Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

134. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Douglas) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Gray)⁰

Washington, December 28, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Report on Possible Deficiencies in the U.S. Posture for Limited Military Operations

The attached report,¹ which represents the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is forwarded in response to NSC Action No. 2317–c.²

Your attention is invited to paragraph 1 of their “General Comments” in which it is stated, in part, that the studies do not by themselves constitute a valid basis for formulating programs or reaching decisions. I concur with this statement. With respect to the JCS report, I feel that the following comments should be added to insure understanding and to clarify certain points.

(1) Department of Defense planning for logistics support of limited war is currently based upon the general order of magnitude of effort such as that contained in the Contingency Plan for Resumption of Hostilities in Korea. Planned logistics support capability is, or will be, adequate to meet any one, or combination of contingencies, at one time, provided in sum they do not exceed the general order of magnitude contained in the Korean contingency plan. This basis for limited war support planning was issued on 15 March 1960 to the Military Departments and was included as part of a presentation to the NSC on 30 June 1960 with respect to the Military Logistics Base section of NSC 5906/1. Approval of this concept of our planning base was indicated in NSC Action No. 2254, dated 6 July 1960.³ At the present time, the Military Departments are developing their requirements in accordance with this concept.

(2) Paragraph 2 of the “General Comments” by the JCS refers to certain conclusions contained in the five hypothetical limited war studies which were presented to the NSC on 6 October 1960. Specifically, it was indicated that U.S. capabilities in conjunction with those of our allies are generally adequate to conduct any one of the hypothetical military operations considered, but that our capabilities are dependent on prompt actions being taken as required in each case, including an expansion of the war production base. This general statement on expansion of the production base should be interpreted to mean that prompt action must be taken to increase the deliveries of matériel from the production base in-being, including both active and inactive plants, within the limits of the production base planning concept approved by the NSC on 6 July 1960.

(3) Paragraphs 2 and 3 of that section of the JCS report which is headed “Specific Views” constitute a qualified indication of the status of Service Mobilization base planning, and the general status of war reserves. These comments, as prepared by the JCS, relate to both limited and general war planning and status, and further, are based on a relatively few items reviewed by the Services, rather than a complete study and review concurred in by the JCS or the Secretary of Defense. As previously indicated in comment (1) above, the Department of Defense is still in the process of developing and reviewing its requirements in accordance with the objectives presented to the NSC on 30 June 1960. Pending completion of this effort, any reflection of status must be qualified as preliminary. Further, NSC Action No. 2317 addressed itself to limited war capabilities. The cited parts of the JCS views relate to both limited and general war planning and capabilities. This is called to your attention to preclude a possible misunderstanding. Even the preliminary views stated should not be interpreted as applying to limited war capabilities only.

(4) It is recognized that there are certain deficiencies in our limited war posture, particularly with regard to the logistic stock position and to modernization. Optimum modernization of limited war forces has not been the objective. The objective rather has been to assure an adequate degree of modernization. Our limited war posture is improving and will show a substantial improvement on the basis of the FY 1962 budget as submitted.

(5) With reference to page 15, paragraph 8–i, of the attached JCS report, the data reflected for the MATS Modernization Program were correct at the time the JCS report was prepared. Subsequently, however, the decision was made to revise this program. Currently, $30 million is programmed in FY 1961 for the development of the so-called Specific Operating Requirement (SOR) aircraft (long-range jet powered cargo aircraft) and an additional $98 million is being requested in the FY 1962 budget. For interim modernization, an amount of $175,800,000 has been programmed during FY 1961 for 50 C–130E aircraft.

(6) Steps have been taken since the JCS study to increase the commercial airlift capacity available to support military requirements by increasing the capability of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). To improve commercial air carrier emergency effectiveness and responsiveness changes in procurement policies have been effected. Only CRAF carriers are being permitted to participate in MATS contracts thus providing the carriers greater experience in military logistic support operations. Contracts with CRAF carriers are being negotiated to provide for an expanded capability to be made available on call of the Secretary of Defense. The objective of this requirement, in addition to improving carrier responsiveness, is to minimize or possibly eliminate the need for call up of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet in situations short of general war.

In my opinion, the following conclusions can be drawn from the JCS report:

(1) Capabilities in Southeast Asia. Logistics limitations in Southeast Asia, stemming from the lack of development of communications, port and terminal facilities and transportation means, will severely affect U.S. and friendly indigenous military operations. These limitations will influence the nature of operations and the type of force to be employed and must be considered in all planning. Action is being taken to improve strategic communications into and within the area and to improve capabilities for conducting over-the-beach supply operations. When considered politically feasible, additional transit and base rights in the area would facilitate dispersal, staging and recovery of aircraft and repositioning and prestockage of materials and supplies. While our operational capabilities are improving, this area presents difficult but not impossible problems for limited military operations.

(2) Air and Sea Lift Capabilities. Except for some shortages in the first 20 days, the airlift capability for limited war conditions considered by the JCS appears to be adequate if the Civil Reserve Air Fleet is activated and if airlift capabilities in one area are augmented, in the initial phase, by temporary transfer of capability from other areas. (This conclusion is valid only if the Civil Reserve Air Fleet or equivalent commercial airlift augmentation becomes available within the proper time frames and proves effective.) Sea lift capability is generally adequate. Shortages in the first 60 days of limited war could be made up through use of available foreign flag shipping and through “hot bunking” on passenger ships. The FY 1961 and 1962 budgets will provide about $470 million for improvements in our airlift capabilities.

(3) Mobilization Base Plans. At the present time limited war operations could result in some degradation of our general war posture. It is anticipated that upon full implementation by the Military Departments of the 15 March 1960 logistics guidance our capability to support limited war situations should be improved without degrading our general war readiness posture.

It is requested that this report be given special limited distribution.⁴

James H. Douglas⁵

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Records of the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Top Secret. Attached to a December 30 covering memorandum from Lay to the NSC.
1. Document 130.
2. See footnote 8, Document 125.
3. Concerning the NSC meeting held June 30 and NSC Action No. 2254, see Document 106 and footnote 5 thereto. NSC 5906/1 is printed as Document 70.
4. The JCS report was discussed at the NSC meeting on January 5, 1961. (Memorandum of discussion by Boggs, January 5; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
5. Printed from a copy that indicates Douglas signed the original.