Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

82. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the German Ambassador (Krekeler) and the Acting Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, November 30, 1956¹

Washington, November 30, 1956

Ambassador Krekeler came in to report to me on the results of his recent trip to Germany.

1. Foreign Minister Von Brentano had advised the Ambassador that he would like to come to Washington for informal discussions during the second week of January. He felt that such discussions could be most profitable on both sides. I said that the Department would give the matter every consideration, but that I could not give an offhand answer.

2. The Ambassador believed that it was most important that President Heuss should make a formal visit to the United States during the early spring. He felt that this was especially important in view of the elections which would be coming up later in the year and the necessity of gaining support against neutralist elements which were always a threat in the German situation. The Ambassador thought that a date soon after Easter—about April 20—would be most convenient for his President. I promised that we would look into the matter.

3. The Ambassador said that Chancellor Adenauer was preparing a memorandum for President Eisenhower, stating the views of the German Government on their policies in central Europe and the Middle East.² He believed that this memorandum would be most useful in (a) pulling together the views of the German Government and (b) clarifying a number of points which had so far perhaps been misunderstood on both sides.

4. As a result of the actions of the U.K. and France in the Middle East, the Ambassador said that reaction in Germany had been so violently against those two countries that it was at present impossible to proceed with plans for European integration, common market, EURATOM, etc. He believed that, given a little time, this situation might be rectified but any moves in this direction at present could be counter-productive.

5. The Ambassador said that he would like to make a number of observations in connection with our plans for the coming NATO meeting, and I suggested that he get together with Mr. MacArthur. He agreed to do this early next week.

6. With regard to the Hungarian situation, the Ambassador said that he had talked with a number or his friends while in Germany who had accompanied a German Red Cross unit into Budapest during the height of the fighting. The Ambassador reported that these people were qualified military observers and it was their unanimous opinion that the operation of the Russian military units was motivated by military considerations and that they did not seem to be dictated by political considerations.

7. With regard to Egypt, the Ambassador told me that the Chancellor had told him that there should be plans developed for economic aid to the Egyptian people. The Ambassador replied to the Chancellor that any such suggestions by the German Government would have to be accompanied by a willingness on their part to participate in the program. He gathered that the Chancellor would be willing to make such a recommendation. I pointed out to him the importance of coordinating our plans for such aid as it might well be necessary at some period to exert concerted pressure on the Egyptian Government to adopt a reasonable course and that we should not be working at cross-purposes.

8. The German Minister of Defense, according to the Ambassador, wished to concentrate upon the immediate organization of five divisions to be combat-ready by the end of 1957. He anticipated that they would be available on an organized but only partially trained basis by the middle of the year. This decision in no way changed their plans for an ultimate force of twelve divisions. He anticipated that these divisions would have less men but more fire power than had originally been planned.

9. The Ambassador closed the visit with assurance that the Chancellor wished, above all, to have close and harmonious relations with the United States and that his actions would be governed to an overriding extent by such a policy. I thanked the Ambassador and assured him of our great desire to cooperate. I pointed out, however, that our problems undoubtedly would be multiplied by remarks that the Chancellor had made to other people, such as Senator Green, in which he appeared to violently disagree with our policies and had criticized them in no uncertain terms. The Ambassador appeared much embarrassed and assured me that he would do everything to help eliminate the effects of such criticism. I advised him that we would show him the report of the conversation with Senator Green at an early opportunity.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by Hoover.
2. No copy of this memorandum has been found in Department of State files. It was presumably a more formalized version of the Chancellor’s message to Eisenhower; see Document 80.