Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

298. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State¹

Belgrade, February 6, 1957—3:04 p.m.

1104. No distribution outside Department.

1. Although I am not fully conversant with final Washington developments on Tito’s trip, it nonetheless seems clear that for reasons of its own, Yugoslav Government decided to cancel visit and blame it on unfavorable publicity.² Unfavorable publicity for Tito in United States is certainly nothing new and has occurred concomitantly with aid debates every year. This could not have come as any great surprise to Yugoslav Government although vigor of reaction to trip may have been more than anticipated. When Foreign Secretary informed me of decision on January 28, he implied very clearly it would be postponement and made no mention of any publicity and in fact, on January 11³ he had deplored United States press leaks until time was fixed. When it is remembered that almost year elapsed between Tito announcement of his visit to USSR (June 1955) and his trip (June 1956), there seems to have been no necessity for such sudden publicity cancelling trip. We cannot therefore exclude possibility there was some ulterior motive, although growing intensity of ideological clash between Yugoslavs and Soviets would seem to militate against likelihood there any collusion between the two.

2. Yugoslav exceeding sensitivity at unfavorable United States publicity would seem illogical and inconsistent when compared with their attitude toward anti-Yugoslav propaganda from Moscow. Only recently when I made some passing reference to virulence of Soviet radio propaganda against United States, I received long lecture from Foreign Secretary how those who work for peace and relaxation of tension should rise above such attacks and should pursue their mission without regard to vituperation. And certainly Yugoslav publicity and official attitude on United States Near East policy has not been characterized by any inhibitions. Therefore as I regard manner in which Yugoslav Government forced cancellation, I am impelled to conclusion Tito did not desire to make visit at this time. I have subsequently found out that following hunting party on January 27 when both Tito and Popović had earnest conversation with Soviet Ambassador, Tito kept his principal collaborators until 3 a.m. and I suspect decision to publicize cancellation of trip was taken that night. This was followed by return to Belgrade of Yugoslav Ambassador to Moscow following conversation with Khrushchev, and Italian Ambassador is informed Khrushchev gave him message that there is in Kremlin no significant group with closed mind on reconciliation with Belgrade.⁴ When I saw Prica at a dinner on January 29 he told me economic negotiations with Soviet Union were going fairly well and Tempo subsequently told United Kingdom Ambassador that Soviets had promised sufficient coking coal under trade agreement. (While these two comments are superficially in conflict with report submitted Toica 301,⁵ thread of Soviet willingness and desire placate the Yugoslavs is present in each.) At the same time Yugoslav press is commencing to emit hints that “Yugoslav-American cooperation” (read economic aid) will not be affected. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

3. Viewing situation as seen from Belgrade, it seems to me that best attitude to adopt at present juncture is one of reserve. I assume Tito visit is off for indefinite period but should welcome confirmation. Cancellation of trip has caused great sensation here and NATO colleagues are naturally curious of our ultimate intentions. Pending information from Washington, I have adopted cautious line and am giving no comfort to hints that visit may be only postponed.

Riddleberger

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 768.11/2–657. Secret; Limit Distribution.
2. In telegram 1070 from Belgrade, Riddleberger reported that Popović had told him that the Yugoslav Government had instructed Mates to inform the U.S. Government that such a short visit by Tito would not be useful and that in view of conditions in the United States it might be better to postpone the trip. (Department of State, Central Files, 768.11/1–2857)
3. In telegram 994 from Belgrade, January 11, Riddleberger reported that Popović had informed him that Tito was suffering from rheumatism and that treatment would be continued into April. Popović expressed the hope that further press leaks could be avoided until the time of the visit was determined. (Ibid., 768.11/1–1157)
4. Micunović makes no mention in Moscow Diary of returning to Belgrade with such a message.
5. Toica 301 from Belgrade, May 8, 1956, contained an evaluation of Yugoslavia’s wheat needs and agricultural production schedule. (Department of State, Central Files, 768.5–MSP/5–856)