted a simple and reliable detection system, especially against attempts to launch ICBMs from shipboard on the high seas by a power which might be seeking to evade the test ban.

Dr. Ling read Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the report. In connection with Paragraph 7 he remarked that it was conceivable that a Soviet all-inertial guidance system tested on space vehicles could find its way into the missile stockpile, even though a system tested only in space could not be as confidently used for missile purposes as one tested for such purposes. He read Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the report, remarking that more study of the internationalization of space was required. After reading Paragraph 10 Dr. Ling said it seemed impossible to tell whether a test ban in 1963 would increase or decrease the risks of the U.S. position, since many of these risks were associated with unforeseen contingencies. After reading Paragraph 11 Dr. Ling warned that if a deployment of radars for detecting missile tests was wanted in 1963, the time to begin the engineering study was now.

Dr. Ling then read Paragraphs 12 through 16. He remarked that a more detailed study of requirements for inspection of a ban on missile testing was needed. In connection with Paragraph 16 he believed that a potential violator of a ban on missile testing would have to weigh the risk of detection against the possible advantage he would gain from violation. In the event of a total ban on testing, the advantage of evasion might be great; but a ban on production only might make the advantages of evasion considerably less persuasive. Dr. Ling then read Paragraphs 17 and 18 of the report, and concluded his presentation by declaring that the whole study was complex and difficult. The ad hoc group had tried to be factual and cautious without carrying caution to such an extreme that nothing at all could be done.

Secretary Douglas believed the study was an interesting and useful one, but cautioned against considering missiles alone without reference to other categories of force. Conclusions as to the wisdom of a ban on missile testing depend not only on the facts brought out by this study, but also, and to the same extent, on the situation with respect to long-range aircraft or short-range missiles at a particular time, because if the effect of long-range missiles were eliminated the short-range missiles and manned bombers would become very important in the military situation. Secretary Douglas felt rational conclusions could not be reached on this subject for any particular time period in the absence of a careful estimate of our delivery capabilities other than our long-range missile capabilities. He added that the chart displayed by Dr. Ling comparing U.S. and USSR ICBMs was precisely the kind of chart that had caused a great deal of trouble on the Hill because it seems to show that our situation is desperate. Dr. Ling said that to some extent the study group had been at the mercy of the terms of reference. The group had taken manned bombers into account, but not short-range missiles. Polaris had been very much on the minds of the group when it arrived at its conclusions.

The President asked what Secretary Douglas meant by his remark about the U.S. being in a desperate condition.

Secretary Douglas said he meant that if we consider nothing but ICBMs and ignore all other elements of strength, then the USSR seems to have an edge on us. He added that the CEP of missiles was a matter of great interest to him. He felt the U.S. would be in a serious situation even if the Soviets had considerably less than a 90 per cent probability of producing a specified over-pressure at each aim point in the U.S. He believed it was important to realize the limitations of the charts Dr. Ling had displayed.

Secretary Herter felt the presentation had demonstrated the immense complexity of the problem. He believed the most important conclusion emerging from the report was that it was not to our advantage to agree to a ban on missile testing at this time. However, some considerations different from those developed in the study made two years ago had appeared, so that in his view study of this subject should be on a continuing basis. The time might come when a limitation on missile testing might be in the interest of the U.S. In any case studies of this kind constituted important guidance in disarmament problems.

Admiral Burke agreed that further study was desirable. He felt we did not yet know whether a ban on missile testing would ever be desirable in the future. Secretary Herter said at some time in the future we might conclude that we had more to gain than to lose from a limitation on missile testing. In reply to a question from Mr. Gray, Secretary Herter said the French were exerting a great deal of pressure now for a ban on missile testing. Such a ban appeared to be a fixed idea of the French because of their political situation. Secretary Herter believed that the negative information in the report was of great value.

The President pointed out that our ideas might be changed a great deal if our reconnaissance satellites were successful. Secretary Herter wondered whether a ban on missile testing would slow up the development of our reconnaissance satellite program. The President said that in the light of the study just presented, we would not think of agreeing to a ban on missile testing before 1963.

Admiral Burke pointed out that the conclusions of the study were based on many sensitive assumptions, so that a slight change in the assumptions might make a considerable change in the conclusions. He felt the study should be broadened to encompass many of the related matters referred to in the presentation. Dr. Ling said if the study were broadened it would tend to become an overall study of general disarmament. Admiral Burke felt that one related study could be pursued at a time. Mr. Dulles remarked that the U.S. did not have at the present time adequate intelligence on Soviet philosophy and techniques regarding ICBM launching. Intelligence on this matter was, however, a high priority target. The President said he believed a study of this subject was an extraordinarily difficult task. He was worried about the proposal that the subject should be kept under constant study because he shuddered at the amount of talent that would have to be expended in such an operation. Dr. Kistiakowsky pointed out that the study just presented had been prepared on a part-time basis; that is, by persons who had other duties. He felt we must continue to study this subject or we would find ourselves helpless to decide these questions in the future. The President believed it was possible to make periodic studies of the subject; that is, at some time in the future we might make another study in an effort to determine to what extent the conclusions presented today should be modified in the light of later developments. Dr. Kistiakowsky said one of the chief difficulties of the study was its ad hoc nature, which made it possible to study only part of the overall subject at one time. The President said we did not need to make a decision at this time on the nature of the next study.

The National Security Council:¹⁰

Discussed the subject in the light of a presentation of a report by the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (transmitted, on a Special Limited distribution, by the reference memorandum of March 21, 1960).

[Here follow Agenda Items 3–6, unrelated to disarmament.]

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Restricted Data. Drafted by Boggs on March 24. For Kistiakowsky’s account of this meeting, see A Scientist at the White House, pp. 281–282.
1. See footnote 15, Document 136.
2. See footnote 2, Document 148.
3. See footnote 4, Document 237.
4. With this memorandum, the Executive Secretary of the NSC transmitted the conclusions of a study entitled “The Feasibility and National Security Implications of a Monitored Agreement To Stop or Limit Ballistic Missile Testing and/or Production,” March 14. (Department of State, S/S–RD Files: Lot 71 D 171) See the Supplement.
5. See the Supplement.
6. Donald P. Ling of Bell Laboratories was a member of the President’s Science Advisory Committee.
7. Not found.
8. Document 88.
9. Not found.
10. The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 2198, approved by the President on March 31. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)