Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament, Volume III

132. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to Secretary of State Herter⁰

Washington, December 21, 1960.

SUBJECT

• NSC 6022 “Continental Defense”¹

On December 22 the NSC will consider the attached draft policy.

In February the Planning Board began a review of existing policy on Continental Defense (NSC 5802/1).² A discussion paper was prepared which was the subject of Council consideration on September 15, 1960.³ The principal subject of the discussion was the prospects for an effective active defense against Soviet ballistic missiles. The Department of Defense report to the Council showed that effective active defense of the continent and especially of our nuclear retaliatory force will not be available to the United States in the foreseeable future. Therefore the President directed urgent re-examination of current policy and programs for passive defense, particularly fall-out shelters. A specific report on this subject made by OCDM in consultation with State and Defense⁴ (NSC Action 2300–e)⁵ is a subsequent agenda item for the NSC meeting on December 22.

The existing policy paper on Continental Defense places primary emphasis on active defense measures rather than passive measures. The new draft policy is an attempt to change this emphasis in the light of the earlier NSC discussion and recent studies and reports which do not hold out good prospects for effective active defense against increasing Soviet missile capabilities. The differences of view which exist in the draft policy reflect differing assessments of the need for a shift in emphasis toward passive defense.

A split in the paper is in paragraph 7. The majority of the Planning Board believes that the U.S., while continuing active defense measures against manned aircraft attack should, in view of (1) increasing Soviet reliance on missiles, and (2) present limitations on achieving an effective anti-missile missile, make a particular effort to exploit passive measures for defense of the U.S. in general and the retaliatory force in particular.

The Budget–JCS position reflects little change from existing policy.⁶ The JCS view is probably conditioned by the strong support in the Army for development of Nike–Zeus, the only anti-missile weapon development now having any prospect of success. Budget has joined JCS in this split because of the cost to the Federal Government of the proposed fallout shelter protection. However, while JCS would be willing to “give increased attention to measures for the passive defense of the population,” Budget would want this attention given only to measures “essential to the protection” of the retaliatory capability.

A split in paragraph 4 represents JCS reluctance to include in the paper language which casts doubt upon the probability of development of an adequate AICBM system.⁷

The split in paragraph 12–b indicates JCS desire to make a somewhat firmer commitment to Nike–Zeus than the majority deem prudent now.⁸ We believe that such a capability would have value for psychological reasons to offset a likely Soviet claim of a similar capability.

The other split in the paper is in paragraph 20 concerning Civil Defense. The majority of the Planning Board favors a statement that a program of Civil Defense, in which a key element is fall-out shelters, is an essential part of a continental defense posture and would have the additional value of contributing to the deterrent (JCS again objects, however, to the inclusion of language questioning prospects for effective active defense). Treasury favors what is largely a restatement of present policy with emphasis upon Federal Government leadership and example only, so far as fall-out shelters are concerned. Budget prefers a short statement and a reference to the existing NSC policy document which deals with shelter policy.

The Budget approach on this split is also reflected in its split on paragraph 23.⁹

(The issue on the question of fall-out shelter will also be raised in connection with the OCDM report called for in NSC action 2300–e which is the next item on the NSC agenda for the December 22 meeting. The pertinent paragraphs of the Continental Defense paper can be amended, if necessary, to incorporate the decisions taken then.)

In paragraphs 24 and 25 Treasury and Budget object to the provision of federal guidance and leadership for other than initial recovery from nuclear attack. In paragraph 25 Defense joins Treasury–Budget. Also in paragraph 25 Treasury, Defense and Budget wish to place certain limitations upon measures to be taken with respect to the stockpiling of civilian items for survival and recovery.

In paragraph 28 a footnote implies that the President might be asked to make a decision on putting into use of an active device for the detection of fissionable material introduced into the US by clandestine means during the next few months when a prototype is completed and tested.¹⁰ We hope that the Presidential decision to use an active device on accompanied diplomatic baggage would be limited to such periods of internal tension which would warrant acceptance of the serious foreign policy risks involved in such use.

Recommendation:

That you adopt the majority position on all splits in the paper and that you express, in connection with paragraph 28 of the paper, the view indicated in the last sentence of the paragraph above.

0. Source: Department of State, S/P–NSC Files: Lot 62 D 1, NSC 6022 Series. Top Secret. Drafted by Furnas.
1. Dated December 13. (ibid.) See the Supplement.
2. See footnote 10, Document 8.
3. See Document 120.
4. Enclosed with a December 7 memorandum from Lay to the NSC, not found.
5. See footnote 10, Document 120.
6. The Budget–JCS version of paragraph 7 reads in part: “The United States should place predominant emphasis on measures to improve our active defenses, as compared with—but not to the exclusion of—passive defense measures.”
7. Paragraph 4 stated that the changing character of the Soviet threat and an assessment of the relative effectiveness of various active and passive defense measures made it necessary to re-examine U.S. programs for continental defense, and that national planning should recognize that “barring a technological breakthrough, the development and deployment of an adequate AICBM program during the 1960’s [was] questionable.” JCS reserved its position on the quoted portion.
8. This paragraph called for continued efforts to develop an effective capability against ballistic missiles “as a matter of highest national priority,” but the JCS, unlike the majority, wanted “some operational” capability “by the earliest possible date.”
9. This paragraph dealt with local input into civil defense preparations.
10. Paragraph 28 concerned the problem of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the United States.