Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

172. Memorandum by the President’s Special Assistant (Rockefeller)¹

Washington, undated.

I. This is a proposal to counter recent Soviet moves in East Berlin which dramatize the Soviet contention that Berlin is no longer subject to four-power control, and that postwar agreements relating to freedom of the city and to the rights of the Western Allies throughout the city are invalid. There are other possibilities, obviously. This one would require a willingness to face up to the real issue of principle in a bold, dramatic way; it would require coordination with our allies in Berlin, which may be impossible of attainment.

II. It is suggested that the merits of the following plan be examined:

1. In the British sector of West Berlin, a few hundred yards from the Brandenburger Gate, which is at the Soviet Sector line, there is located an imposing Soviet war memorial erected in 1945, at the time the Soviets were in sole occupation of Berlin. It is manned by three or four armed Soviet guards, who are relieved at regular intervals. The British authorities in Berlin have permitted Soviet control of this monument since the end of the war.

2. At an early date, on the occasion of the changing of the guard, the Soviet jeep carrying the relief guards from East Berlin could be stopped at the Brandenburger Gate by West Berlin police. This would require ten or twelve heavily armed policemen, a so-called “Bereitschaftseinheit,” i.e., a riot-squad. The Soviet officer in charge would be told that the bearing of arms by foreigners in West Berlin was illegal, unless the arms were registered with the police, or a general agreement had been entered into. This would presumably result in a check by the Soviet officer with his superiors. It is doubtful that the Soviets would be prepared to shoot their way into West Berlin.

3. The Soviet Commandant in Berlin would undoubtedly immediately protest to the British Commandant, who could express his full sympathy with this obvious violation of the rights of the Occupation authorities in the four-power city, and indicate that he would be prepared to take the matter up with his colleagues In the Kommandatura, and with the German authorities, giving the impression that he was in no hurry. He could also point out that several incidents of this nature had recently occurred in Berlin, alluding to the recent arrest of an American group in East Berlin, when German police insisted that the two-way radio in a US Army automobile was illegal under East German law.

4. Since the matter of the Soviet War Memorial in the British sector goes to the heart of Soviet prestige, it could be expected that the Soviet authorities would be under pressure to liquidate the incident as rapidly as possible. The Western powers would constantly indicate that they were prepared to settle it only on the basis of reaffirmation of the principle of four-power responsibility for all Berlin, and of the rights of all Occupation Authorities in all parts of the city.

5. There are obvious difficulties in the proposal. West Berlin authorities would have to be willing to engage in the demonstration. Our allies in Berlin would have to be convinced of the utility of making an issue of the matter in a dramatic way. The possibilities of reprisal against the Berlin population, such as new controls on circulation throughout the city, slow-down on the autobahn, etc., must be weighed. The timing may be undesirable for any number of reasons. But it would appear to be useful to examine the practicability of matching recent Soviet moves by one in the same category.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/12–955. Confidential. Attached to a brief memorandum from Rockefeller to Secretary Dulles, dated December 9.