81. Letter From President Eisenhower to Chancellor Adenauer1
Dear Mr. Chancellor: I was very much interested in the views which you recently sent me through General Gruenther.2 I agree with you that it is of the greatest importance and urgency that full unity be restored in the Western camp. It is most urgent that we bring to an end the threat of hostilities in the Middle East and move in the direction of an overall settlement in the area. The most immediate problems are to secure the withdrawal of armed forces in accordance with the United Nations resolution, keyed to the entry of the United Nations Emergency Force; implementation of the United Nations injunction against the introduction of new forces and military matériel in the area of conflict; and clearance of the Suez Canal. Beyond this, a basis must be found for solving the fundamental Arab-Israeli conflict and reaching agreement on a future regime for the Suez Canal. I welcome your thoughts on the subject and am certain you will agree with me on the necessity of working through the United Nations to find solutions to these problems.
I agree also that there must be improved understanding regarding political consultation among the NATO Governments. You have no doubt by this time seen the report of the Three Wise Men.3 Although we have not yet had a chance to study this report in detail, it seems to us to provide a sound basis for dealing with this problem. However, methods of consultation are not enough. They must be used. While we must work toward harmonization of policies among the NATO countries, I am sure you will agree that it would be unrealistic [Page 177] to expect that we will be able always to achieve identity of viewpoint with regard to matters outside the NATO area.
Improvement of the economic conditions of the peoples of the Middle East is certainly an essential aspect of the problem of our relations with that area. This problem must be worked out with them on a cooperative basis. However, I doubt whether any general approach can be effectively undertaken until progress has been made toward solving the two basic problems of the Arab-Israeli conflict and of the Suez Canal.
One of our greatest hopes in this direction is the clear and continuing evidence of basic differences in the thinking of some of the Heads of State in the Mideast. Some of these are deeply disturbed over recent developments and have a clear understanding of the dangers inherent in the policies pursued by their more reckless and irresponsible allies.
I appreciate the difficulties which have confronted the Federal Republic in making progress in the buildup of its military forces to which you referred in your message. I hope that the Federal Government will soon be able to give NATO a firm statement of its plans. In our view, the need for the forces which Germany has undertaken to contribute to NATO continues to be as great as ever. I am sure you will agree that the urgency for such a contribution has been made all the more apparent by recent events in Eastern Europe.
While additional forces are needed to provide an effective NATO defense in Europe, it would be difficult to increase the American share. As you are aware, a good portion of our combat-ready ground forces is already stationed in Germany. Furthermore, an increase in our forces at this time would give rise to misunderstanding both here at home and abroad.
I should very much welcome an opportunity to discuss these matters with you and would be glad if you could come to Washington some time in the new year. I will communicate with you again as to when we might arrange to see one another.
Sincerely,
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/11–2956. Secret; Presidential Handling. Transmitted to Bonn in telegram 1479, November 29, which is the source text, for immediate delivery to the Chancellor. The next day, the Embassy reported that the letter had been delivered through the Foreign Office at 11 a.m. on that day. (Telegram 2087; ibid., 762.00/11–3056)↩
- See supra.↩
- The Three Wise Men submitted their report to the North Atlantic Council during its meeting in Paris, December 11–14, 1956; see vol. IV, pp. 137 ff.↩
- Telegram 1479 bears this typed signature.↩