Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

247. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

Washington, March 23, 1960, 8:45 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Herter
• Secretary Dillon
• General Goodpaster

[Here follows Herter’s account of a discussion with Senator Albert Gore about the scheduled Eisenhower visit to the Soviet Union.]

With regard to the latest Khrushchev note,¹ Mr. Herter confirmed the correct translation of the provision that, at the conclusion of the moratorium, discussions would continue without resumption of tests. He said the British are pressing very hard to accept the Soviet proposal.² He gave the President a long letter from Selwyn Lloyd,³ which the President read, expressing disagreement with certain of Lloyd’s premises (chiefly the one that any resumption of testing, even by the Soviets, will be blamed on the U.S.).

Mr. Herter said he had had a legal analysis made as to whether an executive agreement signed by the President could bind his successor, and the finding is that it cannot. He also said there is strong feeling on Mr. McCone’s part against the Russian proposal, and less strong on the part of Defense. They stress that we should not make a permanent ban of testing without having adequate inspection. The President said he agreed. He did not understand that a permanent renunciation was involved. Mr. Dillon commented that the basic question is really the length of period of study on improved inspection methods, which is to be covered by a moratorium. Mr. Herter said that if we do not accept the moratorium idea, our only recourse is to go back to the limited treaty we proposed a year ago.

The President said he understood the Russian proposal to relate to weapons testing. He asked if there is any way by which agreement to the conduct of explosions for peaceful purposes can be obtained. Mr. Herter recalled that this had been agreed upon in principle. Mr. Herter said both Dr. Kistiakowsky and Mr. McCone stressed the importance of conducting underground explosions, including nuclear explosions, as part of a research program to improve inspection methods.

The President thought that he could agree to a moratorium for a particular period. We would start with a proposal for a one-year moratorium, but could, he thought, safely agree on a two-year moratorium. He does not plan to ban testing simply by pronouncement—at least not permanently or indefinitely. If through the operation of the treaty inspection system we obtain greater confidence that effective observation in Russia can be accomplished, we could then think about extending the moratorium arrangements. He added that he does not want to do anything that would purport to bind his successor, since he feels his successor should be in a position to make his own concessions.

Mr. Herter asked if he might pass the Khrushchev letter to the other principals engaged in this study, as well as to the British. The President declined to give this authority, in light of the leak of his last exchange with Khrushchev. He suggested that Mr. Herter tell Ambassador Caccia that we regard this Soviet proposal as a new idea. It has one principal defect—that they are insisting on stopping testing simply by pronouncement, whereas we wish to couple pronouncement with inspection. The Soviets have, however, agreed that it is difficult to inspect below the threshold, and this agreement gives hope for negotiation. We are not, however, going to accept a long-term ban without inspection.

Mr. Dillon commented that, with regard to the study period, we could have an agreement to a treaty covering explosions above the threshold and rely upon a unilateral statement below. The President said such a statement would still have to be limited to a year or two, and not bind his successor. He said he is inclined to think the Soviets are really ready to stop testing if they make an agreement. There are two hypotheses on which the contrary might be true: they think their propaganda machine is good enough so that they could “lie away” any violation that was discovered, or they plan to continue testing in some place not covered by the agreement, such as China. Mr. Dillon noted that the French have said that they will not be bound by any agreement reached.

[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects. ]

G.
Brigadier General USA

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on March 25.
1. Dated March 3. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Khrushchev–Eisenhower) See the Supplement.
2. On March 19, Soviet Representative Tsarapkin informed the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests that the Soviet Union was prepared to conclude a treaty on cessation of all nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, the oceans, outer space, and of all underground tests that produce seismic oscillations of a magnitude 4.75 conventional units or above. As for unidentified underground events at or below 4.75 conventional units, Tsarapkin stated that the Soviet Union was prepared to institute a program of joint research and experiments with the West on the understanding that all parties to the treaty agreed not to carry out testing at or below 4.75 conventional units during the period of joint research and experimentation. For full text of the statement, see Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 72–75.
3. Dated March 22. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Dulles/Herter–UK Officials) See the Supplement.