Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

252. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, April 13, 1960, 3 p.m.

US/MC/25

FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Washington D.C., April 12–14, 1960¹

SUBJECT

• Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on Disarmament

PARTICIPANTS

• Additional Attendees Listed at Tab A²
• U.S.
  • Secretary Herter
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Farley
• Canada
  • Secretary Green
  • Mr. Robertson
  • Ambassador Heeney
• France
  • Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
  • Ambassador Alphand
  • Mr. Lucet
• Italy
  • Foreign Minister Segni
  • Ambassador Brosio
  • Ambassador Straneo
• U.K.
  • Foreign Secretary Lloyd
  • Ambassador Caccia
  • Mr. Hainworth

Secretary Herter extended a welcome to the group and expressed the hope that today’s discussion would be worthwhile. He said that the agenda for the meeting was a nebulous one. We hoped to discuss the progress made to date at Geneva, to concert our assessment of the existing situation and discuss the moves we might make between now and the Summit. He assumed that all delegations had available the Five Power report prepared by our Geneva delegations³ and that this would serve as the basis for the discussion. The first point to note was the sharp difference of opinion between the East and West on the manner of proceeding in negotiations. The Soviets were sticking so far on the need to agree on general principles at the outset. The Allies on the other hand consistently stressed the need to agree on first measures which could constitute a real beginning toward the ultimate goal. The Western powers have resisted seeking agreement on general principles which could be differently interpreted by the two sides since this would not represent any meaningful advance. We continue to hold that our plan represented the most practical approach, although we were willing to discuss any proposals presented. The Soviets have recently made a switch in tactics in suggesting adoption of the UN resolution as a basis for discussion:⁴ this is curious in view of the last paragraph of this resolution which speaks of agreement on specific measures toward the goal of complete and general disarmament. He felt that our own approach was precisely in accord with this paragraph. He suggested that we now discuss the position we had reached and any difference of opinion we might have on the assessment.

M. Couve de Murville agreed that our problem was to discuss whether we should seek among ourselves to redefine our general goals or to stick with the position we had taken until now. He had begun to wonder how we should orient the discussion in Geneva in the future. He himself agreed that all we could really hope to do is to define certain concrete practical steps which we can take now. We had not yet succeeded in making clear our own program of action and he hoped that the session today would result in some clarification of our ideas.

Mr. Green said that he was much concerned about the policy that was being followed in Geneva and that he had reservations about the U.S. suggestion that we should maintain our present course of action. He observed that world opinion feels that the negotiations are deadlocked and that the situation was very serious. He thought that there was not much to be gained by spending another two weeks with the present situation in which each side has rejected the other’s proposal. Canada felt that an attempt should be made to develop specific agreements on measures on which there is now a degree of unanimity. Such measures appeared in the first stages of both plans. He suggested that consideration be given to the specific areas which could be dealt with in this manner. Secretary Herter said that he thought we were in complete agreement on this approach which stressed the need to discuss concrete steps and to get away from propagandistic discussion of generalities. We would all like to move in the direction suggested by Canada, but the Soviet position made this difficult. It was quite possible that this situation would change. Khrushchev may have in mind presenting a proposal to break the deadlock at the Summit. Mr. Green said that he favored extending an invitation to the Secretary General of the U.N. to attend the sessions. If this were done world opinion would be focused in a different way. The Secretary General might well have some useful suggestions to present. His attendance would be particularly appropriate since we have proposed an international disarmament organization. An impression has been created that this organization would rival the U.N. and this has caused dissatisfication among members of the U.N. who are not represented at Geneva. He felt it would be wise to arrange for the Secretary General’s appearance before the recess. This move would be a step forward and might help break the deadlock.

Sig. Segni suggested that the Canadian proposal was premature and would cause complications in the negotiations. He thought it more useful to formulate general principles for consideration at the Summit, which would then be in a position to achieve some positive result.

Mr. Lloyd said that four points had arisen in the discussion so far: (1) The wisdom of trying to put forward a Western counter-statement of principles, (2) Whether we should continue to concentrate attention on specific agreements which could be reached, (3) The suggestion that Hammarskjold be invited to Geneva, and (4) What could the Summit accomplish on disarmament. He said that the British Delegation had prepared a paper relevant to the first two points. He felt strongly that we must not remain at a relative disadvantage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. We needed to introduce a reply to the Soviet paper on general principles. His own inclination was to put forward a statement which would deal both with general objectives and the specific matters on which we proposed immediate discussion. Secretary Herter said that the U.S. had been thinking along similar lines and had sent this morning to Geneva a proposed counter-statement of our own for comment by our delegation. Mr. Lloyd read the U.K. suggestion (Tab B). Secretary Herter said that this statement runs extraordinarily close to the one we ourselves had prepared. Regarding the suggestion of inviting the Secretary General, he agreed with the Italian view. He felt that it would only lead to confusion if the Secretary General addressed the meetings before the recess. He had been in touch with the Secretary General and was aware of his preoccupations. The U.S. side had been doing some work on this question and hoped to have a working paper that could be distributed to the other participants before the Istanbul meeting.⁵ He felt it was undesirable, however, to raise this matter in the negotiations at this time since it would make it more difficult for us to focus on the key issues we wished to highlight. He doubted that the Secretary General would be willing to discuss anything other than the general question of relationship between the IDO and the U.N. and it would not be productive to raise this matter in the negotiations now. Mr. Green observed that it would be a good idea to get the discussion off on another course. The presence of the Secretary General could not harm the negotiations and might indeed do a great deal of good. It was only a few months before the General Assembly where the Western powers will have to explain the lack of results so far. What he suggested was a Western initiative to which the Soviets could not very well object. As it is, they have maneuvered themselves into a position where they can take credit for championing the U.N. Accordingly, he did not think that discussion of this question in the conference should be delayed.

M. Couve de Murville said that he felt the U.K. draft was a good one in principle. It placed emphasis on the practical steps on which agreement could now be reached. Although he did not feel that the Soviets were making a great impression on public opinion with their plan, he felt that we ourselves should pay more attention to this aspect. He approved of the first paragraph in the British paper as a simple, straightforward and readily understandable statement of the Western objectives. He did not wish to get into a detailed discussion of the remainder of the paper and suggested that it should be turned over to the delegations in Geneva for study and advice. He felt that it was desirable to aim for a Western proposal which could be put forward at the Summit on certain specific measures which could be carried out immediately. He suggested that we obtain the views of the Geneva delegations on this matter as well. He did not feel capable of engaging in a detailed discussion of this matter and wished only to stress French emphasis on nuclear disarmament. We could not very well omit proposals on control of nuclear weapons from the first steps. He noted that this took a secondary place in the British paper.

Sig. Segni said that he accepted the proposal of Mr. Lloyd that a Western draft be developed. However, its text should be carefully worked out and studied. He also agreed that we should attempt at the Summit to reach some kind of detailed agreement and not just agreement on principles.

Secretary Herter agreed that the U.K. draft should be sent to Geneva for study by the delegations at once. He felt we should make every effort to get an agreed Western counter-statement before the recess.⁶ At the same time, we should press the Soviets on their indications of flexibility so that we could do as Italy suggested at the Summit. He thought that the British draft should be studied together with the U.S. draft which he said he would circulate at the present session. Mr. Green agreed that it would be useful to seek the views of the five delegations on matters which the Heads of Government could press at the Summit. Secretary Herter recalled Khrushchev’s statement at the UN about partial measures. He was convinced that the Russians know as well as we do that our approach is the more practical one. He felt that it was still possible that they would change their tactics before the recess. Mr. Lloyd said that he felt there was agreement that we should attempt to develop a Western counter-statement for tabling before the recess and that we should proceed to get the advice of our experts in Geneva on the contents of such a statement as well as on the specifics we might propose at the Summit. M. Couve de Murville said that he had received a proposed text from Moch of a similar statement which they would make available to the others as soon as possible.

Secretary Herter said that we would want to consider at the Istanbul meeting exactly what we should do at the Summit, in the light of whatever progress we are able to make in Geneva between now and then. Sig. Segni said that he would like to have another meeting of the five Foreign Ministers just before the Summit to consider the specific proposals which might be put forward there. If this were discussed at Istanbul, the danger of press leaks would be great. Therefore, he favored postponing final decisions until the last possible moment. Secretary Herter thought that this suggestion had merit but that the matter should be decided at Istanbul rather than now. He agreed that there was a great danger of any decisions worked out so far in advance becoming public property.

Reverting to his earlier suggestion, Mr. Green said that he had not proposed that the Geneva negotiations get into details on the question of the U.N.’s role on disarmament. He proposed only that the Secretary General be invited to give his general views on the question so that the UN will feel that its interests are being kept in mind. Secretary Herter said he continued to doubt that this would serve a useful purpose. He said he wished to digress for a moment on a rather discouraging aspect of the arms control problem which had occurred to him in connection with the French emphasis on control of delivery systems. He said that he had consulted an experienced American Army engineering officer on the possibility of concealing as many as a hundred missiles in violation of an arms agreement. The officer had advised him that he could guarantee concealing and that the only risk he would run of detection would be if there were an informer. He felt that problems like this emphasized the need for an international body with sufficient strength of its own to make cheating on the part of a would-be violator unprofitable. Thus he felt that our stress on the need for peacekeeping institutions in the context of total disarmament was sound and must be maintained. Recapitulating the discussion so far, he said that it appeared to be agreed that we would instruct our delegations to develop a paper for tabling before the Summit so that the Russians would not have the last word. In response to Mr. Green’s suggestion that we concentrate on working out limited areas of possible agreement, Secretary Herter said that he felt that this had been our approach all along and that it continued to be a sound one.

Referring again to the question of the Secretary General, Mr. Lloyd said that he had discussed the problem in general terms with Hammarskjold last Sunday. The Secretary General was going to Geneva to the Law of the Sea Conference and had said that he would like to sit in on a session of the Ten-Nation Committee. He had made no mention, however, of making a statement. Hammarskjold had said that it would be dangerous if the IDO developed without any connection with the U.N. His own preference was for a close connection. However, all he wanted was assurance that the two bodies would not be completely independent. Lloyd had assured him that we foresaw that the IDO would be established “within the U.N. framework”. He had said frankly that he did not feel that we could agree on a specific subordinate relationship to the Security Council in view of the Soviet veto or to the General Assembly as presently constituted, where a two-thirds vote is required. This could be a matter of life and death and we could not submit to the arbitrament of these bodies. It was clear that Hammarskjold had not thought the problem out himself and he had little to say about Lloyd’s observation. He felt, however, that Mr. Green had a sound fundamental point—that we must not let the Soviets get away with posing as champions of the U.N.

Secretary Herter asked whether there were any other matters which ought to be discussed. The present group was to meet again Sunday, May 1, in Istanbul, and would have another report from the delegations in Geneva at that time. Mr. Lloyd raised the question of a press line. Secretary Herter read a suggested draft prepared by the Canadians. After an exchange of views, a statement was agreed on the basis of the Canadian draft (Tab C).⁷

Tab B

⁸

DISARMAMENT “PRINCIPLES” TO BE PUT FORWARD BY THE WESTERN POWERS AT THE SUMMIT

1. The final goal is general and complete international disarmament, covering all States and all types of forces and weapons, to the levels required by internal security and fulfilment of obligations under the United Nations Charter; and the maintenance, by international machinery, of international law and order in a disarmed world.

2. The disarmament process must:

(a) be balanced and comprehensive so that no country or group of countries obtains, at any stage, a significant military advantage;

(b) give equal security to all, so that international confidence is progressively increased;

(c) be effectively controlled throughout, to ensure that disarmament obligations are carried out and that there is no evasion.

For the carrying out of this process thorough preparatory work is required, and international control machinery must be established to function as disarmament measures are put into force.

3. For obvious practical reasons disarmament must take place by stages, each stage to be completed as rapidly as possible; but no fixed timetable for the whole process can be laid down in advance.

4. Immediate detailed consideration should be given to:

(a) reductions of the armed forces and armaments of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and certain other States, together with the associated measures of control, to which the States represented on the 10-Nation Committee might agree at once, pending the negotiation of general disarmament measures affecting other States;

(b) the establishment of a ban, with appropriate controls, on the stationing of weapons in orbit or in outer space.

5. Preparations for the further measures of disarmament should also begin immediately. Special attention should be paid to the particular problems of agreeing upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, to the transfer, under control, of fissionable material from military to peaceful uses, and to the control of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. Consideration should be given, in addition, to interim measures to give States better protection against surprise attack and increase international confidence during the early stages of general disarmament.

6. The disarmament process must be started as soon as possible, in order to build up international confidence, and provide experience of the technical and practical problems of international disarmament and control.

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by Spiers and approved in M on April 16 and in S on April 21. The meeting was held in the Conference Suite at the U.S. Information Agency.
1. The Foreign Ministers of the United States, Canada, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom met in Washington April 12–14 to discuss the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament meeting in Geneva and the summit conference scheduled to begin in Paris on May 16.
2. Not printed.
3. Apparent reference to the paper submitted to the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva by the five Western nations on March 16, printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 68–71.
4. The Soviet bloc proposal, April 8, is printed ibid., pp. 79–80. The U. N. General Assembly resolution, No. 1378, November 20, 1959, is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, p. 1545.
5. The Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council held at Istanbul May 2–4, 1960.
6. The Western proposal was submitted to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee on April 26; see Documents on Disarmament, 1960, pp. 81–82.
7. Tab C is in the Supplement; it is also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, p. 400.
8. Confidential.