Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

171. Letter From the Ambassador in Germany (Conant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)¹

Bonn, December 5, 1955.

Dear Livie: A week ago I started to write you a long letter about the situation in Germany in general and the problem of Berlin in particular but just at that moment I received the news of the detention of the two Congressmen in East Berlin² and for obvious reasons postponed my letter. I am afraid the events of the last week will not make my letter any briefer, but I do have the advantage now of reporting on an hour and a half conversation which I had with the Chancellor the day before yesterday (Saturday).

As you already know the Chancellor is considerably disturbed about various articles which have appeared in United States press about the German situation and by the attack on the Administration’s German policy from various sources, particularly Harriman. We in the Embassy feel that some of the writers and commentators on Germany are badly informed about the true situation. Furthermore I couldn’t help feeling from my brief conversations in Geneva³ that perhaps some members of the U.S. delegation too had arrived at tentative conclusions which I do not think are warranted. Let me attempt, if I can, to analyze the general situation as we see it here in the Embassy and then turn to the specific problem of Berlin.

If I read the critics correctly and understand the apprehensions of some members of the U.S. staff, the chief point of concern is that as soon as the Chancellor disappears from the political scene German policy will necessarily be radically altered. This alteration, so it is claimed, can only be in the direction of reconciliation with Moscow; sooner or later, it is said, the Germans will doublecross us by making a deal for reunification which will be at the expense of the Western position in general, and the U.S. position in particular. While admitting that our whole policy in giving the Federal Republic sovereignty and proceeding to encourage its rearmament within NATO is a calculated risk, I feel the pessimistic forecast of the doubting Thomases is based on two false assumptions: (1) that the emotional drive of the German population will within the foreseeable future prove to be a major political force and (2) that there is a basis for a “deal” between a government in Bonn and Moscow.

Before analyzing the situation further, let me make it plain that I am not basing my optimistic forecast of the future on any such premise as “the Germans have changed”. If I live long enough to write anything about my experience here in the last three years, I shall devote a chapter to attacking such glib phrases as “the Germans have changed” or “the Germans haven’t changed”. Anyone who has been a college president in the United States for twenty years can not start from any other assumption than the premise that the vast majority of human beings are quite ready to doublecross their friends and partners if occasion arises! Therefore we can eliminate what I would call the sentimental argument from the discussion and get down to a prognosis of probabilities. When we do so, the following facts seem to emerge.

At present the demand for unification is to be found in those parts of Germany where the division causes real economic hardship. First and foremost is Berlin, of course, second Hamburg, and third a number of cities and towns along the border—for example, the textile area around Hof. Leaving geography aside, the urge for unification is to be found among those Germans who have relatives in the East or who have hopes of re obtaining properties they have lost. This latter group undoubtedly includes those who were expelled from the Eastern provinces; but at the same time the very existence of the pressures for reopening the question of the Eastern territories with all the political uncertainty that that involves is one of the reasons why many of the native West Germans are apprehensive about the whole reunification issue. It is noteworthy that all political parties have soft-pedalled all discussion of the Eastern boundaries with the exception of the BHE (which is disappearing). More than one German has spoken to me about the dynamite implicit in any public debate of this problem. Furthermore, the German industrialists must see that reunification would bring serious financial problems and taxes might well go up in order to provide for the necessary reconstructions. As far as the Ruhr group is concerned I have detected very little urgent desire for immediate reunification though, of course, they all insist that no one in Germany or in any other country can even suggest that the free world is satisfied with the present division. Quite rightly it seems to me they believe we should keep reunification to the forefront; for after all one can never tell what may develop in the international situation which will provide a favorable moment for pushing these claims more vigorously. Certainly the owners of property and managers of industry have no stomach for taking the risk of living in a unified Germany where any of the Pankow crowd are likely to have a voice. They are worried about the political and economic consequence of even a SPD/CDU coalition government.

Let me consider a little further what possible deals might be made assuming the worst about a German government in Bonn. A deal involving the Pankow crowd coming into the government seems to me out of the question for the reasons I have just given. A deal permitting either free elections or the sovereignty of Bonn to extend over the Soviet Zone would seem to me only conceivable at the price of the United States troops withdrawing from Germany and Bonn accepting enforced neutrality. The number of real neutralists who have advocated such a deal today is limited to the group of intellectuals and their followers, led by Heinemann. The leaders of the SPD at lunch the other day (Ollenhauer, Erler, Wehner) assured me that they would never agree to a unification on the basis of American troops going home. All they had ever advocated they maintained was an agreement between Russia and the United States in a security system which might involve the change of American troop disposal, but to leave Germany unprotected and with no European security system was far from their thoughts indeed. (I wish they would say this publicly and I also wish somebody would banish the words “security system” but that is another subject.)

As for the stability of the present government in Bonn, quite apart from the Chancellor’s health, I think you should realize that his party holds an important card which has not yet been played. The Chancellor referred to this in our conversation on Saturday. It involves the electoral law which must be passed by the Bundestag before the 1957 election. If this law were to be one in which proportioned representation were eliminated and strictly majority voting the rule, his party together with the CSU might well obtain a two-thirds majority. The FDP would almost be eliminated (leaders of this party have expressed their anxiety on this score to me) and the SPD representation in the Bundestag would almost certainly be reduced. I am passing no judgment on the ethics of such a change in the electoral law but the fact is that in terms of the American system of elections, the Chancellor’s parties (CDU and CSU) are much stronger than the present composition of the Bundestag indicates.

My relatively optimistic forecast for the foreseeable future here in Germany rests on two assumptions which I want to underline. The first is a continuation of full employment and the other is demonstration that the free world is strong enough to meet any challenge the Soviets may make. As to the first point I do not agree that a mere recession from the present boom would constitute a serious threat but only if the recession led to considerable unemployment. This I judge to be unlikely unless the whole economy of the free world should undergo a very severe depression. You will know better than I how to appraise this possibility.

It is the second assumption that I want to underline and discuss at some length in the balance of this letter. Undoubtedly, if the leaders of any of the major parties or leading people in industrial circles became convinced that the United States was going to pull out of Europe or was unable to protect our present forward positions, then a scramble for a personal reconciliation with Moscow might result. This is particularly true in the forward exposed areas along the border and above all in Berlin. Thus, I come to the conclusion that our position in respect to Berlin is a key to the problem of the future of the U.S. policy in Germany. To take an extreme case, if we were forced to leave Berlin, or in order to stay were forced to urge Bonn to negotiate with Pankow, then my optimism about the future is extremely limited for after all a Pankow government which was tolerated by the West and received a de facto recognition from Bonn would be in a very strong position to push its views on Western Germany. That the Soviet Zone is already being used as a forward bastion for disturbing the economic and political situation in the Federal Republic is quite obvious, but all these attempts can be met and defeated, I believe, on the one assumption that the United States, Great Britain and France and the Federal Republic remain united and react powerfully to the challenges which are bound to come in connection with Berlin.

Let me try to be specific about what I think is needed in regard to Berlin and what I hope can be accomplished in the not too distant future. The approach outlined in the Instruction of August 23 (CA–1536)⁴ by the Department seems to us to require amendment in two regards. (You will recall it was impossible to proceed as instructed at the time because of the British and French position.) The amendments involve first, an elimination of the idea that the IZT counter-measures can be applied piecemeal. The second is the idea that the German countermeasures must be in effect before COCOM cooperation can be obtained. I think the experience of last spring with the autobahn shows the difficulties of trying to put pressure on the GDR without taking the case to the public. It also shows that the minor inconveniences caused by partial measures were not successful. According to our views here what is required is both a public demonstration that the Three Western Powers mean business in regard to free access to Berlin and secondly a public trade embargo in cooperation with the COCOM countries. What I hope is that in this new committee which is being set up to study the documentation of travel, etc., it will be possible for the United States, British, French and Federal Republic representations to agree on a series of operations which would go into effect if and when there were further serious difficulties in regard to access to Berlin. These plans would, according to our view, have to be discussed with the COCOM countries and the Three Western Powers would have to agree to go into the COCOM meeting prepared to support the plan. Furthermore, I would hope that a knowledge of these plans would leak to the Russians and a knowledge of their existence might prove to be the greatest deterrent to action by the Soviets. Or I might even go so far as to say that by oral statements the Ambassadors in Moscow should let the Russians know plainly that we are prepared for very strong measures if they tried to use access to Berlin as a mode of promoting recognition of the GDR, but I am not prepared to push this recommendation, until we are agreed on the plans.

As an illustration of what I have in mind let me set forth my own ideas as to what should be agreed on in advance in regard to the situation which would arise if an announcement were made that hereafter no more German trains would be cleared for Berlin, unless the Minister of Transport at Bonn would meet with the Minister of Transport of the GDR.

Let us suppose that this statement were made and followed up by actual stoppage of the trains by the Volkspolizei and let us further assume that this action did not affect the allied trains. I would advocate that the following steps be taken at once:

(a) Strong protest to Pushkin followed within days by protest to Moscow.

(b) An increase in the number of military trains and their use for transporting essential materials for the Berlin economy both ways. (I know the Army will raise their objections on the basis of established procedures, but that objection must be overcome.) I assume further that the Russians would then try to stop our trains and this would result in a series of dramatic episodes. What is needed at this point is headline stories for several days. At this point and only at this point do I believe the Federal Republic would be prepared to put on a public trade embargo assuming they would have the full cooperation of the COCOM countries.

If this were all done, the Soviet Zone would undoubtedly retaliate by cutting off the brown coal supply. Therefore we would be in the midst of a trade war and also a very tense situation in Berlin. It might be necessary to establish again an airlift, but with this airlift, our stockpile and the pressures put on the Soviet Union by the embargo, I should hope we would win out, though it might take time. The alternative let me remind you would be to tell the Bonn government it must deal at the ministerial level with the GDR. In my humble opinion the day we do that we might as well leave Berlin and not many months later we might as well retire from Europe too.

In order to understand the reluctance of the Germans to carry on a partial embargo against the Soviet Zone, you must understand that they are convinced that they are very dependent on the brown coal from the Zone. This was made clear by the Chancellor last Saturday. Though it is equally clear that they are prepared to take on this hardship when the Three Western Powers on their side are willing to show that they are in earnest about any interference with access to Berlin. The difficulty last spring in connection with the autobahn tolls was that the Three Western Powers were not willing even to make a public protest to Moscow, you may recall. Regardless of the merits of this position which I appreciate was determined by a number of special factors (e.g. British elections), the Germans interpret it as passing the responsibility to them. In short the Germans will be willing to do their part but they will insist that there be strong pressure put on Moscow by the Three Western Allies and in as public a way as possible. This seems to me not an unreasonable position for them to take.

I think I should report two or three further facts which will help you to appraise the situation here. In the first place, at the Cabinet meeting last Wednesday according to Professor Hallstein several members spoke pretty strongly about the need for vigorous allied protests in connection with the detention of the Congressmen and Dibrova’s subsequent statement. Rather unpleasant allusions were made to the lack of firmness of the allies in connection with the autobahn. Secondly, Professor Hallstein, Von Brentano and the Chancellor have each separately referred to the legend about General Clay’s desire to break the Berlin blockade by force.⁵ There seems to be a fixed belief on the part of the leading Germans of all parties in Bonn and in Berlin that Clay wanted to send a convoy under armed escort through the blockade and was ordered not to do so by Washington. What is more important is the fact they are all convinced that if he had done this the Russians would never have opened fire and there never would have been an airlift. As far as my information goes this is a legend and I believe a dangerous one. But it is symptomatic of the German belief that the Three Western Powers must show their strength if we are to remain in Berlin. With this I agree.

For this very long letter, my apologies. With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Jim

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/12–555. Secret; Official–Informal.
2. Regarding the detention of Representatives Ostertag and Poland in the Soviet sector of Berlin on November 27, see Documents 223 ff.
3. Conant visited Geneva on November 15 for consultations with the U.S. Delegation.
4. CA–1536 outlined the possible courses of action available to the Western Powers on the question of tolls and concluded that diplomatic protests were “much less likely to induce the Communists to change their blackmail tactics than demonstrating by countermeasures that it does not pay” (Department of State, Central Files, 962A.7162B/8–2355)
5. Regarding Clay’s views on the sending of an armed convoy to Berlin in 1948 to break the blockade, see Foreign Relations,, 1948, vol. II, p. 958, or Jean E. Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, vol. II (Bloomington, 1974), pp. 735–738.