Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

248. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, March 23, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Geneva Nuclear Test Negotiations: Meeting of Principals

PARTICIPANTS

• Department of State
  • Secretary Herter
  • Under Secretary Dillon
  • M—Mr. Merchant
  • EUR—Mr. Kohler
  • EUR—Mr. Dubs
  • S/S—Mr. Borg
  • S/AE—Mr. Farley
  • S/AE—Mr. Spiers
  • S/AE—Mr. Baker
• Department of Defense
  • Under Secretary Douglas
  • Lt. General Fox
  • Mr. Irwin
  • Lt. General Dabney
• White House
  • Dr. Kistiakowsky
  • Mr. Gordon Gray
  • Mr. Keeny
• Atomic Energy Commission
  • Mr. McCone
  • General Starbird
  • Dr. English
• Central Intelligence Agency
  • Mr. Dulles
  • Dr. Scoville

Mr. Dillon distributed for discussion the attached draft policy statement on nuclear testing (Tab A) prepared in the Department of State, and suggested a paragraph by paragraph review of the paper.

Secretary Herter suggested that reference to peaceful uses detonations be included among the unsettled issues in paragraph (1). Mr. Dillon confirmed Mr. Irwin’s understanding that the use of the term “quota” did not imply acceptance of the Soviet principle of a politically-determined quota. Mr. Dillon stated that the ultimate decision might be called a political one, but that we would base our decision on our view of the technical needs for proper control. Secretary Herter said that the quota to be applied below the threshold did not need to be included in the treaty, but could be determined by side agreement along with the moratorium.

Turning to the second paragraph, Mr. McCone said it should be clear that we would proceed independently with research if there were delays in a joint program. Mr. Dillon indicated that this program would be part of the “package”. If there were delay in reaching agreement on the research program, there would be no agreement on the moratorium. After further discussion, it was agreed to refer to a “coordinated” rather than a “joint” program, and to make clear that nuclear detonations in such a program would be subject to similar safeguards as those envisaged for peaceful uses detonations.

Turning to paragraph (3), Mr. McCone stated that this was in effect complete acceptance of what the Soviets proposed on March 19.¹ As such it would be a sharp departure from the policy we have stated and restated. Secretary Herter pointed out that the moratorium would not be part of the treaty, as the Soviets propose. Mr. McCone continued that it would be illusory to expect that anything can be done to improve seismic capabilities in less than 3–5 years. Even then the results may be questionable. Preparations for “Cowboy”² took ten months. Thus a two year moratorium was not realistic. We would be stepping into a long-term moratorium. This complete reversal of policy was very alarming.

Mr. Douglas stated that if the Soviets accepted our threshhold proposal, we would not do any testing at least for a year or two. In practical terms we would not be giving up anything more in proposing a moratorium. The key question in any case was how much we are willing to pay for a treaty which provides for controls for the first time. The coordinated research program would teach us a lot in two years even though it would not be conclusive in that time.

Mr. Dulles suggested that the specific date of January 21, 1961, be put in as the time specification for the moratorium. The President could argue that this was the maximum commitment he had authority to make, and that the extension would be a matter for decision by the next President. Mr. Gray suggested that no specific time period be mentioned, but that the length of the moratorium be made to depend upon the good faith demonstrated in pursuing the research program. If a fixed period were specified, there would be little incentive for Soviet good faith performance.

Mr. Dillon observed that our practical problem was that we were not likely to test in any event. Mr. Douglas agreed, stating that in his view the price of agreement to a moratorium was not too great. We have an opportunity to take a long step forward toward international controls. Mr. McCone agreed that we would probably not test, but that we are confronted with a matter of principle. The reasons we would not test now were primarily political. The next President may feel differently on this question.

Secretary Herter said that the most the President can do is say that he would recommend extension of the moratorium to his successor. This may have some dangers, but there were pressing political objectives which can be served by agreements, and these should not be overlooked. The Nth country problem and a breakthrough on the arms control front were among these. However, he did not think the Russians would accept the proposal we were considering. Mr. Gray noted that putting a date, January 1961, in the third paragraph would bring the issue immediately into the political campaign. Other candidates would be under great pressure to endorse the moratorium. Mr. Irwin agreed. Mr. Dillon said that a candidate could refuse to commit himself until he was elected.

Mr. Douglas suggested, as an alternative, that a two-year moratorium be written into the treaty. A less-than-10-months moratorium would not be convincing to the Russians or to public opinion.

Mr. Irwin said the moratorium idea concerned him. He wondered what the Russians could accomplish if they cheated and we didn’t. In his mind there was no doubt that over a period of time the Russians would cheat if they could. Mr. McCone agreed. Professor Emelyanov had told him of the deep split in the Soviet Government on this issue. The anti-test ban faction could get the upper hand in the future. There are developments of great military significance which could be accomplished by further testing. New types of small tactical weapons were important, although not overly so. More important are the missile warhead improvements which can be made. He reviewed present yield/weight figures and indicated the improvements which could be anticipated with further testing, stating that warhead weight reduction could mean an increased range for a given rocket.

Mr. Douglas said that some of these things would be nice to do, but that Defense has not overemphasized their importance. We do not have to go further than far enough. We could use a slightly higher yield on Polaris, but even slight improvements in guidance accuracy would more than compensate for yield increases of this order. Mr. McCone said that he was only indicating the improvements which could be made, and not arguing the military necessity of further testing. Mr. Douglas said that we had a military as well as political interest in opening up the USSR. We must look at both sides of the question. Inspection in the USSR would be a real step forward. Mr. McCone said that this may or may not be the case. Many of the control posts would be in isolated areas, although on-site inspection could be of some significance. Dr. Scoville disagreed, stating that even stationary posts could be of great importance.

Mr. Gray said he also believed that at some point we will have enough. He seriously suspected we had reached that point. Dr. Scoville said that the knowledge we could gain from inspection would be more important militarily than the yield increases Mr. McCone had described. Soviet agreements that any seismic event would be eligible for inspection opened up a major opportunity.

Secretary Herter said he was worried about the prospect of no agreement at all, particularly if there were public & political restrictions on our ability to test anyway. It is more to our advantage to accept the imperfect than to have nothing and perhaps leave the field open for the whole world to develop and test nuclear weapons. We cannot toss these considerations aside too lightly. Furthermore, we had made a great deal of progress in ten months of negotiation. Mr. Irwin observed that we were assuming the Soviets would reject the threshhold treaty without a moratorium. Perhaps this was wrong.

Dr. Kistiakowsky reviewed the progress which could be expected in 2 years of research. Much could be done on instrumentation and the threshhold of the Geneva system could probably be pushed down to 5 KT from the present 20 KT. However, there would still be a detection threshold. Unmanned seismic stations could result in a substantial improvement. General Starbird pointed out that even a 1 KT threshhold could allow testing of some military significance through use of presently known extrapolation techniques. Mr. Douglas said this would be tremendously expensive. Dr. Kistiakowsky said that great sophistication would be required for any useful testing at this level. It was not a technique readily available to 3rd countries. Dr. Scoville said that current intelligence indicators could provide good clues of where to look although they could not in and of themselves prove violations.

Secretary Herter recapitulated the views expressed and said that he felt the President should have an opportunity to hear the dissenting views expressed by Mr. McCone. For his part he would be willing to limit the formal moratorium to the President’s period of competence. Mr. Douglas reminded the group that a possible alternative would be to put a 2 year period into the treaty itself. Mr. Gray raised again the desirability of avoiding a fixed time period and of tying the moratorium to the research program and installation of the control system provided in the treaty. Mr. Dillon said that it would be asking a lot for the Soviets to agree to such an open-ended proposal which would leave any state free to resume tests on an essentially subjective basis.

Secretary Herter said he would find out when a meeting with the President could be scheduled.³

Tab A

⁴

Draft Policy Statement

The United States should be prepared to accept the following three-point program in the Geneva nuclear test negotiations:

(1) Conclusion of a threshold treaty along lines proposed by the U.S. on February 11,⁵ with satisfactory settlement of the outstanding technical and political issues required for an effective control system, including the level or quota of inspections (to be applied both above and below the threshold), remaining aspects of the staffing and voting problems, composition of the Control Commission, and the phased extension of the controls necessary to assure a world-wide cessation of nuclear weapons tests.

(2) Agreement on a joint research program, to be planned as soon as possible, for the purpose of progressively improving control methods for events below the threshold. Such a research program should explicitly make provision for the conduct of nuclear explosions necessary for improving and testing detection capabilities.

(3) Simultaneous unilateral declarations, or executive agreement, by the three powers at the time of signature of the treaty that they would refrain from conducting nuclear weapons tests explosions not prohibited by the treaty for an agreed period⁶ while (a) the joint research program is being pursued, (b) the initial phase of the agreed control system is being installed, and (c) there are no indications that the other countries are not abiding by the declaration.

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Spiers and cleared by U, M, and S. For Kistiakowsky’s account of this meeting, see A Scientist at the White House, p. 281. On March 24, Herter, Allen Dulles, and Goodpaster met with Eisenhower, and Herter briefed the President on this meeting as follows: “Defense is prepared to go along with a line of action such as the President had discussed with Mr. Herter yesterday. Mr. McCone is violently opposed. He thought perhaps the President should see the principals, or possibly Mr. McCone alone. The President said he is willing to accept the proposal for a moratorium on tests below the threshold, but it must be limited to an agreed period and made subject to the decision of his successor. As regards Mr. McCone’s opposition, this is a policy question, and Mr. McCone will have to accept the President’s policy determination.” (Memorandum of conference with the President by Goodpaster, March 24; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)
1. See footnote 2, Document 247.
2. Not further identified.
3. Not further identified.
4. Secret. On March 24, the President received a copy of this draft proposal, dated March 23, with revised language in paragraphs 2 and 3. Eisenhower initialed the draft proposal and made a revision in the footnote. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Disarmament) For text of the draft, see the Supplement.
5. For text of the U.S. proposal of February 11, see Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 31–33.
6. The United States will first propose a one-year period, but will be prepared to accept a two-year period if this should prove necessary to reach agreement on the over-all package. It would have to be made clear that either a declaration or an executive agreement would be subject to reconfirmation by the newly elected President. [Footnote in the source text.]