176. Memorandum of Discussion at the 378th Meeting of the National Security Council0
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and Agenda Item 1. “Recommended Revisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directives.”]
2. Geneva Technical Conference on Nuclear Testing
Dr. James B. Fisk, Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference, said he and his colleagues were grateful for the opportunity afforded them of participating in the Conference, and hoped the results would be useful. His report would cover (1) the substance of the technical agreement, (2) certain aspects of the negotiations, (3) a brief appraisal of certain Western and Soviet strengths in the nuclear weapons field, and (4) some of the problems lying ahead.
Dr. Fisk recalled that the charter of the U.S. Delegation had been to examine methods for the detection and identification of nuclear weapons [Page 655] testing, and to devise a system to monitor test suspension. He wished to emphasize the word “suspension”, which had been agreed upon after long argument over “suspension” versus “cessation”. The limitations inherent in any system designed to monitor test suspension had always been in the background of the Delegation’s thinking. Dr. Fisk said any system for monitoring test suspension has important parameters: (1) the yield of the explosion to be detected, (2) the probability that detection can be achieved, (3) the number of control posts necessary to achieve detection, and (4) the environment of the tests (whether underground, at high altitudes, etc.). Dr. Fisk noted parenthetically that underground tests turned out to be the principal problem.
It was evident at the outset, said Dr. Fisk, that the greater the number of control posts established, the smaller would be the number of inspections required. This presented great difficulty for the Soviets, who wanted relatively few control posts as well as very little inspection. It was clear that detection of high-yield tests would not be difficult, but that detection of low-yield tests would require a large number of control posts and a large number of inspections. The United States started the Conference by suggesting a system which would detect one-KT explosions and would require 650 control posts. In rebuttal the Soviets insisted that they could accept no more than 100 control posts. By hard work and long argument, a technically agreed system was devised without horse-trading.
The system agreed upon will probably detect 5–KT explosions, even under the most difficult circumstances, and will detect one-KT explosions under conditions similar to those which have existed for most nuclear tests in the past. The system involves 180 control posts—110 on the continents, 60 on islands and peninsulas, and 10 on ships. These posts would have the capability of detecting, with a 90% degree of probability, explosions of 5–KT or greater, and a capability, with less than 90% reliability, of detecting lower-yield tests. However, Dr. Fisk warned, the system would also have serious limitations. For example, it might not be able to detect tests in some areas of the ocean and on some seismic islands. There would also be difficulty in detecting shallow underground shots, as well as high-altitude shots.
Dr. Fisk then turned to a description of the negotiations. He said the Conference was a technical conference with heavy political overtones. The Soviet Delegate had once remarked that science must not interfere with the task of the Delegates. At the beginning of the Conference the Soviets brought to bear heavy pressure for a commitment that the United States would suspend nuclear testing. After painful argument, followed by a day’s adjournment, the Soviets dropped this pressure, apparently on the basis of fresh instructions from Moscow. One Soviet tactic throughout the Conference was to say the job of the Conference was [Page 656] easy; the way to stop nuclear testing was just to stop it. At one time the Soviet Delegates attempted to demonstrate the ease of detecting nuclear tests by handing the U.S. Delegation a long list of U.S. tests which the Soviets had detected. However, this list contained a number of non-existent U.S. tests, and this fact was pointed out to the Soviets. Another Soviet tactic was to press for the minimum simplest system and one which would involve the least interference in the territory of the USSR. The Soviet technical arguments were weighted to support these tactics. However, there was also an element of objectivity in the Soviet attitude, so that in the end it was possible to reach agreement on all technical points.
Dr. Fisk emphasized that from the mid-point of the Conference until its adjournment, it was evident that the Soviet Delegation wanted to reach agreement. As a result, the Soviets made what the U.S. Delegates regarded as important concessions—namely, (1) they agreed to overflight of the USSR under certain circumstances; (2) they agreed to inspection; and (3) they accepted the main points of the system proposed by the United States.
Dr. Fisk said he believed the Soviets were anxious for an agreement because of the Fourth Power problem; that is, they may have had in mind the possibility that a fourth country, possibly even including a satellite, would achieve a nuclear weapons capability.
On the last day of the Conference, the Soviets addressed to the U.S. Delegation a plaintive inquiry as to whether the United States was about to announce the suspension of nuclear tests. Apparently, said Dr. Fisk, the Soviets had some prior intimation of the President’s announcement on this subject.
Dr. Fisk said the caliber of the Soviet team was high. The Soviet Delegates were technically sound, and were ably led by an outstanding scientist, who was also a Lieutenant General and a Communist Party member.
During the negotiations Dr. Fisk had formed the impression that the Soviets had devoted little attention to tactical nuclear weapons, either because they consider such weapons unimportant or because they know relatively little about them.
Dr. Fisk then reported that the caliber of the Western team was also high. The U.S., U.K., French and Canadian Delegates had worked as a single team. Dr. Fisk felt that the strength of the West in the nuclear field lay in close ties between the United States and the United Kingdom. He said that the Western team had revealed very little sensitive material in the course of the negotiations, and had almost certainly obtained as much information as it gave.
Turning to problems lying ahead, Dr. Fisk warned that the system agreed upon at the Technical Conference was only an outline and that important political and organizational problems, as well as problems of technical implementation, remain to be solved. He thought, however, [Page 657] that if political negotiations take place they will have a solid foundation in the technical agreement. He suggested that between now and October 31 the United States should give careful consideration to any proposals for nuclear tests before actually carrying out such tests.
The President asked what Dr. Fisk meant by his last observation. Dr. Fisk replied that any decision to conduct additional tests would have an impact on the success or failure of subsequent political negotiations. He was not saying there should be no tests, but was only suggesting that the effect of such tests on the political negotiations should be carefully weighed.
The President asked how the Soviets indicated that they might have had advance information as to his Friday statement. Dr. Fisk said the Soviets had asked him whether the United States was about to make an announcement on suspension of nuclear tests, and the way in which they had put the question led him to the belief that they had some prior knowledge of such an announcement.
The President said he wished to compliment Dr. Fisk on his patience during the Technical Conference.
Secretary McElroy asked Dr. Fisk whether he could say any more about the Soviet attitude toward the small nuclear weapons. Dr. Fisk said the Soviets had indicated no interest in tactical weapons. During the difficult arguments over high-altitude explosions, they had played up the Sputniks and seemed disinterested in some of our technical arguments. When we had pointed out the possibility of shielding tests in order to reduce gamma rays, the Soviets had remarked that thousands of pounds of shielding would be required. Soviet arguments of this nature had led Dr. Fisk to the belief that the Soviets were not sophisticated in the field of tactical nuclear weapons.
Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that the Soviets had exploded a number of low-yield weapons. Dr. Fisk agreed, but said there had been no evidence of Soviet underground shots.
Secretary Herter said the senior U.S. diplomatic official in Geneva had extolled the skill of Dr. Fisk in the technical negotiations. Perhaps Dr. Fisk had missed his vocation in life. The President said Dr. Fisk might look upon this compliment as the kiss of death.
The National Security Council:1
Noted and discussed an oral report on the subject by Dr. James B. Fisk, Chairman of the U.S. Delegation.
[Page 658][Here follow Agenda Items 3. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security” (see Document 33), 4. “U.S. Policy Toward the Sudan,” and 5. “U.S. Bases in Morocco.”]
Director
NSC Secretariat
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Boggs on August 28.↩
- The following sentence constitutes NSC Action No. 1979, approved by the President on August 27. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)↩