Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

220. Notes of Meeting⁰

Washington, June 5, 1959.

Notes by McCone of the Meeting, June 5, 1959 at 7:30 AM attended by:

• Acting Secretary of State Dillon
• Acting Secretary of Defense Gates
• Gordon Gray
• Dr. Killian
• Allen Dulles
• John McCone

The meeting convened at 7:30 AM. At 8:00 AM the group was joined by General Loper, General Starbird, Dr. English, Dr. Killian, Philip Farley and one or two others.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the opening of the Geneva Test Conference on June 8, most particularly the disposition of the Berkner Reports.¹

Secretary Dillon stated the State Department believes the Berkner and Panofsky Reports² should be made public. The security information should be edited out of them. Careful attention should be given to how they are released. All Agencies should agree on the procedure and be of a single mind so that all would answer questions from the press and others in a consistent manner. The President should be informed regarding the implications of the release.

Secretary Gates stated that the Berkner Report should be released and could be released. Dr. Killian asked if he referred to the entire Berkner Report. General Loper said, “Yes.” Defense, therefore, went on record as favoring the release of the Berkner Report and indicating they also favored release of the Panofsky High Altitude Report.

Dr. Killian stated that our objectives in the Geneva Conference should govern our strategy and tactics of which the release of the Berkner and Panofsky Reports were a part. He raised the following:

1. Are we endeavoring to reach a comprehensive test suspension on all testing. If this is the case we should go one way.

2. If our objective is to reach the phased approach, that is, atmospheric and then underground and high altitude later, we should consider tabling the reports at once.

3. If our objective is to break off the negotiations this would be aided (perhaps to our embarrassment) by the improper handling of the reports, most particularly the findings and conclusions with reference to concealment.

Therefore, Dr. Killian concluded that the policy with respect to the release of the reports relates to our objectives in the Conference.

Secretary Dillon then suggested we move rapidly, but protect security. He asked whether security was involved. General Starbird replied that there was some restricted data in each of the reports but this could be easily removed. General Loper stated there was some military and intelligence information of a sensitive nature which likewise could be removed. It was, therefore, agreed that the reports must be rewritten if they are to be released.

Mr. Dulles stated that the release of the reports would give some intelligence information. In his opinion they would not oppose their release if they were “sanitized.”

McCone then stated AEC’s views as follows:

We continue to support the policy of the President that all tests should be suspended by agreement providing, and only providing, that the agreements can be safeguarded. We do not agree to any procedure under which we would suspend testing in any environment if the agreement cannot be safeguarded. It is our opinion, as a result of intensive and careful study of this question that an agreement to suspend underground shots cannot be properly and safely safeguarded by known technology. Therefore, we continue to advocate research, experimentation and testing either by the United States alone or jointly with the Soviets and British or through the United Nations as a means of developing this technology. We believe means of properly safeguarding can be developed through this experimentation. McCone pointed out that Dr. Northrup had stated that from three to five years would be required for such experimentation and, furthermore, it was possible even then results would not bring forth a satisfactory system. However, in McCone’s opinion, and that of the AEC, this was the reasonable course to pursue because of the possibilities of finding a successful solution.

For that reason the AEC advocates the phased approach. With respect to high altitude, McCone suggested we pursue technical discussions with the Soviets but in the June 8 meeting we emphasize that these discussions, while important, should not be exaggerated because in the final analysis it was very questionable in our mind whether this country or the Soviets would ever at any time conduct an extensive program of high altitude testing. The reason is that the cost of the test would be extremely high and in all probability expenditures of lesser proportions would produce propulsion engines for our missiles which would permit utilization of weapons already in being. Therefore, the need for development of light high yield weapons would not be essential.

There seemed to be no disagreement among the group with these points. Dr. Killian agreed particularly with respect to our position on high altitude and its excessive costs.

McCone then went on to suggest that the Berkner Report be tabled and that this report and all prior data which we have submitted be used to force technical discussions on underground detection. McCone recommended that if the Soviets did not agree to such technical discussions we should then withdraw from any further discussion of suspending underground tests and direct the negotiations to suspending atmospheric and high altitude testing.

There was not full acceptance of this proposal, but no real objection was expressed.

It was concluded that:

1. The summary of the Berkner Report should be released and the volume having to do with further research, experimentation and development should be released. Some, including AEC representatives, had not seen the summary and it was agreed that General Starbird and Dr. English would review the summary promptly and give their comments to Phil Farley.

2. Concurrent with this release, which should be made promptly, we should agree to technical discussions on high altitude with the caveat that we didn’t think high altitude was very important.

3. The Panofsky Reports should be reviewed and summarized and stripped of sensitive or restricted data and then they should be released at least in summary form.

Attached to this memorandum, and for my files, should be the memorandum prepared by General Starbird and Dr. English.³

John A. McCone⁴

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Chairman’s Reading File, 1959. Secret. Prepared by McCone.
1. Reference is to the Panel on Seismic Improvement, or the Berkner Panel after the panel’s chairman Lloyd Berkner; see footnote 1, Document 194. For the Berkner Reports as published, see the summary report of March 31, released on June 12, printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, pp. 1378–1392, and the Department of State summary, June 12, printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 1313–1317. In addition, the Department of State published in July 1959 a detailed technical report by the Berkner Panel entitled The Need for Further Research in Seismology.
2. The Report of the Working Group of the Panel on High Altitude Detection, chaired by Dr. Wolfgang K.H. Panofsky (Director of the High Energy Physics Laboratory, Stanford University) was not made public. The panel considered the problem of identifying nuclear explosions in the region between 50 and 100,000 kilometers above the earth. The group concluded that detection of nuclear explosions at distances of 100,000 kilometers was possible, but there were problems with so-called “low altitude” (50–200 kilometers) explosions and concealment. (Memorandum from Panofsky to Killian, May 1; Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Additional Records of the Special Assistant for Science and Technology, Disarmament, Hi. Alt.—Misc.) See the Supplement.
3. Not found.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.