Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

133. Memorandum of Discussion at the 471st Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, December 22, 1960.

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. U.S. Policy on Continental Defense (NSC 5802/1; NSC Action No. 2151—f—(1); Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated July 14, 1960; NSC Action No. 2300; NIE 11–8–60; NIE 11–5–59; NSC 6022)

AND

2. Measures for the Passive Defense of the Population With Particular Regard to Fallout Shelter (NSC 5802/1; NSC 5807; NSC 5807/2; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy on Continental Defense”, dated July 14, 1960; NSC Action No. 2300–e; Memos for NSC from Deputy Executive Secretary, subject: “Measures for the Passive Defense of the Population, with Particular Regard to Fallout Shelter”, dated December 7 and 8, 1960¹)

Mr. Gray briefed the Council on NSC 6022. (A copy of Mr. Gray’s briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)²

In the course of his briefing, Mr. Gray referred to paragraph 4 of the statement of policy,³ where the Joint Chiefs of Staff reserved their position on language which questions the U.S. capability to develop and deploy an adequate anti-ICBM system during the 1960’s barring technological breakthrough.

General Lemnitzer said the word “adequate” was the key word in this paragraph. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt the paragraph downgraded the possibility of achieving an anti-ICBM system in the 1960’s. A really adequate anti-ICBM defense would probably never be achieved.

Mr. Gray pointed out that current policy on continental defense contemplated an active defense against ICBM’s. A part of our old shelter policy and other continental defense policy were predicated on an active defense. We are now less optimistic about the possibility of an active defense against ICBM’s than we were in 1958, when current continental defense policy was written. Part of the reason for reviewing the 1958 policy is to take account of the change in our estimated capabilities to employ active defense against ICBM attack.

General Lemnitzer believed there was a possibility of getting an effective anti-ICBM system by 1970, but whether the system would provide complete coverage by then was another question. Mr. Gray wondered how effective the system would be.

Secretary Gates said he disagreed with the Joint Chiefs’ view on this point. He had been told that even if we spend $500 million a year beginning this year, and assuming that all the complicated hardware functioned properly, we would be able to defend only 20% of the population against ICBM’s by 1969. Secretary Gates felt the statement in the paper was conservative.

Mr. Stans suggested the paper should make the statement that the time by which an active defense against ICBM’s can be developed is uncertain.

The President said the scientists who talked to him had indicated uncertainty about the time at which an anti-ICBM system could be developed.

Mr. Gray suggested that the years immediately ahead constituted a “period of greatest danger”, one of several such periods we had lived through. The policy statement is indicating that we have little hope of an effective active defense against ICBM’s. At the same time there are those who demand a vastly increased shelter program. Mr. Gray wondered therefore whether some of the difficulties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not stem from the fear that the $500 million a year now being spent on an active anti-ICBM system would be devoted to shelter construction.

General Lemnitzer agreed that Mr. Gray had correctly identified a part of the JCS concern. People might believe it was useless to spend money on an anti-ICBM system if the possibility of achieving an effective system were downgraded.

The President pointed out that the word “questionable” was used in paragraph 4. He felt this word meant we were in doubt as to whether an anti-ICBM system would be developed in the 1960’s.

Secretary Gates felt the word “questionable” was the right word, since there was this doubt. He referred again to the fact that even with a great deal of effort we would be able to cover only 20% of the population with an anti-ICBM system by 1969. Accordingly, he believed the statement in paragraph 4 was correct.

Mr. Scribner⁴ thought the effort now being devoted to developing an anti-ICBM system should not be reduced. The difficulty was that some people, upon seeing statements like that in paragraph 4, would want to divert money from the anti-ICBM missiles to shelters.

The President said the statement in paragraph 4 seemed correct to him, and he believed it should be included in the policy paper. The statement was merely a statement of fact. He asked whether anyone could assure him that we would have an anti-ICBM system in the near future.

General Lemnitzer agreed that in so far as the statement was true there should be no objection to including it in the policy paper. The statement apparently meant that we can’t count with certainty on achieving an active anti-ICBM defense in the 1960’s. On the understanding that this paragraph would not be the basis for a major shift of funds from active to passive defense measures, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would withdraw their reservation.

Mr. Gray then explained paragraph 7, dealing with the question of relative emphasis.

Secretary Gates said that in terms of such things as airborne alert, enhanced ground alert, BMEW’s, dispersal, mobility and hardening, our policy has veered more toward passive defense than toward interceptor planes and anti-missile missiles. We are now spending more on passive defense operations than on active defense; this is Defense Department policy. Accordingly, Secretary Gates thought that language leaning toward passive defense should be incorporated in the policy statement.

Mr. Gray said the issue was how much effort the United States should devote to passive defense of the population.

The President said that paragraph 7 referred to passive defense of our retaliatory capability. Mr. Gray said that part of the paragraph referred to retaliatory capability, while the remainder referred to the defense of the population.

Secretary Gates believed the Majority language in paragraph 7 stated what we were actually doing more accurately than the Budget–JCS language.⁵

The President said he saw no objection to the Majority language.

Mr. Stans said the language proposed by Budget was the language of the present continental defense policy. He had tried to discover the significance of proposing a change in present policy on relative emphasis. He could see no reason for such change because, as Secretary Gates had said, we have been carrying out passive measures within the scope of the present policy. Secretary Gates believed the language of current policy could be improved because it referred to “predominant emphasis” being placed on active defense. It was not true that predominant emphasis was now being placed on active defense.

The President believed the Majority language in paragraph 7 should be adopted.

Mr. Stans pointed out that the Majority language in paragraph 7–b referred to “increased attention to measures for the passive defense of the U.S. population.” In the Budget version this language would be deleted.

The President said he would never agree to delete language of this nature. In his view, we should be doing a lot more than we are doing for passive defense of the population. He believed in doing everything possible to alert people without getting them hysterical.

Mr. Gray suggested that paragraph 7–b might be put aside for the moment, inasmuch as it was related to the divergences of view in connection with paragraphs 20 and 21. The paper contained three versions of paragraphs 20 and 21. One alternative reflected a program which would soon be presented by Governor Hoegh; the other alternatives reflected a different approach. Mr. Gray suggested that Governor Hoegh make his presentation on “Measures for the Passive Defense of the Population, with Particular Regard to Fallout Shelter”, after which some of the splits would fall into place.

Governor Hoegh said that the key element in the passive defense of the population was fallout shelter, which would contribute to deterrence of war and, in the event the deterrent failed, would protect the population, enabling the nation to survive and go on to win the war. He said the OCDM goal was fallout shelter for the whole population within five years. This goal was to be achieved by providing encouragement to the people and to industry to provide their own fallout shelter without undue panic or haste. Governor Hoegh then displayed charts showing the cost of currently-approved measures. Measures approved by the NSC would have approved expenditure of $97 million, 1959 to 1961. Actually because of reduction in appropriation requests, only $15.65 million were expended. In FY 1962, $42.9 million is being requested.

Governor Hoegh said 25% of the population had an adequate basis for fallout shelter in existing structures. A recent Gallup poll shows that 71% of the people favor fallout shelter. He pointed out that more than a million people had already built fallout shelters, while 13 million families had chosen the safest place in the home in case of attack. OCDM had constructed 400 prototype shelters.

Governor Hoegh then turned to proposed measures, and displayed a chart along the following lines:

Proposed Measures
	FY 1962	5-year Total
Federal Buildings
New military	10	50
Existing military	20	100
Grants in aid	16	90
Tax credits	800	4000
Federal matching grants	2	2
NEAR system	0	50
Total	848	4292
Total of approved and proposed measures	890	4512

Governor Hoegh said that certain proposed measures could be taken without cost—namely, Presidential actions, the inclusion of shelter provisions in Federal loan programs, and State actions. Governor Hoegh emphasized the need for Presidential action. He suggested that the President might make the statement regarding fallout shelter in a press conference, or in the State of the Union Message, or might announce that he was building a fallout shelter at Gettysburg.

In connection with State actions, Governor Hoegh gave as an example the fact that some States and cities do not assess a property higher for tax purposes because it has a shelter. He also noted that many local communities are correcting their building codes to facilitate shelter construction.

In conclusion, Governor Hoegh said that if all the proposed measures except the tax credits were adopted he believed the necessary action by the American people would be stimulated. However, all actions other than the tax credits would be needed to produce this effect.

The President thought it would be illogical to allow tax credits for shelter construction. He said people take a great many actions for their own welfare without claiming tax credits. In response to a question from Mr. Gray, Governor Hoegh said he was not pressing for the adoption of tax credits at the present time.

Mr. Gray said he would like to read the goal stated in the OCDM paper: “The goal of the Federal Government should be that the entire population has fallout shelters within five years with such governmental support and assistance as is required to meet this goal.”

The President felt the goal should be stated differently. It should be stated as a goal of fallout shelter within five years with the role of the Federal Government defined more precisely.

Mr. Gray then summarized for the Council the Planning Board comments on the OCDM report on “Measures for the Passive Defense of the Population.” (A copy of Mr. Gray’s briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting, and another is attached to this memorandum.)⁶ When Mr. Gray noted that Budget and Treasury would put shelters in only some Federal buildings rather than in all suitable buildings, the President commented that “some” Federal buildings would be his choice too.

General Lemnitzer said he agreed with the argument that fallout shelter in military buildings would be a great stimulus to private construction of shelters.

Before Mr. Gray finished reading the Planning Board comments on the OCDM report, the President said there was no need to read all the comments.

Mr. Gray said that the essential differences of view could be summarized as follows: Some officials think we should adhere to shelter programs already approved, while others believe it is necessary to adopt new measures.

Mr. Stans said that provision in the budget had already been made in the FY 1962 budget for the items shown on page 19 of the OCDM report except for the $25 million for shelters in existing civilian Federal buildings. $2 million had been put in the budget for this item, with the understanding that a supplemental would probably be requested by the new Administration if a larger shelter program were approved.

The President felt it would be undesirable to refuse, say, $10 million for shelter in new civilian Federal buildings. Mr. Stans said this item was in the budget. The President believed he would oppose both extremes. He wished to put the Federal Government out in front so that it could show what can be done in the shelter field. However, a vast program of shelter in old Federal buildings would be difficult.

Governor Hoegh said that for $100,000 a fallout shelter for 5000 persons could be built under the Treasury Building. The President protested that the Treasury Building would be in a main target area and subject to blast. Governor Hoegh said a calculated risk had to be taken on this point; Washington might not be hit. The President believed that fallout shelter would have to be constructed on a selective basis in old buildings. He believed that the $2 million mentioned by Mr. Stans was a little low in view of the way we spend money on some other things.

Governor Hoegh asked whether the $2 million could not be raised to $10 million or $15 million for shelter in existing civilian Federal buildings. The President said that in any case the $2 million should be increased.

Mr. Stans suggested that the exact amount be left open for decision after a survey of the buildings. The President asked whether there was fallout shelter in the new CIA building. Mr. Dulles said no funds had been permitted for this purpose, but he had managed to have the basement of the new building strengthened so that fallout shelter could be constructed later.

Secretary Herter said that funds for fallout shelter in the new State Department building had not been allowed. The President then said that $10 million should be put in the budget for fallout shelter in existing civilian Federal buildings. This represented his view, but he doubted that Congress would appropriate the money.

Mr. Stans said he would like to see consideration of a user charge as a means of recovering part of the cost of the NEAR system.

Secretary Gates said he wished to express an unpopular philosophy. He was worried about increasing emphasis on fallout shelter because he feared this would lead to control over our economy. Our people were not accustomed to doing things by halves. He feared that fallout shelter might lead to regimentation, and that controls would change our type of society.

The President said no one had made more speeches than he had favoring private enterprise and a free economy, but he was unable to see how the construction of fallout shelters, as proposed in the OCDM paper, would lead to controls. He recalled that in 1953 or 1954 the Council had discussed a $40 billion shelter program, and that might have resulted in a different story. But our shelter policy was devoted to Federal Government leadership and stimulation, not to compulsion. He did not want to get the Federal Government too far into the shelter work, but it would be stupid for the Federal Government to be indifferent.

Governor Hoegh said he believed that people would build their own fallout shelters as indicated by the Gallup poll he had previously mentioned.

The President wondered whether a large number of people in the Gallup poll had favored shelters because they thought the Government would pay for them.

Secretary Herter said he believed in the goals stated in the OCDM paper. The question was the means of achieving these goals. He would hesitate to go on record as approving the details of the OCDM program unless he were sure that the proposed measures would be implemented.

The President said that Governor Hoegh had what he needed for implementation in the FY 1962 budget.

Secretary Gates pointed out that the proposed measures shown on Governor Hoegh’s chart were not funded in the FY 1962 budget.

The President said that with respect to new Federal buildings additional money could not be put into the budget until the designs were known.

Secretary Herter asked whether the cost of fallout shelter in existing buildings could be absorbed by the Defense budget. Secretary Gates said that Mr. Stans had already absorbed everything that could be absorbed in the Defense budget.

Mr. Stans said that some proposals made in the OCDM report could be handled on the basis of legislative recommendations. The President believed that recommendations on civil defense should be incorporated in the State of the Union Message. Governor Hoegh thought a single piece of legislation should be introduced to carry out the passive defense program contained in the OCDM paper.

Mr. Scribner said people favored fallout shelter, but he wondered whether they favored it enough to build it. He believed that in an emergency people working in the center of Washington would try to get home so that a fallout shelter under the Treasury Building, for example, would not be very useful.

The President said that Treasury employees would need a fallout shelter at home as well as under the Treasury Building. He had often wondered whether officials would be inclined to go to a relocation site or would attempt to reach home.

Mr. Scribner believed people would have to be frightened before they would build large numbers of fallout shelters. He also felt that many shelters probably were used for storage and did not have adequate food or water supplies on hand.

Governor Hoegh pointed out that 6% of the people have a two-weeks supply of food on hand.

The President said we were talking about measures which would awaken the American people without making them hysterical and which would stimulate them to take action by showing that the Government is serious about this problem. He believed we should be fairly conservative in the tone of our legislative recommendations. Mr. Stans said the Budget Message could submit recommendations for fallout shelter. The President suggested that a requirement for the preparation of new legislative recommendation on fallout shelter be incorporated in the NSC Record of Action.

Mr. Gray said OCDM would be requested, in consultation with Defense and Budget, to prepare a revised statement of policy on measures for the passive defense of the population. The revised paper should include a statement of financial implications as guidance for the next Administration. The new paper would be designed to supersede our current policy on “Measures to Carry Out the Concept of Fallout Shelter” (NSC 5807/2). Mr. Gray also suggested that the alternative paragraphs 20 and 21 of NSC 6022 be referred back to the Planning Board for revision in the light of the discussion.

Mr. Gray said that paragraph 23 could also be resolved by the Planning Board. In connection with paragraph 23, the President said he was becoming more and more pessimistic about the possibility of evacuating cities in the event of a nuclear attack.

Mr. Gray then called attention to paragraph 25, which involved the issue of the extent to which civilian items should be stockpiled. Mr. Gray pointed out that originally it had been the policy to stockpile for survival and that this policy had been subsequently extended to stockpiling for recovery. Part of the Planning Board wished to stockpile for initial recovery only, while the remainder of the Planning Board wished to stockpile for recovery, omitting the word “initial.”⁷

The President asked where machinery such as bulldozers would be stockpiled. Governor Hoegh said all stockpiles would be located underground. He added that OCDM was encouraging the citizens of local communities to stockpile such things as medical supplies. He thought it was essential to have a stockpile policy because of the deficiency of essential items which would exist after a nuclear attack.

The President wondered how the survival of the stockpiles would be assured. Governor Hoegh said the stockpiles were relatively safe because of their storage underground.

The President wondered whether we could not induce the drug companies to locate their warehouses in safe places. Governor Hoegh said this had been attempted, but the drug companies preferred to keep their supplies stockpiled near the market. The President said that policies such as the one under discussion might work if the people of the United States could be stimulated to believe in the desirability of advance preparations against the possibility of attack.

After Governor Hoegh had made some drafting suggestions for paragraph 25, Mr. Scribner asked how recovery was defined. Did the word mean that we would stockpile enough material to place the country on a pre-attack basis within a short time? In other words, was complete recovery meant, or only the minimum of recovery essential to get the country functioning on an austere basis again?

Secretary Gates thought paragraph 25 was too open-ended. The President wondered why a time limit could not be put on stockpiling. When Governor Hoegh said this was a difficult matter to prejudge, the President replied that OCDM was prejudging the matter when it decided on the amounts to be stockpiled. Governor Hoegh said he interpreted the word “recovery” to mean that the nation has survived the attack, restored free government and institutions, and has the necessary items for the people to live and get back to a production basis sufficient to support continued viability of the country. The President said he was not completely convinced that free government could be restored very soon after a nuclear attack. He believed if materials were to be stockpiled, it was necessary to know exactly what the policy was and how much it was necessary to stockpile.

Governor Hoegh said OCDM estimates of stockpile needs were based on the time it would take to restore industry after a nuclear attack. Since industry could not be restored for a year, a year’s requirements should be stockpiled, although these requirements were of course based on a smaller population.

Secretary Herter asked whether we were now talking about the stockpiling of food and medical supplies. Mr. Gray said the issue was whether to stockpile such items as food and medical supplies only or whether to stockpile all items essential to recovery.

Mr. Stans said removal of the word “initial” in paragraph 25 would change present policy in a major way. Even under the paragraph as redrafted by Governor Hoegh, almost every element of society would have to be stockpiled. The President believed our policy could not go too far. Mr. Stans thought that any phase of stockpiling could be dealt with separately and specifically. Mr. Gray pointed out that under Governor Hoegh’s language structural steel might be stockpiled, since such action would not disrupt the economy at a time when steel production is declining.

The President said the problem had no real solution. No one knows in what condition a nuclear attack will leave the country. He was unable to see how we could stockpile enough supplies to enable us to resume our normal industrial processes immediately. Perhaps after a nuclear attack we would all be nomads.

Governor Hoegh believed it would be necessary to restore our industrial society after an attack in order to enable the people to survive. He thought perhaps our society would be restored on the 1920 basis. Secretary Gates said it perhaps would be cut back to a 1776 basis. The President doubted that the stockpile itself would survive. He said our imagination could not encompass the situation which would result from an attack on this country involving the explosion of 2000 megatons. He concluded that war no longer has any logic whatever. Mr. Gray said the word “initial” would be left in paragraph 25, and the right-hand version of the split was adopted.

As an additional comment on stockpiling, the President said there would be no transportation after a nuclear attack to carry stockpiled items where they were needed. Governor Hoegh felt transportation would not be completely destroyed. He believed railroad transportation facilities would survive and be restored to normal in about thirty days. The President did not agree, believing that the railway centers in the cities would be completely destroyed. He was willing to go along with the stockpiling of medicine, but he didn’t believe that raw materials and semi-manufactured items should be stockpiled.

Mr. Gray then turned back to paragraph 12–b, where there was a split over whether the United States should “attempt to develop” AICBM capability by the earliest possible date, or should “ensure some operational” AICBM capability by the earliest possible date. In response to questions from the President, Mr. Gray said the language of this paragraph would be adjusted to indicate clearly that it referred to an anti-missile missile system. He felt the issue was between the present research and development priority for the AICBM and an operational capability.

General Lemnitzer said the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt operational capability should be the objective. The President said the paragraph should be drafted in such a way as to take out both versions of the split.

Mr. Gray then turned to paragraph 19–a, where Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed deletion of a provision that the Secretary of Defense should consult with the Director, OCDM, with respect to the location of new fixed retaliatory bases and major military administrative headquarters. Secretary Gates wondered whether the provision which Defense objected to would give the Director, OCDM, a veto power. As long as no veto is implied, he was certainly willing to consult with the Director, OCDM.

The President felt the provision for consultation should remain in the paper because various factors in addition to the military factor needed to be considered. The President recalled that he had once raised this question in connection with the location of a Titan base near Denver.

Mr. Gray said that the other divergences of view in NSC 6022 could be settled on the basis of actions the Council had already taken.

The National Security Council:

Continental Defense:⁸

a. Discussed the draft statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 6022; in the light of the presentation referred to in Item 2 below.

b. Adopted the statement of policy in NSC 6022, subject to the following amendments:

(1) Page 2, paragraph 4: Include the bracketed sentence; deleting the brackets and the footnote thereto.

(2) Pages 4 and 5, paragraph 7: Include the Majority version (deleting the Budget–JCS version), with the following changes:

(a) Subparagraph 7–a: Insert the word “military” before “active defenses” and before “passive measures”.

(b) Subparagraph 7–b: Insert the word “civilian” before “passive defense”.

(3) Pages 9 and 10, paragraph 12–b: Revise to read as follows:

“b. Against ballistic missiles: The United States should continue efforts to develop at the earliest possible date an effective anti-ballistic-missile capability as a matter of highest national priority,* both for its own value and to offset the practical and psychological disadvantages of possible Soviet claims of success in this field.”⁹

(4) Pages 14 and 15, paragraph 19–a: Include the bracketed words; deleting the brackets and the footnote thereto.

(5) Page 15, paragraph 19–b: Include the word “selected”; deleting the brackets and the footnotes thereto.

(6) Pages 15, 16, 16–A and 17: Referred the alternative versions of paragraphs 20, 21 and 23 to the NSC Planning Board for revision in the light of the discussion at this meeting.

(7) Page 17, paragraph 24: Delete the word “initial”, and the brackets and the footnote thereto.

(8) Pages 17 and 17–A, paragraph 25: Include the Treasury–Defense–Budget version, deleting the Majority version.¹⁰

Measures for the Passive Defense of the Population, With Particular Regard to Fallout Shelter¹¹

a. Noted and discussed a presentation by the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, based on the enclosures to the reference memorandum of December 7, 1960; in the light of the views of the Treasury Department thereon, transmitted by the reference memorandum of December 8, 1960, and of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thereon, as referred to at the meeting.

b. Noted the President’s approval of the objective of obtaining fallout shelter for the population within five years, principally with local and private effort, and with Federal resources to be confined largely to setting an example and stimulating individual efforts to attain the objective but not to guarantee its attainment.

c. Noted the President’s directive that suitable language to support the policy in b above be prepared for the State of the Union and Budget messages, and that legislative proposals authorizing appropriate implementing measures be prepared for submission to the Congress in January; subject to the normal Executive clearance process by the Bureau of the Budget.

d. Requested the Director, OCDM, in consultation as appropriate with the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, to prepare, in the light of the discussion at this meeting, a revised statement of policy on the subject, together with an estimate of the financial implications, for consideration by the Council on January 12, 1961, to supersede NSC 5807/2.¹²

Note: The actions in b, c and d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Director, OCDM, for appropriate implementation, in consultation as appropriate with the Secretary of Defense and the Director, Bureau of the Budget.

[Here follows Agenda Item 3. “NATO in the 1960s.”]

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Boggs on December 23.
1. Neither the December 7 nor 8 memorandum has been found.
2. Not printed.
3. See footnote 7, Document 132.
4. Fred C. Scribner, Jr., Under Secretary of the Treasury.
5. See footnote 6, Document 132.
6. Not printed.
7. The Departments of Defense and the Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget wished to include the word “initial;” the majority wished to omit it.
8. The following paragraphs constitute NSC Action No. 2360, approved by the President on December 29. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
9. The asterisk in this paragraph refers to a definitional footnote in NSC 6022.
10. These amendments, along with others specified in NSC Action No. 2386, approved by the President on January 18, 1961, were incorporated in NSC 6022/1, “U.S. Policy on Continental Defense,” also dated January 18. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council, and ibid., S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 6022 Series)
11. The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 2361, approved by the President on December 29. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
12. On January 12, 1961, the Council considered NSC 6104/1, “Measures To Provide Shelter From Radioactive Fallout,” dated January 10, 1961, and adopted it with modifications as NSC 6104/2, same title, approved by the President on January 18. NSC 6104 is ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 6104 Series, and NSC 6104/2 is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 273, Records of the National Security Council, Policy Papers File.