Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

170. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, August 15, 1958.

SUBJECT

• U.S. Policy on Nuclear Tests

PARTICIPANTS

• State
  • The Acting Secretary
  • Mr. Philip J. Farley, S/AE
  • Mr. Fisher Howe, S/S
  • Mr. Vincent Baker, S/AE
• Defense
  • Mr. Donald A. Quarles
  • Lt. General Clovis E. Byers
  • Captain Clifford S. Foster
• AEC
  • Mr. John A. McCone
  • General Alfred Starbird
• CIA
  • Mr. Allen Dulles
  • Mr. Darcy Brent
• White House
  • Mr. Gordon Gray
  • Dr. James R. Killian, Jr.
  • Mr. Spurgeon Keeny
  • Mr. Bromley Smith

Mr. Herter stated that Mr. Farley had conferred with the Secretary this morning in New York on the proposed policy statement on nuclear tests¹ and would be back in about twenty minutes. In the meantime he wanted to discuss current developments in Geneva. In this connection he read Denuc 163 of August 14² which had just been received.

Following a brief discussion of the status of negotiations in Geneva, Mr. Herter turned to the draft announcement on the proposed test suspension which had been taken to New York as a basis for consultation with the Secretary, and read the draft to the group. He said that an appointment had been made for 2:30 Monday, August 17, with the President to discuss a statement along these lines.³

Mr. Farley arrived and pointed out the changes in the draft under consideration which had been suggested by the Secretary.⁴

The discussion then turned to a definition of issues posed for decision by the draft statement. In this connection Mr. Quarles noted that a suspension of tests as of the date of the beginning of negotiations was proposed in the draft statement, whereas the policy paper under consideration in previous meetings had referred only to a suspension as of the effective date of the agreement. He referred to tests presently scheduled by the United States and the United Kingdom.

Mr. Gray noted that another issue to which the President’s attention should be called is the question of Communist China and its relationship to the proposed test suspension agreement. Mr. Herter noted that if Communist China demanded recognition as the price for agreement, this demand—rather than U.S. policy—would be the stumbling block on the road to agreement in the eyes of the world. Mr. McCone said we might let the UK or Scandinavians do any actual negotiating with Communist China, since they have recognized its government.

Dr. Killian said that he had already prepared a paper defining some of the issues which the President would have to be aware of in making a decision, and distributed the paper for information.⁵

Mr. Gray noted two additional issues: one was the separation proposed between the test suspension and other elements of our present disarmament position; another was the redefinition of the term “safeguarded” in our present disarmament policy which would, under the new proposal, in effect mean “largely safeguarded”.

Mr. Herter asked whether the safeguards agreed in Geneva would in fact be adequate. Dr. Killian said we could never have complete certainty, but the Geneva control system would represent the achievable goal in this direction, and it was unlikely that significant testing could go on.

Mr. Quarles asked whether the redefinition of “safeguarded” meant that in the proposed policy statement testing in the lower ranges would be suspended even though the control system was not highly reliable in these ranges. Mr. Gray said this was its meaning. Mr. Quarles indicated agreement and said he thought tests in the lower ranges should continue.

Dr. Killian stated that the system agreed at Geneva, he believed, would pose a risk of detection so great even below the five kiloton range that no country would attempt tests.

Mr. McCone noted that the proposed policy statement involved other issues of NSC policy as well, for example, the policy of reliance on nuclear weapons and the policy of promoting a vigorous program for research and development.

Dr. Killian stated that if disarmament is also a real goal of U.S. policy, the two policies to which Mr. McCone referred would necessarily have to be adjusted in some degree even though we could—and should—of course, continue an active research and development program. Mr. Herter referred to the importance of disarmament as a goal of U.S. policy as reflected most recently in the President’s speech in the special session of the United Nations General Assembly.⁶

Mr. McCone said there was also the issue of a suspension applicable to tests above ground as distinct from underground tests. Dr. Killian mentioned there was the additional problem of the phasing of a suspension in relation to other measures. Mr. Herter asked whether Mr. McCone would accept a phasing which would permit the suspension of tests in the atmosphere first, to be followed at a later time by a suspension of underground tests. Mr. McCone said he would, and that a complete suspension might be justified at a later date if there were sufficient progress in disarmament as a whole. By the time such progress were achieved, however, he thought it would be more generally recognized by public opinion that peaceful uses can be advanced by underground testing. It might even then be advisable to continue underground tests for this purpose. Dr. Killian observed that a return to underground testing for peaceful purposes after the period of complete test cessation might be psychologically more advantageous than proposing an exception for underground tests in the first instance. Mr. Quarles noted that some testing for peaceful purposes in the small ranges might be continued below the threshhold of effective monitoring.

Mr. McCone asked how practical the threshold is from the standpoint of enforceability. Mr. Brent said that we can detect tests in the five-to-ten kiloton range above ground with existing equipment. The practical threshold would be very low indeed if this system were supplemented by that agreed upon in Geneva.

As to phasing possible steps, Mr. McCone suggested we might from September 1 of this year to January of 1960 agree to limit testing to fully contained underground firings and to cooperate in establishment of the system for test detection, while continuing our efforts to reach agreement on conventional reduction, the peaceful uses of outer space, the nuclear cut-off and reduction of stockpiles of fissionable material. We might then say that when a satisfactory monitoring system was in operation and there was sufficient progress on disarmament, we would adopt such further limitations on testing as seemed appropriate in the light of the degree of effectiveness of the monitoring system and the general international situation. The United States should reserve its right to reconsider at a later date what limitations were appropriate. Dr. Killian observed this would mean underground tests would continue until there was a general disarmament agreement. Mr. Quarles said that such a package might look very much like our present first stage disarmament package and thereby lose some of its political appeal. Mr. McCone said that under this proposal the AEC could carry on the program which Defense has indicated that it needs, and that otherwise, AEC would be seriously handicapped in carrying out this program.

Referring to the draft Presidential announcement, Mr. Dulles suggested that a specific date such as September 14 or the first of October might be mentioned. Mr. Herter said that a date could be added along with a statement that the United States hoped that by that date the negotiations would have begun. He asked Dr. Killian’s view on the advisability of continued underground testing. Dr. Killian said if we wanted a test suspension agreement, continuation of underground testing might be disadvantageous. The Soviets could use this part of our proposal to charge bad faith on our part, or at least unwillingness to suspend tests completely. Mr. Brent said that from an intelligence standpoint the Soviets do not appear to be testing at all, and that such a proposal would amount to proposing that the Soviets begin testing underground, Mr. Quarles said it might be better to state our proposal for continuation of underground tests in a different way, perhaps by offering to discontinue any tests which would put radioactive materials into the atmosphere. He said this proposal had an additional logic, namely that we are closer to agreement on the means of detecting earlier tests than on detecting underground tests; accordingly, there would be a plausibility in reserving for a time our position on underground tests.

Mr. Brent noted that in previous discussions our proposals had not called for a unilateral test suspension. Mr. Farley said this was because we had in the past been discussing a policy proposal to be incorporated in a negotiated agreement. The additional unilateral step would have as one purpose that of preventing the Soviets from resuming tests during negotiations on the agreement. Mr. Quarles said that the early unilateral move also had the rationale of a) avoiding contamination of the atmosphere and b) facilitating the political negotiations on the test suspension agreement.

Mr. Gray asked whether Defense still held to the threshhold idea. Mr. Quarles said that the Joint Chiefs would not comment upon the distinction between underground tests and those in the atmosphere because they held to the present package policy. They would comment on alternatives only after there had been a decision to change the present policy. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, however, would want to hold to the threshold concept—not necessarily to announce that we would continue tests in the lower ranges but not to give up the idea of our freedom to act at our discretion below the range of enforceable limitations.

Mr. Gray said in defining the issues more clearly it would be helpful to know how long AEC would propose to continue underground tests. Mr. McCone said he favored their continuation only in the first phase. However, he did not consider underground testing any more a matter of international concern than explosions, for example, of dynamite.

While Mr. Herter left the meeting to talk to Secretary Dulles, who was calling from New York, Dr. Killian said that by way of defining the issues, he would be glad to read an unfinished draft now in preparation in his office on the pros and cons of test suspension. He read this paper to the group.⁷

Mr. Herter returned from his conversation with Secretary Dulles, noting that the Secretary believed that once we admit that testing above ground constitutes a real hazard, it would be very difficult to go back to testing above ground. It would be the more difficult after it had been stigmatized by a clear distinction drawn between tests above and below the ground.

Mr. Herter said there was the need for scientific decision also on the effects of the two kinds of suspension on our security requirements. Mr. Quarles said he believed we could state the distinction in a way to meet the problem Secretary Dulles had raised, especially as the United States has consistently held that testing in the atmosphere would not constitute a hazard. Dr. Killian believed we would find it more difficult to maintain this position in view of the report of the UN Radiation Committee.⁸ Mr. Quarles said that applying the line of reasoning which the Secretary had suggested, it might be harder to resume any form of testing if once we suspended any form of testing.

Mr. Gray noted there was a consensus in the meeting on much of the draft Presidential statement. He suggested that a redraft should be prepared with brackets indicating the principal issues, such as the proposed exception for underground testing and for tests below the threshhold of reliable detection. On the threshold question Mr. Quarles said that this issue would arise only after it had been decided to separate a test suspension from the rest of the package. We might then announce that there would be no tests which would lead to atmospheric contamination. Then, at a still later date, after a system of detection were agreed, say a year from now, we could decide on the threshold problem in the light of the capabilities of the agreed system.

Dr. Killian asked whether the Department of Defense agreed that the purpose of the negotiation was to establish a monitoring system for a complete test cessation. Mr. Quarles said yes, that we should be prepared to accept a complete cessation if the negotiations result in a system which would justify it. Mr. Quarles would like to preface the document with the statement that the first decision by the President would be the issue of separability.

It was agreed that Mr. Farley should prepare a revised draft of the Presidential announcement with brackets indicating the principal issues involved.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8–1558. Secret. Drafted by Baker.
1. Apparent reference to Enclosure 1 to Document 165.
2. In this telegram, the Delegation at Geneva reported that “there appeared to be further meetings of the minds on most significant points other than numbers of posts, discussion of which Fedorov obviously postponing to last.” (Department of State, Central Files, 700.5611/8–1458)
3. For text of the statement as made on August 22, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, pp. 1111–1112. A draft version of this statement, August 18, with Eisenhower’s initials and revisions in his hand, is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series. See the Supplement.
4. These changes have not been identified.
5. This undated paper, entitled “Policy Questions Raised by the Discussion of Test Cessation or Limitation,” was transmitted to Goodpaster by Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., of Killian’s office on August 15. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary Records, Nuclear Testing) See the Supplement.
6. For text of Eisenhower’s address to the Third Special Emergency Session of the U.N. General Assembly, August 13, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958, pp. 606–616.
7. The August 15 paper, entitled “Principal Arguments for a Test Cessation,” was transmitted to Goodpaster by Keeny, August 15. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office Files, Staff Secretary Records, Nuclear Testing) See the Supplement. No specific “con” paper has been found.
8. See footnote 4, Document 166.