Office of the Historian

156. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the Secretary of State in Washington and the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) in New York, November 2, 1956, 4:11 p.m.1

November 2, 1956, 4:11 p.m.

TELEPHONE CALL TO AMB. LODGE

L. said he has the Br and Fr next door in a very emotional condition—they say there will be a bad impression at home if we are in a hurry to get them on the dock2 and drag in Russia. L. told them that was unjustified. The Sec. said they want the limelight off them and have the 3 of us go together. The Sec. thinks it is a mockery for them to come in with bombs falling over Egypt and denounce the SU for perhaps doing something that is not quite as bad. L. agrees. The Sec. wants no part of it. L. is glad to hear that. The Sec. said no res this p.m.—discuss the situation and suggest it be useful to get a representative of the new Hungarian govt as quickly as possible and one is more or less en route and we should watch it carefully and have this fellow get here fast. L. does not think it possible for us to agree on a res. The Sec. said we don’t have any hard info as to what is going on in Hungary—no doubt re Egypt. Keep it on the agenda. L. will say we will be glad to attend the meeting—trying to get the rep here to get facts but impossible to take a stand on a res.3 [Here follows discussion of the Middle East. For text, see volume XVI, page 938.]

  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations. Transcribed by Bernau.↩
  2. In the early hours of November 2, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 997 (ES–I), introduced by the United States and opposed by the United Kingdom, France, and Israel. It called for an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of forces behind armistice lines, and following a cease-fire, the reopening of the Suez Canal. (U.N. doc. A/3256).↩
  3. Telegram 236 to USUN, November 2, confirmed the substance of this conversation in respect to the procedure to be adhered to at the Security Council meeting on Hungary. Every effort was to be made to dissuade the French from tabling a substantive motion and, failing success in that, steps were to be taken to defer a vote. (Department of State, Central Files, 764.00/11–256)↩