Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

118. Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, May 28, 1957, 11–11:52 a.m.¹

Washington, May 28, 1957, 11–11:52 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Disarmament; the Communiqué on Chancellor Adenauer’s Talks in Washington; Support Costs

PARTICIPANTS

• Federal Republic of Germany:
• Chancellor Konrad Adenauer
• Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano
• Ambassador Heinz L. Krekeler
• Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Grewe
• United States:
• The President
• The Secretary of State
• Mr. Donald A. Quarles
• Mr. Robert C. Murphy
• Ambassador David K.E. Bruce
• Mr. C. Burke Elbrick
• Mr. Robert R. Bowie
• Mr. J.J. Reinstein
• Interpreters:
• Mr. Weber
• Mrs. Lejins

Disarmament

The President welcomed the Chancellor. He said that he had expected that the meeting would be conducted in a slightly less formal atmosphere. Given the character of the meeting, he would suggest that the Chancellor raise such matters as he cared to discuss.

The Chancellor thanked the President. He said that he could only report that he and the Secretary had had several very good talks, the results of which were reflected in the draft communiqué.² On their way to the White House, they had discussed a possible change in the communiqué), in the paragraph dealing with disarmament, on which he believed they had reached agreement. Mr. Dulles said that no language had been agreed. He thought there had been agreement that it might be made clear that somewhat active participation on the part of the Federal Republic in the disarmament negotiations was contemplated. He thought he could work out some language on the point with Foreign Minister Von Brentano.

The Chancellor said that he would like the language to say that the Federal Republic would be consulted not only as a member of NATO, but because its interests were affected.

The President said that he wished to make clear that the United States does not intend to take up in any international conference any matter in which one of our allies is concerned and to take decisive action on it without the consent of that ally. He said it would not only be discourteous to do so; it would be foolish. The President suggested that the point the Chancellor had in mind might be expressed by including a short sentence in the communiqué stating that nothing affecting Germany could have force or effect without the consent of Germany. He suggested that the drafting of the exact language be left to Herr von Brentano and Mr. Dulles. He thought there was no difference in intent.

The President asked whether the Chancellor had any other points to raise on the communiqué. The Chancellor said he did not.

Mr. Dulles said that he and Chancellor Adenauer had had a long talk on disarmament the previous afternoon at which he had explained American thoughts on this subject very fully.³ He had told the Chancellor that he had been given our thinking more fully than had been done with any of our allies to date and more than most people in the United States Government. Mr. Dulles said that the Chancellor had a very natural concern lest we should make a comprehensive disarmament agreement covering the entire area under discussion, including continental Europe, without adequate consideration for the need of avoiding prejudice to the reunification of Germany. He said he thought he had made clear to the Chancellor that the principal evolution of our thinking had been along lines much in accord with the Chancellor’s thoughts. In particular, we had become increasingly aware of the difficulty of applying a system of inspection and control in Europe until the question of German reunification was taken care of. We were, therefore, prepared to leave this matter out of the first stage of disarmament, until the reunification question could be taken care of.

Mr. Dulles said that he had also told the Chancellor that it was our feeling there was a tendency on the part of the four Western powers who were carrying on the disarmament negotiations in London to assume too much responsibility vis-à-vis other countries. It was, therefore, our intention to seek more active participation by other powers. He had made this point to the Chancellor in particular in their discussion the previous day and it would be raised with our other continental allies at the NATO meeting on the following day. The problem of how to work out procedures for participation was still before us. This also was involved in the statement in the last page of the communiqué on which language remained to be worked out.

The President remarked that the language of the communiqué looked fine to him.

Chancellor Adenauer said that, as Mr. Dulles had said, he had given the Chancellor on the previous day a very full account of the American views on disarmament. After thinking over what Mr. Dulles had said to him on the previous evening and in the conversation which they had had that morning, he could now say that he was in full agreement with the American position.

Communiqué

It was then agreed that the communiqué be issued as soon as possible. Mr. Dulles suggested that agreement on the language on disarmament be reached immediately. The German representatives suggested that some additional words be added to the sentence at the beginning of the last paragraph of the communiqué reading as follows:

“The President stressed that any measures for disarmament applicable to Europe would be accepted by the United States only with the approval of the NATO allies, which he hoped would take a leading role in this regard”.

They suggested adding the phrase:

“and in connection with the reopening of negotiations on European security and German reunification”.

The President thought this language might cause some difficulty. Mr. Dulles pointed out that it seemed to suggest that NATO had responsibility for German reunification. He pointed out that the previous paragraph referred to the responsibility of the four powers for this question.

Professor Grewe then suggested as a substitute the addition of the following words to the sentence:

“and taking into account the link between European security and German reunification”.

The President and the Secretary agreed to this suggestion.

German Assets in the United States

The discussion on this subject is recorded in a separate memorandum.⁴

Financial Support for United States Forces in Germany

Ambassador Bruce raised the question of financial support by the Federal Republic of American forces in Germany. He pointed out that this had been discussed by the Chancellor and Secretary Dulles in Bonn on May 4,⁵ at which time an agreement had been reached. The question of working out suitable language was still pending. He asked whether Foreign Minister Von Brentano could say whether he thought the matter could be worked out in the next few days.

Herr von Brentano said he was not prepared for a discussion on this subject. However, he was familiar with the matter. At the meeting on May 4, Mr. Dulles had said that there was a problem of presentation from the viewpoint of the American Congress and had suggested that the United States make a reservation allowing it to raise the question again later. The Chancellor had pointed out that this would give rise to difficulties with the Bundestag. Language on the subject was now being negotiated in Bonn. Herr von Brentano read the American and German formulations for the United States reservation. He suggested that there was no difference in substance between the two texts. He said that the presentation in the German draft would be better from the viewpoint of the German Bundestag.

The President said he understood that the matter was then only a question of phraseology.

Mr. Dulles said that this would be a subject of Congressional interrogation and would be of particular interest to the Defense Department. Secretary Quarles said that the more definite the reservation could be, the better the position of the Administration before Congress would be.

The President said he realized that the Chancellor had several speeches to make.⁶ In view of this fact, the meeting might be brought to a close. Assuming that both he and the Chancellor would for the next few years continue in their present positions, he hoped that the Chancellor would find it possible to visit him again. He felt that these visits were always very useful from the American viewpoint. The Chancellor thanked the President. He said that each of his visits had been most profitable to him, not only in terms of the specific matters which he had dealt with, but in learning to appreciate increasingly the qualities of the American people and the American way of life.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 888. Secret. Drafted by Reinstein on June 4.
2. Not found in Department of State files. For texts of the communiqué and declaration issued by the President and the Chancellor on May 28, see Department of State Bulletin, June 17, 1957, pp. 955–956.
3. See Document 116.
4. The memorandum focused on a brief and general discussion of German assets in the United States. Adenauer noted that there might be a way to solve the problem without using American tax funds. The President added that the matter of assets had given him and the Secretary “much anxious thought”. The President concluded: “However, this was a matter of law, and it was not always easy to persuade Congress to solve problems in a manner one would like.” (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 888)
5. See Document 105.
6. For texts of Adenauer’s addresses to the House of Representatives and Senate, see Department of State Bulletin, June 17, 1957, pp. 956–960.