Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

171. Record of Meeting⁰

Washington, August 18, 1958.

REVISION OF U.S. POSITION ON FIRST PHASE DISARMAMENT

Meeting held August 18 from 12:00 to 2:05 P.M.; chaired by Acting Secretary Herter and attended by Deputy Defense Secretary Quarles, accompanied by Lt. Gen. Byers; Chairman McCone, accompanied by Gen. Starbird; Allen Dulles, Dr. Killian, Gordon Gray, and others.

Secretary Herter introduced a revised draft of a statement to be made by the President at the conclusion of the Geneva Technical Meeting in the event that substantial agreement is reached on feasible methods of monitoring a cessation of nuclear tests. The draft, in its operative paragraphs, presented most of the differences of opinion by means of brackets. A copy of the draft is attached.¹ The positions of the participants appear to be as follows:

a. State favored the unilateral one-year suspension of all nuclear testing, during which time an effort would be made to negotiate with the USSR and the UK, other nations accepting responsibilities under the agreement in which monitoring stations would be established (Communist China, France) participating as appropriate. The agreement to be negotiated would involve the terms of cessation, as well as the practical measures required to install an effective monitoring system. During the course of the meeting, State retreated from its position of desiring to negotiate a 24-month cessation of testing to a position of stating that the U.S. was prepared at the beginning of each year of extension of unilateral test suspension to continue withholding tests for an additional year, depending on whether satisfactory progress was being made in installing an effective monitoring system and satisfactory progress toward other substantial arms control measures. State was flatly opposed to permitting the continuance of underground testing. It also opposed limiting the statement to the mere announcement that we would participate in negotiations to draw up a test monitoring system.

b. The Joint Chiefs, in a formal letter to the President, restated and reaffirmed their opposition to test cessation, as well as separation of a test cessation agreement from other proposals in the London “package”. (Apparently the letter to the President is identical with the copy of a JCS letter which Deputy Secretary Quarles gave to Mr. Gray two days earlier.² There is no copy of the letter sent to the President in our files.) The JCS argument included their belief that if tests ceased they would never be started again, even though a cessation agreement provided the conditions under which testing could legally be resumed.

c. Defense also opposed any change in existing arms control policy, but was prepared to live with a change if the President decided that political considerations were controlling. In the event a change was made, Defense accepted the State position on unilateral cessation, except for its desire to continue underground testing. In any agreement to be negotiated, Defense continues to stand by the “threshold” concept, i.e., that no agreement would require the U.S. to promise to withhold tests which were below the capability of the monitoring system to detect. The Secretary of Defense apparently stated his views in a letter addressed to the President from which Deputy Secretary Quarles read extracts. There is no copy of this letter in our files.

d. AEC opposed any agreement involving cessation of testing. It was prepared to accept an agreement regarding the installation of a monitoring system. AEC also opposed an agreed cessation of testing, but was prepared to accept unilateral limitations on testing. For the first year, the U.S. would limit testing to aboveground explosions. As progress was made toward agreement on a monitoring system and on other disarmament measures, the U.S., again unilaterally, would at appropriate times state its willingness to further limit testing. At no time, however, would it be prepared to agree to promise not to continue tests below the “threshold”.

Chairman McCone was very strongly opposed to a cessation of testing. He said the offer suggested by the State Department was not necessary, went far beyond what the situation demanded, and was not in the U.S. national interest. He argued that in our national territory the firing of nuclear weapons underground concerned no one but the U.S. All radiation would be contained in underground tests and no one would be affected other than the citizens of the United States. He did not accept Secretary Dulles’ reasoning, as stated by Acting Secretary Herter, that if we agreed to halt aboveground tests and continue underground tests, the resumption of aboveground tests, in the event no agreement was reached with the USSR, would become almost impossible because by implication we have admitted that aboveground tests were harmful. Mr. McCone said that the effect of the State proposal would be to place us at the mercy of the Russians—during the suspension period our laboratories would be disbanded and in the event we wished to resume testing we would not be in a position to do so for several years. He again recited the cost of a suspension to the U.S., citing the efficient warhead Polaris, the anti-missile missile, small low-range battlefield tactical weapons, etc.

e. Dr. Killian did not state a flat view, but reaffirmed his belief that to be meaningful, cessation of tests must be total. He referred again to the unfortunate effect which a conditional suspension would have on the Russian scientists, and to a lesser extent, on the U.S. scientific community which had been proceeding on the assumption that the monitoring system was being set up to monitor a total cessation. He pointed out that about half of the time of the Geneva meeting had been spent in discussing methods of monitoring underground tests. He said that as regards aboveground tests, our present capability, without stations in the USSR, was substantial and could be greatly improved by additional stations outside the Soviet Union. Hence, a monitoring system for aboveground tests could be set up without an agreement with the USSR. He said the issue involved whether the U.S. was honestly interested in obtaining an agreement for cessation of tests, or whether it was merely adopting a position on testing to meet a public relations problem caused by the agreement reached at Geneva. (In the earlier discussion with Mr. Gray before the State meeting, Dr. Killian referred to a tightly-held report of the Science Advisory Committee³ which concluded that it would be in the over-all U.S. interest, vis-à-vis the USSR, to cease testing. He preferred not to include the scientists’ conclusions in any written document.)

Dr. Killian asked whether Congressional consultations would be required. The point he was trying to make he had made earlier to Mr. Gray, i.e., does the President act alone, following a discussion with his advisers, on the question of suspending tests, or should he consult members of the Legislative Branch. Secretary Herter replied that when a treaty was involved, Congressional consultation would be required. He did not respond to the broader issue raised by Dr. Killian. Secretary Herter said Secretary Dulles would confer with the British and French Foreign Ministers in New York prior to any announcement.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, NSC Staff Records, Executive Secretary’s Subject Files, Policy re Use. Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith on August 20.
1. See footnote 3, Document 170. The draft was not attached and has not been found.
2. Reference is to a memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, August 15, which was then apparently sent as a letter to the President. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Nuclear Testing) See the Supplement.
3. Not found. See Document 151.