Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Eastern Europe, Volume XXV

158. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 2, 1956—11 p.m.

475. Re Hungarian situation. In conversations with Dixon (UK) and de Guiringaud² (France) prior SC session this afternoon³ I found them determined to proceed with meeting today and to press substantive resolution to vote.⁴ French Delegation said had instructions call meeting and present substantive resolution today alone if necessary. UK and France confident they could get 8 votes for French substantive resolution tonight without US. They wanted to move into emergency GA as fast as possible after veto. Claimed could get over 53 votes in GA.

Ensuing discussion was strained and difficult. Dixon justified immediate drive for SC veto by Soviets on ground that situation changed since they proposed two-staged SC operation in tripartite meeting October 29.⁵ He has heard reports new Soviet troops entering and taking control Hungary.⁶ Further charged US has lost interest in Hungary and now only wants increase pressure on UK and France under GA Suez resolution.⁷ He said he believed US working on false assumption that UK advocating drastic action on Hungary in order to counteract effect of GA resolution.

I explained US has not lost interest in Hungary but considers situation there too confused to permit our pressing substantive resolution to final vote.⁸

Dixon said he now understood our view more clearly but strongly requested that we ask Department to call on British Chargé, Washington and also have Embassy London tell UK FonOff of reasons our stand. Otherwise he feared official UK reaction to our refusal seek final action against USSR will be highly critical. Ordonneau⁹ (France) made same request re French. Strongly recommend this be done earliest.

Ramsbotham¹⁰ (UK) individually approached two USUN officers to say UK not at all worried by pressure from GA resolution. They motivated only by sincere anxiety over Hungarian developments.

We finally agreed on following course of action:

1. UK and France would not put in substantive resolution tonight and I would not put in procedural one.

2. I would make early speech tonight.

3. Cuba or another member would be requested after round speeches suggest no further action possible tonight.

4. There would be another SC meeting tomorrow afternoon.

5. We would consult tomorrow morning on both substantive and procedural resolutions. Dixon requested agreement that three powers would “work towards” agreed substantive resolution. I agreed to consult about one, and said they could inform governments they were “making progress”.

Request authority introduce substantive as well as procedural resolution tomorrow with priority for ours. Substantive resolution should include paragraph for appointment committee with names states left blank if Department wants delay vote to avoid veto although delay entails risk that UK and France will get priority. We can thus keep resolution pending until we are ready to vote on it.

Cannot be sure however that we can persuade both UK and France to agree not press for SC condemnation and Soviet veto. During our meeting they several times pointed out they could force our hand by introducing such resolution on their own.

We believe resolutions should be introduced by US and not be tripartite.¹¹

Please instruct urgently.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 764.00/11–256. Confidential; Priority.
2. Louis de Guiringaud, Alternate French Representative at the Security Council.
3. The 752d Security Council meeting took place between 5 and 8:50 p.m. (U.N. doc. S/PV.752)
4. Telegrams 474 and 476 from USUN, November 2, provided the text of the British and French draft resolutions, respectively. (Department of State, Central Files, 764.00/11–256)
5. Telegram 434 from USUN, October 29, spelled out this strategy. Dixon proposed that the first stage consist of speeches against the Soviets and the introduction of a procedural resolution to suspend Council deliberations for 48 hours to allow time for the conclusion of negotiations for the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Hungary. The second stage was to involve a substantive resolution, the full nature of which had not yet been determined. The likelihood of the substantive resolution was to be made known, but not the possibility of the procedural maneuver. (Ibid., 764.00/10–2956)
6. Nagy wrote to Hammarskjöld on November 2 reporting that new Soviet military units had entered Hungary. He requested the Secretary-General to call upon the “Great Powers” to recognize Hungarian neutrality. (U.N. doc. S/3726)
7. See footnote 2, Document 156.
8. Lodge’s address of November 2 is in U.N. doc. S/PV.752, pp. 9–10.
9. Pierre Ordonneau, Adviser for Security Council Affairs.
10. Peter E. Ramsbotham, First Secretary and Head of the British Chancery.
11. At 11:10 a.m. on November 3, President Eisenhower met with Acting Secretary Hoover and Legal Adviser Herman Phleger to discuss the approach to take on the Hungarian question in the Security Council. “Mr. Hoover said he is confronted with two problems at the moment. The first relates to the Hungarian resolution. The Security Council is meeting at 3 P.M. today to take up this matter. The Hungarians are asking for UN help, and the British and French want us to join them in a resolution on the matter. Mr. Phleger said Secretary Dulles did not want to join the British and French, and the President said that such a thought was almost absurd.” (Memorandum of conversation; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings with the President)