165. Letter From Acting Secretary of State Herter to the President’s Special Assistant for
Science and Technology (Killian)0
Washington, August 5,
1958.
Dear Jim: We are giving urgent consideration to the
course of action the United States should take following the present Geneva
talks.
I am sending you with this note a suggested revision of our policy on nuclear
testing, which Mr. Dulles has
generally approved. For your personal information, I am enclosing also a
copy of the staff paper which summarizes briefly our reasons for favoring
this course of action rather than a limited test moratorium which Phil Farley tells me John McCone has discussed with you.
I would welcome a chance to hear your views as to the proper course of action
and your comments on our proposal.
Sincerely yours,
Enclosure 1
1
PROPOSED REVISION OF NSC POLICY PAPER
ON DISARMAMENT2
5a. All parties will agree, independently of agreement on other
provisions of section I.
- (1)
- to refrain, as of the effective date of the agreement, from
nuclear testing until 36 months thereafter. (The suspension would
not continue beyond a 12-month period unless satisfactory progress
was being made in the installation of the inspection system in (2)
below.)
- (2)
- to cooperate in setting up during the first 24 months, or earlier
if mutually agreeable, an effective international inspection
arrangement to monitor tests.
[Page 620]
b. The U.S. will announce that it will resume nuclear tests at the end of
36 months if agreement to an adequately inspected cut-off of the
production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes has not been
achieved.
c. The U.S. will announce that it will refrain indefinitely from nuclear
tests if the monitoring system referred to in paragraph 5a(2) is
operating to the satisfaction of each party concerned and if the
inspection system for the cut-off has been installed to the satisfaction
of each party concerned and if the cut-off has been put into effect.
d. The U.S. will announce that if tests are resumed, it will give
notification in advance of dates and approximate yields of such tests;
provide reciprocal limited access to tests; and conduct such tests
underground.
e. Provisions will be made for the continuation, under international
auspices, of any nuclear explosions necessary for the development of
peaceful application of such explosions.
Enclosure 2
3
Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for
Disarmament and Atomic Energy (Farley) to Secretary of State Dulles
Washington,
August 1,
1958.
SUBJECT
- Proposed Policy on Nuclear Tests
Discussion:
- 1.
- We believe that with the Geneva talks approaching a conclusion,
early policy decisions must be taken on the question of nuclear
tests. Dr. Fisk, Ambassador
Thompson and Embassy
London have also expressed this view within the past week (Denuc 103, Moscow 248, London 661,
[Page 621]
attached as Tab
C).4 In your letter to Prime Minister Macmillan on June 135 you indicated
that we hoped to be able to approach the UK shortly on this matter in the light of information
developed in the Geneva talks; and the UK reminded the Department last week of its desire to
discuss the question with us upon conclusion of those talks. The
approach of the United Nations General Assembly, the release of the
United Nations Radiation Committee scheduled for early August, and
the possibility of the question of tests arising indirectly in
connection with the proposed Special Security Council Session are
additional factors which demand consideration of this
question.
- 2.
- On July 30 Chairman McCone
handed you a message sent to him by Commissioner Libby and Dr. Edward Teller (Tab B).6
The message suggests that to avoid our being forced by public
opinion into a complete test cessation we might propose (1) to limit
the offsite fission fallout per year to one megaton equivalent each
year released by the U.S. and the same amount by the USSR, or alternately (2) to ban
completely off site fallout and permit underground testing by
everyone.
- 3.
- While any measures which notably reduced fallout would lessen
public concern about the health hazards of continued testing, we
believe the AEC proposal is
insufficient from the political standpoint and that it has the
following specific disadvantages:
- (a)
- It would be viewed as a retreat from previous Western
proposals which have called for suspension of tests rather
than test limitations, and would seem an illogical sequel to
the Geneva talks directed toward methods for enforcement of
a possible test suspension.
- (b)
- It would not be accepted and hence would enable the USSR to continue to exploit
the testing issue and its own unilateral suspension in
world-wide propaganda and to avoid the question of a
production cutoff by continuing to hide behind the issue of
a test suspension.
- (c)
- By the same token, it would be an easy way for the USSR to avoid the inspection
to which it has otherwise become largely committed as a
result of the Geneva talks.
- (d)
- It would not inhibit the development of nuclear weapons
capabilities by fourth countries, a problem which has been
of some concern to the U.S. and one which is of apparently
increasing concern to the USSR as well.
- (e)
- It would not have the effect of a test suspension in
freezing weapons development of the U.S. and USSR at a time when we retain
some
[Page 622]
important
advantages in weapons technology (according to technical
studies prepared by the Science Advisory Committee).
- (f)
- A limitation of fallout to a fixed amount would, according
to past technical consideration of similar limitation
proposals, be difficult to enforce by inspection.
- 4.
- The policy recommendations which you discussed in general terms
with the panel of disarmament advisers and approved for discussion
with other agencies in April, we believe, afford the best basis for
decisions at this time. In summary, the nuclear test proposal we
have discussed with the other agencies and revised in the light of
their comments, is the following: The nuclear provisions of our
present proposals (test suspension and cut-off) would be made
separable from the other elements of the package, but testing would
remain linked, as far as the U.S. is concerned, to the cut-off which
would become a condition subsequent. Nuclear tests would be
suspended for three years beginning as of the effective date of the
agreement.7 The suspension would not
continue beyond twelve months unless satisfactory progress was being
made in the installation of the inspection system. The U.S. would
declare at the outset that testing would be resumed if agreement on
an adequately inspected cut-off of production of fissionable
materials for weapons purposes had not been reached at the end of
three years. Conversely, we would announce that the suspension would
be extended for an indefinite period if agreement is reached on the
installation of a control system to assure that no further
fissionable material is produced for weapons purposes. The U.S.
would announce that, if it became necessary to resume testing, the
U.S. would henceforth test only underground.
- 5.
- This proposal would, we believe, turn to our advantage each of the
factors mentioned in paragraph 3 above which weigh against the
AEC proposal. It would be a
logical follow-up to the Geneva talks, deprive the Soviets of the
propaganda advantages of the testing issue, enable us to begin arms
inspection within the USSR, inhibit
fourth country programs, and could freeze our present weapons
advantage. It would, by removing the test issue, enable us to place
more effective emphasis in the nuclear cut-off as the condition
subsequent. Most important, it would be evidence of United States
willingness to go the “extra mile” to help achieve more meaningful
measures of disarmament and thus go far to counter the image which
is all too prevalent abroad of a militaristic United States.
- 6.
- Attached as Tab A8 is a proposed revision of the paragraph on nuclear
tests in present NSC policy which
would incorporate the changes recommended above. The other
disarmament policy recommendations discussed in the interim report
to the Cabinet Committee (Tab D)9 need not, in our view, be decided until the
studies on surprise attack now underway under the leadership of Dr.
Killian have been
completed.
Recommendations:10
- 1.
- That you meet at an early date with Chairman McCone, Dr. Killian, Secretary McElroy and Mr. Allen Dulles to seek agreement
on the nuclear provisions of U.S. disarmament policy along lines
suggested in Tab A.11
- 2.
- That you then seek a Presidential decision in the proposed
revisions in policy as early as feasible.