197. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State1
4315. Paris for Ambassador Bruce. Immediately preceding telegram2 deals only with tactics to be followed in immediate future and does not broach basic problem with which we may soon be faced, namely, whether we are prepared to insist, whatever the outcome, on maintaining the principles underlying our right of access to Berlin or whether in last analysis, if Soviets continue to press their current demands, we would be prepared to yield to them in order to keep open limited access to Berlin.
Soviet position as expounded by Kotsiuba and Pushkin seems clear. Although they recognize right of Ambassadors, military commanders and Commandants to authorize travel to Berlin, they have stated that only certain categories of persons should be authorized and that, of these, some should be authorized for duty travel only. Kotsiuba has furthermore demanded that new documentation be introduced specifying, inter alia, traveler’s status and purpose of his travel. Pushkin, in less precise terms, indicated same requirements. This, plus fact that Kotsiuba’s original démarche to three political advisers3 was made on heels his return from Moscow, strengthens our belief that his demands were based on specific instructions from Moscow. Instructions were perhaps motivated by GDR insistence that Bolz–Zorin letters of September 19554 finally be implemented rather than by Soviet desire to create difficulties over Berlin access as such.
Whatever the motivation, first question is what if any flexibility is there apt to be in Soviet position, i.e., is there possibility they may be satisfied with documentation we are now prepared to provide? In our view, chances are at best slight that they will be, but answer should emerge more clearly from political advisers’ next round with Kotsiuba. If he rejects documentation as inadequate or indicates he must study it before approving it, next move could be stiff letters from three Ambassadors to Pushkin, followed if necessary by tripartite démarche at Moscow.
Before taking matter to Moscow, however, and perhaps even before approaching Pushkin, it would seem advisable to determine ourselves and then to seek tripartite agreement on how far we are [Page 482] prepared to go in maintaining our basic position. British, for example, have indicated that in end they would impose severe limitations on their travel to Berlin if it was necessary in order to keep travel open for personnel stationed in Berlin. Thus they seem not too strongly opposed to including in travel orders statement regarding traveler’s occupation and purpose of travel, and giving German as well as Russian translation of orders. French tend to stronger position, perhaps because in any case they have only minimum of travellers, with little or no leave travel involved.
Our situation is somewhat more difficult in view of amount of US travel, particularly by military train. It is our understanding that trains carry about four thousand passengers a month, with weekend travel sometimes as high as four hundred per night. While we have no breakdown of this, it seems probable that large proportion is leave travel, with at least some of it undertaken not by regular military or civilian personnel but by members of “voluntary agencies” such as Brethren Service Committee, American Friends of Russian Freedom, FOSTER Parents’ Plan for War Children, etc., who are still entitled to use military trains. Obviously a good deal of this travel could be eliminated including, if necessary, leave travel for personnel not stationed in Berlin, but this is question for determination by Washington in light various factors involved.
Question remains, however, of position to be taken vis-à-vis Soviets. It seems to us there two broad alternatives: (1) to maintain, by démarche at Moscow, if necessary, that it is we and not Soviets who have right to determine authorization for travel to Berlin, including purpose for which travel authorized, and that we are not prepared to go further in question of new documentation than uniform travel order forms, passport stamps, etc., which should be adequate assurance that we are appropriately supervising travel (this would not prelude our eliminating some of present travel, as suggested in foregoing paragraph, but we would not inform Soviets we were so doing nor would we agree to include “purpose of travel” in travel orders); or (2) to try at Kotsiuba level to win out on basis principles set forth in (1) but be prepared, if Soviets remain adamant, to yield to their documentation requirements.
Alternative (1), if démarche at Moscow were unavailing, could lead to open showdown with trains being turned back and attendant publicity. In this event, it seems probable we would have full support of public opinion since issue would not merely be one of type of documentation and legitimacy of leave travel, but more basic one of whether it is Soviets or Three Powers who determine latter’s rights. It is also not impossible that if strong tripartite position were maintained up to Moscow level, if necessary, Soviets would yield [Page 483] sufficiently in their demands to enable us to arrive at some tolerable modus vivendi.
Alternative (2) would involve inevitable loss of prestige but loss might be somewhat less if we had not taken issue to Moscow. Possible danger inherent this alternative is that Soviets would be encouraged by our yielding on these demands to make new ones in near future.
As stated earlier in this message, we believe it important determine this basic question on our own side and, if possible, tripartitely before proceeding beyond contemplated next step with Kotsiuba. Would therefore appreciate views soonest so that we may discuss with British and French.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/5–757. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Paris and repeated to Berlin and Moscow.↩
- Supra.↩
- See Document 191.↩
- See Document 218.↩