Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

219. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to Secretary of State Herter⁰

Washington, June 1, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Resumption of General Disarmament Talks

You have asked me to consider ways in which discussions on general disarmament could be carried forward if there is an agreement in Geneva that such discussions should be undertaken. There are three principal possibilities in this regard.

1. Within the Framework of the Security Council. Lloyd has suggested the possibility of having the Security Council take up the question of disarmament. While the Council in the past has undertaken such discussions, it is unlikely that a Western initiative in this regard would be acceptable to the Soviet Union since the composition of the Council is unfavorable to it. It is true, of course, that the present Disarmament Commission reports both to the Security Council and the General Assembly. However, a move to the Council, particularly in light of the Assembly resolutions which have been adopted on disarmament in recent years would be interpreted as an attempt on our part to circumvent the broader interests reflected in the 82-Nation Disarmament Commission. It is unlikely that the Soviets would opt for the Security Council as the forum for initiating general disarmament talks and carrying them forward by means of some appropriate sub-group of the Council. Such an arrangement could be made, however, and would be acceptable to the United States if there was agreement between East and West.

2. Within the Disarmament Commission. Under the resolution adopted at the last Assembly the Disarmament Commission was reconstituted on an 82-Member basis and requested to report to the Security Council or the Assembly any “constructive proposals and recommendations”.¹ In light of the history of this resolution and the interest manifested at the last session by the overwhelming majority of members in bringing disarmament discussions within this framework, the choice of the Disarmament Commission would be whole-heartedly supported, and we could count on positive cooperation both from our Allies and the uncommitted countries. This would give us a real psychological advantage, and the French desire to bring the Disarmament Commission into the picture perhaps reflects some appreciation of this fact. Moreover, the Soviet Union has accepted this forum. We are confident that if the Disarmament Commission should be called that we can get the necessary support so that it will adopt the Assembly rules of procedure. (You will recall that there was a considerable argument during the last General Assembly on this point.) From the standpoint of procedure it would be possible to have a brief general discussion within the Commission, after which an arrangement providing for various sub-groups on certain aspects of our original package, and in particular surprise attack, could be arranged.

We should anticipate that the Soviet Union will insist upon parity in any sub-group which the Disarmament Commission establishes. We should also anticipate that the Disarmament Commission will be disposed to grant parity or quasi-parity in the sub-groups largely on the ground that if agreement is to be achieved through quiet discussions the two states most directly concerned must be satisfied with the arrangements for representation. We do not believe that agreement to parity or quasi-parity (6–4–4 formula for example) in a sub-group of the Disarmament Commission will necessarily have adverse effects throughout the UN system since we would not be yielding on this principle in the parent body. At the same time it would have to be recognized that there would be a number of UN members who would tend to cite our agreement in this case in other circumstances such as the Outer Space Committee and other Committees of the Assembly. In summary, we believe it would be advantageous psychologically and politically for the West to use the Disarmament Commission as the instrumentality for further general disarmament talks, provided we are willing to take on such liabilities as may be involved in agreeing to a parity-type arrangement in various subcommittees.

3. Outside the Framework of the UN. It would of course be feasible to resume discussions outside the UN along the lines of the present nuclear test negotiations. The problem of parity would be faced outside the UN, as it has been in this instance, and talks on, for example, surprise attack, could be undertaken in a political framework rather than the past technical approach. While such an arrangement would be satisfactory to the world at large if it is agreed to between East and West, the majority of UN members would probably prefer to have these discussions pursued within the UN. They, nevertheless, as a manifestation of their interest in achieving agreement, would go along with such an arrangement. Even in these circumstances, consideration would have to be given to some means for bringing the results of the negotiations into the framework of the UN. At the same time, pressure might develop for convening a meeting of the Disarmament Commission, particularly if an impasse should seem to be developing in the discussions outside the framework of the UN.²

The above possibilities have been set forth without account having been taken as to whether we are prepared to undertake general disarmament discussions in the near future. From our preliminary discussions with S/AE, I have the impression that there may be serious political and technical difficulties in the early undertaking of general disarmament talks.

Historical Footnote

Comment: Thinking through the various alternatives it should be kept in mind that the disarmament problem has been handled in a number of forums. These include:

(a) The U.N. Disarmament Commission—made up of the Security Council plus Canada.

(b) The U.N. Disarmament Commission Sub-Committee—consisting of Canada, France, USSR, UK and US.

(c) The Enlarged UN Disarmament Commission—made up of 25 members. This was enlarged still further to 82 members in 1958.

(d) The Conference of Experts on Nuclear Test Cessation—made up of experts and advisers from Canada, France, UK, US, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and the USSR.

(e) The Technical Conference on Surprise Attack—made up of US, UK, France, Canada, Italy, USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Albania.

(f) The Conference on Nuclear Tests Cessation—made up of US, UK and USSR.

0. Source: Department of State, IO Files: Lot 61 D 91, Subject Files, Disarmament. Confidential. A note on the source text indicates that Herter saw the memorandum.
1. Resolution 1252 D, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on November 4, 1958; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 1299–1301.
2. In a June 8 memorandum to Herter, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, John N. Irwin II, opposed Wilcox’s idea of separating specific disarmament topics from the general disarmament package of 1957. Irwin also observed that the newly-enlarged Disarmament Commission was “unwieldy” and that if a sub-group were established, the United States should control its composition. (Department of State, IO Files: Lot 61 D 91, Subject Files, Disarmament) See the Supplement.