33. Editorial Note
During his briefing on significant world developments affecting U.S. security at the 378th National Security Council meeting on August 27, 1958, Allen Dulles discussed Soviet missiles as follows:
“The Director of Central Intelligence said the intelligence community had just completed a new estimate on Soviet guided missile capabilities (NIE 11–5–58, copy of which is filed in the minutes of the meeting). This estimate, which represented the unanimous view of all intelligence agencies, had been prepared on an all-source basis—that is, it had taken into account every scrap of information available. A considerable body of new information on Soviet guided missile capabilities had become available over the past year, but there were still serious deficiencies in our information.
“Mr. Dulles then summarized certain of the conclusions of NIE 11–5–58. He said we had direct evidence regarding nine of the thirteen [Page 136] Soviet missile systems. The USSR would probably obtain a first operational capability with ten ICBM prototypes in Calendar Year 1959. The Soviet ICBMs would probably have a maximum range of 5500 nautical miles, a CEP of five nautical miles, and a reliability of 50%. The performance of these ICBMs would probably improve in the early ‘60s. Of the twelve Soviet launching operations identified, six had probably been unsuccessful ICBM firings, three had been earth satellite firings, and one had been the firing of a space vehicle which failed. Mr. Dulles said he did not exclude the possibility, however, that the Soviets would obtain a first ICBM operational capability this year. One year after obtaining a first operational capability the Soviets could produce and deploy 100 missiles; two or three years later—i.e., 1961 or 1962—they could deploy 500. By the end of 1959 they could probably produce ten to 100 ICBMs. The payload weight of these missiles was estimated to be 2000 pounds, but some were evidently designed to carry 5000 pounds. The heavier weapons might produce a 4-megaton explosion.
“Mr. Dulles said the Soviets were also developing subsonic missiles with an estimated range of 200 miles (not 500 miles, as previously estimated) capable of being fired from a submarine on the surface. By 1961 the Soviets would probably have the prototype of a submarine capable of launching, while submerged, a missile with a 1/3-megaton warhead and a range of 1000 nautical miles. In the light of new evidence on submarine construction and missile development, the 1961 date replaces the previously-estimated date 1964–1966. Mr. Dulles believed the Soviets would elect to develop launching of missiles from submerged submarines rather than pursue development of missiles which could be launched only from a submarine on the surface.
“Turning to shorter-range missiles, Mr. Dulles said that 350 missiles, with ranges of 100, 200, 350 and 750 nautical miles, had been fired by the Soviets since 1953. The USSR would probably achieve an operational capability in 1958 with a missile of 1100 nautical miles maximum range.” (Memorandum of discussion by Boggs, August 28; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
NIE 11–5–58, “Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles,” dated August 19, is in Department of State, INR–NIE Files. The sections entitled “The Problem,” “Foreword,” and “Summary and Conclusions” and a memorandum from Robert M. Biber to Dr. Killian, October 9, containing a different view of Soviet guided missile capabilities, are in the Supplement.