Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

299. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State¹

Belgrade, March 12, 1957—1 p.m.

1258. 1. As two months have now elapsed since receipt of Deptel 556² (whose last paragraph indicated imminent decision resumption of military aid) and Foreign Secretary’s reply set forth in Embtel 987 of January 10,³ I should be grateful for information on how this question stands in Washington. Our detailed recommendations first went forward in Embtel 711 of November 23 and were amplified in message from AMAS to Pentagon of January 14⁴ in response to instructions. I assume no further information is required from Belgrade. AMAS figures show deliveries in last three months have reached absolute low and are well below 500 tons per month.

2. At present all military aid is suspended except training, local OSP, and spare parts and maintenance items necessary to ensure continued effectiveness of previously delivered equipment. This suspension which commenced last summer has without doubt led to confusion, uncertainty and misunderstanding on part of Yugoslavia military, particularly in view of favorable presidential determination in October.⁵ An example is case of three [garble] now ready for delivery and being held in French shipyards. Continuation of suspension not only imposes necessary US financial obligations for security and maintenance of craft that deteriorate rapidly through prolonged non-use but it confuses the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslav military does not understand the US position on delayed delivery of these ships while continuing work on four OSP MSI’s under construction in Yugoslav yards which in effect indicates to Yugoslav Government planned delivery both types. Yugoslav military has, for several years, looked forward to acquisition of these new fleet units since they represent vast improvement over standard Yugoslav ships. The most useful training months for shaking down these ships with Yugoslav crews in local waters are ahead and further suspension in delivery tends to retard training.

3. Turning to the Yugoslav air force it is noted that the benefit of their successful F–86–E training program wherein 227 pilots and 711 technicians were produced is being lost. The 5 flyable aircraft are insufficient to provide proficiency training for more than 15 pilots and 50 technicians, because of complexity and high performance type of aircraft. While not as acute problem, same situation exists with respect to F–84G aircraft where 109 are now flyable of the 132 delivered. YAF reports and AMAS has verified the number of qualified pilots and technicians available in excess of those required to activate the three remaining fighter-bomber (F–84G) squadrons to bring YAF up to the planned 9 fighter-bomber squadrons contained in the force goal. Spare parts and equipment are available in Yugoslavia for one wing of 75 F–86E and are not interchangeable with other YAF aircraft. Deterioration of spares and equipment in storage is not a serious problem but follows a normal course and must be expected. The delivery of these spares to YAF has been interpreted as an indication of future deliveries of F–86E aircraft. Storage of programmed but undelivered aircraft is another problem, however, in that this “flyable storage” would be at great expense to the US. Yugoslavia has approximately eight months of good flying weather per year, most of which lies immediately ahead. The present lack of aircraft denies YAF that training which could be executed during the March–October period and pushes further into the future the ultimate attainment of the planned force goal of providing Yugoslavia with an equipped and trained fighter-bomber and day fighter capability to support its conventional ground and sea forces. Over the MAP years YAF has provided funds and worked in an orderly fashion to have adequate ground facilities (seven modern jet aircraft fields), pilots and technicians prepared to receive the programmed aircraft. YAF is now capable of absorbing aircraft and equipment deliveries at the maximum rate of delivery believed attainable by USAF.

4. With respect to the ground forces the problems are neither as acute nor as distressing to the YNA. They exist in the fields of suspended delivery of ammunition with its resultant fall-off of weapons training and in establishment of crystal repair and maintenance facilities for some 250,000 MAP provided crystals. Neither is in the magnitude of the air or navy problems. However, Yugoslavs continue to press unceasingly for delivery of vehicles and weapons as well as ammunition.

5. Foregoing description of technical problems facing US and Yugoslavs by continued suspension of deliveries represents considered views of General Waters and me. We have not discussed cost to US of storage and related problems issuing from suspension because we are not fully informed, but we understand they are considerable. Pentagon no doubt has this information.

6. Although we recognize this problem of resuming deliveries presents difficulties in Washington, I note from Deptel 701, February 26,⁶ that Department expects include request DS funds in presentation to Congress and expects opposition will be less than last year. If Congressional situation is so improved, perhaps moment is favorable to take decision on military aid. Certainly current and growing Soviet-Yugoslav rift presents us with opportunity consolidate Yugoslav military ties with West. If we decide to lift suspension it would enable us to move toward completion of planned program to provide small, balanced, defensive force which has been mutually developed by US and Yugoslavia. Completion of program would at that time provide strong contrast to Soviet refusal to fulfill commitments in economic field and strengthen Yugoslav determination to resist Soviet pressure—a determination reaffirmed by Tito to Kline on March 9.⁷ If it is our desire to strengthen US influence in Yugoslavia, to demonstrate to non-bloc countries that we are prepared to help maintain their independence by material aid, and to take advantage of Soviet-Yugoslav discord (as exemplified by violent Pravda attack March 10 on Popovic), it seems to us moment has come to resume deliveries.

7. Department please discuss foregoing as appropriate with Defense with request to inform CINCEUR.

Riddleberger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 768.5–MSP/3–1257. Secret; Limited Distribution.
2. The last paragraph of telegram 556 to Belgrade, January 9, indicated that the question of the resumption of military aid would shortly be referred to Secretary Dulles for final decision. (Ibid., 768.5–MSP/1–1057)
3. In telegram 987 from Belgrade, January 10, Riddleberger reported that Popović had said that the Yugoslav Government favored completing the established aid program. He urged that a fixed delivery schedule be provided by the United States, (Ibid., 768.5–MSP/1–1057)
4. In telegram 711 from Belgrade, Riddleberger discussed tentative delivery schedules for military items. (Ibid., 768.5–MSP/11–2356) The AMAS message has not been found in Department of State files.
5. See Document 290.
6. Not printed. (Ibid., 411.6841/2–2157)
7. In an interview with Allen Kline, Special Consultant to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on March 10, Tito stated that Yugoslavia would not rejoin the Soviet bloc, even though the refusal would cause economic difficulties for Yugoslavia. A summary of the conversation is in telegram 1250 from Belgrade, March 11. (Ibid., 033.1100–KL/3–1057)