175. Editorial Note

On August 20, 1958, in anticipation of the release of the Communiqué and Report of the Geneva meeting on nuclear testing, Secretary Dulles in New York sent Acting Secretary Herter a telegram commenting on the draft Presidential statement to be released at the time of the report. Dulles stated that while he accepted the draft (see footnote 3, Document 170) as a statement of policy, he thought that since its function as a public statement was “to influence world opinion and gain good will,” it should be simplified and redrafted to accent the positive. Dulles emphasized that his redraft was not an attempt to retract or modify already agreed language and included in the telegram a suggested text as follows:

“The United States welcomes the successful conclusion of the Geneva discussions on technical requirements for monitoring testing agreements.

“Important questions remain to be resolved before a test monitoring system can be established. These include the organization of the control [Page 652] system and its relationship to the United Nations and national governments, the implementation of staffing and on-the-spot inspection, and the participation of the authorities on whose territories control posts should be located.

“In an effort to resolve these questions, the United States is prepared to join with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom; the other nations which have tested nuclear weapons, in negotiating an agreement for an effectively inspected suspension of nuclear tests. Representatives of other countries having authority over areas within which control posts should be established would of course be consulted. The progress and results of these negotiations might be duly reported to the United Nations and its organs with disarmament responsibilities, through the intermediary of the Secretary General.

“The United States is also prepared, unless testing is resumed by the Soviet Union, to withhold further testing of atomic and nuclear weapons for a period up to one year beginning October 1, 1958, while agreement is being reached both as to the terms of suspension of testing and the detailed arrangements for inspection. Further, if agreement on the terms of an effectively inspected suspension of nuclear tests can be achieved, the United States is prepared to suspend testing on a year-by-year basis, subject to a determination at the beginning of each year of extension that satisfactory progress is being made (a) in installing and operating the agreed inspection system, and (b) in reaching agreement on and implementing major and substantial arms control measures, such as the United States has long sought.

“As the United States has frequently made clear, it does not consider that suspension of testing of atomic and nuclear weapons is in itself a measure of disarmament or limitation of armament. The significance of an agreement for a monitored mutual suspension of tests is that it may lead to other and more substantial agreements relating to limitation and reduction of such weapons and to other essential phases of disarmament. This is our hope.” (Secto 8 from USUN, August 20; Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8–2058) See the Supplement.

At a meeting with Dulles on August 20, British Foreign Secretary Lloyd insisted that a relationship between Western readiness to suspend testing and Soviet willingness to join in negotiations for an agreement to supervise suspension of testing must be established or the West would concede to the Soviet Union a fundamental principle without exacting a price. Dulles therefore agreed to insert at the beginning of the fourth paragraph of the statement the phrase, “If this is accepted principle,” so as to establish the link between the two parts of the statement. (Memorandum of conversation between Lloyd and Dulles, August 20; Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199) See the Supplement.

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At 8:50 a.m. on August 21, Secretary Dulles telephoned President Eisenhower in Washington to inform him that he had talked until midnight of August 20 with Lloyd, that the British were satisfied with the draft Presidential statement, and that he was awaiting the French reaction from Foreign Minister Couve de Murville. (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations) See the Supplement.

In Secto 13 from USUN, August 21, 4 p.m., Dulles sent Herter his views on the importance of including in the Presidential statement a sentence that reads: “The agreement should also deal with the problem of detonations for peaceful purposes, as distinct from weapons tests.” Dulles stated that he did not believe suspension of testing should deny to mankind the “vast new power for human betterment” of atomic energy “as in creating new harbors and waterways, making available underground sources of water, oil, minerals, etc.” Dulles stated that once the distinction between nuclear power for peaceful purposes and weapons testing was established, the United States could conduct in good faith explosions for peaceful and economic purposes. Dulles realized that this additional sentence might provide a “possible loophole” for the Soviets during the one-year suspension, but he thought it was worth the risk. (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8–2158) See the Supplement.

On August 21, the Conference of Experts To Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on Suspension of Nuclear Tests completed its work and issued a Communiqué and Report. The Western Experts and the Delegations from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania had been meeting at Geneva since July 1. Their conclusions suggested that it would be technically possible to supervise and enforce an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons testing. The Communiqué and Report of the Conference are printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, pages 1090–1111; Department of State Bulletin, September 22, 1958, pages 452–462; and American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pages 1331–1332 and 1336–1341.

On August 22, President Eisenhower made a statement on the successful conclusion of the Geneva meeting of experts and offered to withhold further testing of atomic and hydrogen weapons, unless testing was resumed by the Soviet Union, for one year from the beginning of the negotiations among nations with nuclear weapons for a test suspension and establishment of an international control system to enforce it. Eisenhower’s statement is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, pages 1111–1112; Department of State Bulletin, September 8, 1958, pages 378–379; and American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pages 1332–1333. In a note to the Soviet Union, August 22, the United States transmitted Eisenhower’s statement and proposed that negotiations [Page 654] toward the end described by the President begin in New York on October 31, 1958. The text of the note is in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, page 1114.

On August 29, Soviet Chairman Khrushchev gave an interview to Pravda, which represented the first official Soviet response to the Western proposals of August 22. On August 30, the Soviet Union sent a formal note to the United States recapitulating Khrushchev’s statement. In a memorandum of August 30 to Secretary Dulles, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., analyzed the Khrushchev statement and concluded that the Soviet Union was ready to negotiate with the West, but that it appeared intent, by diplomatic means, popular pressure, and through U.N. action, to put maximum pressure on the West to meet Soviet terms in the negotiations. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.5611/8–3058) See the Supplement. Khrushchev’s interview of August 29 and the Soviet note of August 30 are printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, pages 1114–1120.