221. Memorandum of Meeting0

Memorandum of a Meeting With the President, June 8, 1959, at 9:45 AM, attended by:

  • Acting Secretary of State Dillon
  • Acting Secretary of Defense Gates
  • Allen Dulles
  • Dr. Killian
  • Gordon Gray
  • Philip Farley
  • General Persons
  • General Goodpaster
  • John McCone

Dillon reviewed the meeting of Friday, June 5,1 stating conclusions to discuss Panofsky High Altitude Report at Geneva after removal of classified information.2 This in about a week.

Also, the release of the summary of the Berkner Report together with complete report on necessary further developmental work.3 Dillon finally read teletype from Secretary Herter explaining agreed strategy [Page 752] Geneva to proceed slowly but deliberately for three or four weeks and if major unresolved issues not satisfactorily disposed of, delegation will press one last time for phased plan, and if this not acceptable Soviets then delegation will be prepared to end negotiations in manner most advantageous to the United States.

The President agreed with all of the above but spoke at some length that we should not release documents under pressure from the press, the public or the Congress.

McCone stated that I felt information should be released in as complete a form as possible as the Reports contain the type of information the public must have in evaluating our decision to break off or continue discussions. The President expressed doubt as to whether the public would pay much attention to as complicated and involved subject. [sic]

Killian then expressed himself as convinced that we must have technical discussions on underground testing, indicating that the Reports which contained information on both improvements to the detection system and ways of deceiving it were significant. Secretary Dillon agreed and finally the President approved the program as outlined by Secretary Dillon.

It was understood that all Departments would work together in developing the most careful and prudent way of handling the releases, it being pointed out that if these matters were handled carelessly, great harm would result.

McCone then asked if all were of the mind that we must insist upon adequate safeguards for any tests which are suspended by agreement even if the price of such a policy would be no agreement at all. There was no dissent to this expression of policy and all seemed agreed that we must have adequate safeguards.

The President and McCone then discussed the prospect of a unilateral suspension of atmospheric tests if the discussions broke down. The President concurred that we would probably follow this policy but that it would be unwise to make any such indication at this time.

The President then spoke of the importance of underground testing and also of the possibility that further underground testing might open up areas of peaceful uses not heretofore considered feasible. He did not elaborate on just what was in his mind.

The meeting adjourned to an adjoining room and was attended by all except the President. It was agreed that the release of the Panofsky and Berkner Reports required careful handling. A memorandum was distributed by State4 and Dillon agreed to convene a meeting early next week to discuss and agree upon this subject.

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Killian urged a study and a determination of what might be considered a “safe number” of on-site inspections. He stated that a preliminary study had been made by his staff, indicating that it probably involved some theory of mathematical probabilities. McCone agreed that AEC would give thought to this subject.

McCone urged that in considering these matters we evaluate the pluses and the minuses and that we not be carried away by the arguments which merely support our conscious or subconscious desires. On the contrary, we must carefully weigh the rationality of all problems such as the underground decoupling, the feasibility of high altitude testing, etc.

John A. McCone5
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, McCone Papers, Testing File No. 1. Secret. Prepared by McCone.
  2. See Document 220.
  3. See footnote 2, Document 220.
  4. See footnote 1, Document 220.
  5. Not further identified.
  6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.