Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

172. Memorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower⁰

Washington, August 18, 1958.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Secretary Herter, Mr. McCone, Secretary Quarles, Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Gordon Gray, Mr. Wadsworth, Dr. Killian, Mr. Farley, Lt. Gen. Clovis Byers, Mr. Keeny

Secretary Herter showed the President a proposed policy statement regarding possible suspension of atomic testing by the United States if a technical agreement is reached at Geneva.¹ The President stressed that we must make clear that if we do not get agreement on test controls we will resume testing on some certain date. He also asked if high altitude tests are subject to detection. Mr. Keeny said that they are, in that the technical means are known, but Mr. Quarles added that means now existing would not be able to detect a high altitude shot.

Mr. Gray brought out that the paper shown to the President did not carry the agreement of Defense, including the JCS, nor of AEC. Mr. Quarles said the Joint Chiefs consider that the net effect of the proposed test suspension will be disadvantageous militarily. They feel that we should maintain our previous position unless the political advantages of the proposal outweigh the military disadvantage. If such a determination is made then they feel that the memorandum as presented is generally acceptable. The President recalled that Dr. Rabi had come in and said that the United States is technically ahead of the Soviets, who lack one important discovery, and that the United States would gain technically by stopping the tests. I commented that the situation with regard to the balance of advantage in technical terms through cessation is not clear, and that differing views seem to have been presented. Dr. Killian commented that his group felt that technically the U.S. would gain relatively through cessation of tests. Mr. Quarles and Mr. McCone said that their advisors did not agree with this assessment in technical terms, and Mr. Quarles added that militarily the disadvantage to the United States was even greater. The President stated that disagreement as to the balance of advantage is an element in the whole argument.

The President then indicated he saw some reason to make an exception to the general statement so as to permit tests for peaceful purposes. Mr. Wadsworth said he thought that half of the impact would be lost if exceptions were included. The President recalled that Secretary Dulles had said that the accepting of underground tests would be a tacit admission that above-ground tests are harmful. He thought the Russians would not accept our proposal. After further discussion he indicated agreement to omitting the exception.

Secretary Herter asked as to consultation with the Congress. The President thought that the top four Congressional leaders, plus perhaps a very few others, might be informed of this action shortly in advance of its being taken. Secretary Quarles suggested omitting certain references to the UK, and Mr. Herter said that there are real problems concerning the UK. Mr. Gray said that the question of our relationship with Communist China is implicitly raised, since no inspection system could be effective without stations in Communist China. The President stressed that he did not accept any implication of recognizing Communist China.

Mr. McCone said that the Commission unanimously opposes the cessation of tests. The President said he recognized that fact, but that the Commission is not concerned with the question of world political position. He felt that our world situation requires that we achieve the political benefits of this action. In a discussion as to whether the atomic laboratories will lose their key personnel the President said he questioned whether they would leave.

In concluding, the President said that, with changes as he had indicated on his draft, he found the statement acceptable. Mr. Herter stated that we are still waiting for word from Geneva of final agreement. Mr. Quarles left with the President a memo by the JCS.²

G.
Brigadier General, USA

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster. According to Eisenhower’s Appointment Book, this meeting lasted from 2:35 to 3:43 p.m. (ibid.)
1. See footnote 3, Document 170.
2. See footnote 2, Document 171.