Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

196. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, May 7, 1957—7 p.m.

4314. Paris pass Ambassador Bruce. Reference: Berlin’s 938 April 30.² Definitive tripartite discussion here of Berlin access problem has been impossible because of NATO meetings and Selwyn Lloyd visit.³ At working level, however, three Embassies have agreed that in light of US difficulties in connection with Freshman⁴ and Evans cases, both papers quoted in Embassy telegram 4153 April 26⁵ should be revised. Alternative courses of action have been considered and following paper representing preliminary tripartite suggestions has been prepared:

“Three political advisers Berlin should seek meeting with Kotsiuba and follow one of courses set out below:

I. (a) They should present Kotsiuba with rough copies of travel orders and stamps, and of new passport stamps.

(b) They should tell him these are to be introduced as soon as necessary administrative arrangements have been made, and that he will be informed later of date of introduction.

(c) If he says he will give Soviet comments later, he should be told that the samples were being given him for his information and not for his approval. If necessary, he should be told that it is for the issuing agencies to decide to whom travel orders should be issued, and that new documentation clearly shows that travelers have authority of these issuing agencies.

(d) If Kotsiuba insists that documentation must have Soviet approval before being introduced, political advisers should state that they can only report his attitude to their governments, since it is in direct contravention of basic right, repeatedly reaffirmed by himself as well as by Pushkin, of Ambassadors and military commanders to determine authorization for travel to Berlin.

II. Without giving Kotsiuba samples of the new documentation, political advisers should inform him that:

(a) They agree it would be useful to revise travel order forms and stamps thereon in order to achieve greater uniformity.

(b) Issuing agencies and persons authorized to sign can be limited along lines he suggested but, in case of British military authorities in Federal Republic there may be some difficulty because Army, Navy and Air Force Commands are separate. (Comment: If it is possible to resolve this difficulty prior to meeting with Kotsiuba, reference to it could be deleted.)

(c) New stamps will be introduced for insertion into passports of those traveling on orders issued by Ambassadors indicating that bearers are authorized by Ambassador to proceed to Berlin ‘in connection with occupation of Berlin’, thus fulfilling Kotsiuba’s request regarding ‘purpose of travel’ and ‘nature of duties’ or ‘occupation’ of traveler.

(d) They see no point in having German as well as Russian translation of travel orders, which are designed solely for Soviet authorities and not for Germans.

(e) New travel order forms and stamps on above lines are being worked out and samples will be given Kotsiuba for his information before they are brought into use.

(f) If Kotsiuba indicates that he will have to see new documentation before giving definitive reply or ‘approval’, political advisers should repeat that samples of the new forms and stamps will be shown him for his information before they are put into use, but that they will not be submitted for his approval. If Kotsiuba insists that documentation must have Soviet approval, political advisers should make a statement as in I (d) above.

(g) If Kotsiuba replies that forms and stamps along lines indicated are inadequate to meet Soviet requirements political advisers should make statement as in I (d) above.

III. Political advisers should give Kotsiuba sample of new passport stamp only, saying that new travel orders are being worked out and that he will be given samples as soon as necessary arrangements have been made but that meanwhile introduction of new passport stamp should obviate difficulties experienced at Soviet checkpoints by travelers authorized by Ambassadors. Reaction to any comments by Kotsiuba should be as in I and II above.

Comment: Object of course I is to avoid risk that new documentation would be rejected by Soviets on grounds that they had not cleared it, while at same time avoiding giving impression that we are seeking Soviet approval. It would also avoid labor and expense of actually producing new documentation which Soviets might reject when it was put into use. Objection to course I is that it would take at least several weeks to work out new travel order forms to show Kotsiuba, and might, however much we argue to contrary, be interpreted as submitting new documentation for Soviet approval.

Object of course II is to attempt to clarify points of principle before undertaking work of producing new documentation which Soviets might reject when it is introduced. It also has advantage that it could be carried out at once. Risks are that it might make Soviets harden their attitude and would not necessarily prevent them from refusing to accept documentation eventually produced on grounds that they had not given their prior approval.

Course III has advantage that it could be carried out without delay as form of new passport stamp has already been tripartitely agreed. Object would be to overcome present difficulties whereby travelers are rejected by Soviets because they have no status stamp and allow US to continue using old travel order forms until satisfactory new ones have been worked out. (This argument may not apply on US side as Soviets have raised objections to their current form as issued by the Embassy.) Disadvantage of course III is that it is two-stage operation and, if Soviets make difficulties over clearing passport stamp, we would then have additional difficulties in second stage in clearing both passport stamps and new travel order forms.”

Of courses suggested therein, British Embassy prefers I but would apparently also settle for II. We have some preference for II but believe I also acceptable. French presently inclined favor III although British, who suggested it, do not like it nor do we because in view our own difficulties not only over lack of passport stamp but also over our current travel order forms, we do not believe it would solve our present problems even on temporary basis.

Would appreciate comments soonest.⁶

Trimble

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/5–757. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Berlin, London, Moscow, and Paris.
2. Telegram 938 reported that the political advisers had agreed on an interim note to be sent to Kotsiuba saying that the question of travel to Berlin was still under consideration, and that for the present it would be best to keep using the old forms to facilitate travel to Berlin. (Ibid., 862B.181/4–3057)
3. British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd was in Bonn May 2 and 3 for the North Atlantic Council meeting.
4. Arnold Freshman, a member of the Berlin economic staff, was detained for 5 hours by Soviet officials and only cleared for passage to Berlin following a direct protest to Kotsiuba.
5. Not printed. The first paper contained three proposals for a meeting between the Western political advisers and Kotsiuba; the second advanced six recommendations concerning travel orders and personnel going to Berlin. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/4–2657)
6. 0n May 9, Gufler cabled his general agreement with the proposals advanced in this telegram, but stressed that the Soviets were unlikely to wait indefinitely for a Western response. He advised that if tripartite agreement could not be reached on course I, then consideration might be given to combining courses II and III to the extent of giving Kotsiuba a sample of the new passport stamp. (Telegram 1085 from Berlin; ibid., 762.0221/5–957)