157. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions1
349. Following is Department’s tentative appraisal present situation:
Sov Oct. 30 declaration on withdrawal2 appears reflect basic Sov decision it must now change nature its relationship with its Eastern European satellites by withdrawing advisers, altering its one-sided economic relationships, and giving appearance willingness discuss withdrawal Sov troops where and when such steps necessary appease national feelings these countries and support national Communist regimes there. Declaration, which is logical further development of 20th Party Congress CPSU endorsement “various roads to socialism”, promised (1) discuss “measures insure further development economic ties”; (2) “examine together with other states question whether further stay Sov advisers (in satellites) is expedient”; (3) “examine with other socialist countries which are participants in Warsaw Treaty questions of Sov troops stationed in those countries.”
Sovs appear feel nationalist and anti-Sov feeling has reached danger point where losses must be cut by accepting high degree independence satellites, but within “socialist” framework. Sovs probably hope maintain their influence through (1) national communist leaders’ ideological identification with Sovs and their need for ultimate support against anti-communism; (2) growing degree economic integration, even though trade will be on terms more favorable to satellites and Sovs will have to give some economic aid; (3) and, at least in Poland and Czechoslovakia, fear of German resurgence.
Hungary may prove test case this policy. Here Sov influence has deteriorated to point where apparently growing number national communists are for moment taking open anti-Sov line in supporting Hungarian Government’s (1) demand for early withdrawal Sov troops, (2) proclamation Hungary’s neutrality and withdrawal from Warsaw Pact, and (3) intention allow major modification collectivized agriculture and holding new general elections. At present not clear whether Sovs feel Hungarian developments threaten commie control Eastern Europe to point Hungarian rebellion must be crushed. Sov troops continue control access to Budapest plus commanding military positions [Page 367] throughout country from which could crush Hungarian rebellion. Sovs probably desire continue avoid battle with Hungarian Government; may feel Hungarian estimate hopelessness their position will force that Government take actions reverse major anti-communist decisions. In using pressure to this end, Soviet Union will have support of Czechoslovakia and Rumania. Poland and Yugoslavia, while both insisting on withdrawal foreign troops, give signs using influence maintain at least communist-dominated Hungarian Government. Nagy if possible. Possibility Sov involvement in Middle East plus situation in other satellites are factors still unknown magnitude which may tend influence Sovs postpone3 decision.
Sovs give every indication continuing accommodate self to Poland’s drive for autonomy on internal matters, on basis Poland’s apparent determination maintain communist-dominated government and “socialist” internal order plus close alliance with Soviet Union. Close identification of Sov-Polish interests in maintaining Sov control in East Germany (and for Poles’ need for long-term support in retaining western territories) probably presage continuing Polish-Sov military cooperation, though on new basis.
For number reasons (such as national character of peoples, varying degrees of economic distress, and lack of strong living national communist leaders), Governments of Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania are in hands of leaders closely identified with “Stalinist” policies in Eastern Europe. Troop issue only present in Rumania, and declaration Sov willingness negotiate for their withdrawal takes off pressure at this point for immediate future. Sovs must now find ways strengthen hand leaders these countries as most pro-Sov leaders they could hope find.
East Germany is separate problem. Here every indication is that Sovs will stand on present positions of maintaining in power “Stalinist”-East German regime by 400,000 man Sov occupation force. Sovs appear continue regard their ability block German reunification as their trump card, and they are apparently willing defend with force their East German position. Absence national communist leaders of stature, “wait and see” attitude East German people, and increased GDR internal security measures are factors tending stabilize conditions there for present. Appears likely Sovs recognize magnitude seriousness pressures created by recent developments in Hungary and particularly Poland will have on their East German position.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 764.00/11–256. Confidential. Drafted by Blake (EUR/EE) and cleared in draft with Freers, McKisson, and Trivers. Sent to London, Paris, Vienna, Rome, Bonn, New Delhi, Tokyo, Belgrade, Bucharest, Prague, Warsaw, Ankara, Athens, Teheran, Rio de Janeiro, Moscow, Berlin, Frankfort, Munich, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, and Stockholm.↩
- See Document 141.↩
- The word “final” was written on the source text above “postpone.”↩