114. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 26, 1957, 11:30 a.m.1
SUBJECT
- NATO Military Problems
[Here follows the same list of participants as the memorandum of conversation, supra.]
Taking up the third Agenda item, NATO military problems, the Secretary said he had little or nothing to add to what he had said at the NATO Meeting in Bonn, where he had also had an opportunity for full discussions with the Chancellor.2 It did come to his mind, however, that since that date the Chancellor had had a meeting with Prime Minister Macmillan;3 the Chancellor was possibly in a position to throw further light on the question of British thinking, particularly on their willingness to leave reserve forces on the Continent.
[Page 262]The Chancellor said he would like first to say something about his conference with General Norstad shortly before leaving Bonn for the United States. Norstad had given him a comprehensive survey of the NATO situation and had made a very good impression.
The Chancellor said he also wished to refer to the recent resolution of the Bundestag on atomic weapons, and to the recent press conference of Mr. Ollenhauer in which he had said that should the Social Democrats come to power in Germany they would insist that United States forces in Germany not be equipped with atomic weapons; he had also indicated that the SPD was prepared to accept all the consequences flowing from this decision. The Chancellor said he did not think the SPD would be successful in forming the next government and he was confident the present government would remain in power. In this event it would insist that Allied troops in Germany should be equipped with the most modern and efficient weapons. The Chancellor added that it was obviously the intention of the SPD to undermine NATO whereas his government wished to see NATO made as strong as possible.
As for the Macmillan talks, the Chancellor said they had been conducted in a very good atmosphere, although at first he had been somewhat concerned over British insistence on building hydrogen weapons and reducing their conventional forces. The formula which had been agreed upon in the talks was that steps must be avoided under all circumstances which would produce any weakening of NATO, and that in assessing the British as well as the overall NATO situation account must be taken of the German forces which are now being built up.
The Chancellor said he had later asked General Norstad if hydrogen weapons of British manufacture would come under his command. Norstad had replied in the negative but had said he could not conceive of a situation where the British would not cooperate fully with NATO in this matter. The Chancellor said that, as the Secretary was aware, the French were also considering manufacturing hydrogen weapons. Such a development, quite apart from French difficulties in Algeria, would involve further weakening of the conventional forces assigned to NATO. The Chancellor said he therefore saw a possibility (and he stressed this was only a possibility) of a development in the direction of a weakening of NATO should NATO member states attempt to build up stocks of atomic weapons not coming under the control of the Supreme Commander while at the same time reducing the conventional forces under the Supreme Commander’s control. It was quite important whether the Supreme Commander had the power of control in this situation or was entirely dependent on the goodwill and understanding of the other parties. The Chancellor said he was aware the Secretary might not wish to comment on this problem [Page 263] now but he had merely wished to direct attention to his concern over this potential development.
The Secretary said he was not clear whether the Chancellor was satisfied with the question of the disposition of the British reserve force, i.e., whether this should be stationed on the Continent or in the United Kingdom. The Chancellor said this problem had been discussed but no decision had been taken. The matter required the approval of the Council of Western European Union. This in turn required the advice of General Norstad which was not expected until some time during the summer. It therefore appeared that the decision of the WEU Council could not take place before fall.
The Secretary said he wished to comment briefly on the Chancellor’s remarks about the position of the SPD, not because he was interested in intervening in German internal affairs but because the question was of great importance to the posture of the free world. (The Chancellor interpolated that Mr. Ollenhauer had made the statements in question at a large press conference.) The Secretary drew the Chancellor’s attention to the world map behind him. He referred to Finland, where important mineral deposits had been taken over by the Soviet Union during the last war; to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which had been forcibly taken over by the Soviets; and to Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria and Albania, which had come under Soviet control solely as a result of the Soviet threat to use military force in these areas. On the other side of the world Mongolia, Tibet, North Korea, and North Viet-Nam had all been taken by Soviet force. All these aggressive expansions had occurred in areas where there were no collective security arrangements. On the other hand, in no area protected by such collective security arrangements had there been such aggression. The Secretary said he also wished to observe that the heart of collective security arrangements is the willingness of all parties thereto to use whatever force is necessary to repel aggression. He therefore could not but conclude, as had the Chancellor, that to leave such a vital area as the Federal Republic unprotected by collective security arrangements, or so poorly protected that it would become a tempting target for aggression, would represent a betrayal not only of the Federal Republic but also of others in the free world who were willing to stand beside the Federal Republic. We were trying to limit the danger that atomic weapons would be used in a manner contrary to the moral sense of those peoples who have any moral sense. But to agree to forego the availability in case of need of the most effective weapons would be as foolish as to have agreed to forego the use of gunpowder when this began to replace bows and arrows.
The Chancellor said he was in complete agreement with the Secretary. He was convinced, as he had already indicated, that his government [Page 264] would win the elections. He had wished to make the point only so that there would be no doubt the majority of the German people approved his government’s course of action. He wished to reiterate once again that both for Germany’s allies and for its own forces, his government wished to have the most modern and effective equipment available.
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 888. Secret. Drafted by Creel on June 3.↩
- See Document 105.↩
- Prime Minister Macmillan and Foreign Secretary Lloyd visited Bonn following the NATO meeting.↩