159. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1

1048. Embtel 1044.2 Soviet press today contains no reference to any mixed commission. BBC last night, however, in Budapest report listed reactivation mixed commission concerning Soviet troops in Hungary as one of requests Hungarian government in note to Soviets. From tone of press, however, this morning, and particularly domestic broadcast Moscow radio yesterday evening, it seems clear, as mentioned reftel, mixed commission is little more than device to gain time for preparations armed action in Hungary. If BBC information correct, it is not creation of new or high level commission that is involved, but at best merely meeting of already existing, presumably low-level, body which hardly represents any serious intention Soviet government to negotiate with Hungarian government. It is also possible that commission gambit will be used by Soviets in SC debate in hopes forestalling SC action and to confuse issue.

From my conversations with Zhukov (Embtels 992 and 1003)3 Hungarian situation, I received, as already reported, distinct impression Soviet military had been in favor strong action both in Poland and Hungary, and yesterday at Syrian reception both Zhukov and Sokolovsky4 had air of satisfaction and even triumph in contrast to Zhukov’s state frustration in previous talks.

Soviet press and radio treatment, which will be covered in separate message,5 seem to be moving direction depicting Hungarian Government as “counter-revolutionary” thus removing it from application declaration on relations with “Socialist” countries.

Exact effect of Anglo/French action against Egypt in Hungarian matters cannot be determined, but it is possible that diversion world opinion Hungarian situation has led Soviets to believe they have freer [Page 371] hand in this regard. On other hand, armed action against Hungarian people will be difficult even for Soviet propaganda to reconcile with posture defense independent small nations Middle East question and should blunt edge Soviet propaganda campaign.

In addition tone Soviet press strongest indication probability impending Soviet action is of course reinforcements being sent into Hungary, and I should have mentioned in reftel that among other reasons for placing no credence Bulganin’s statement was he used classic Soviet cover-up phrase that reports of reinforcements “do not correspond to reality”.

Throughout Hungarian problem, as we have frequently reported from here, Soviets confronted simple choice as events have developed either to cut their losses and remove troops under best face-saving cover that could be devised, or else return to open use of force and in effect military occupation Hungary. There has undoubtedly been considerable discussion in Soviet leadership on this point with careful thought consequences either course of action. Indications, although never conclusive until event, seem to point to basic decision to use of force if necessary to keep Hungary in Soviet camp.

Soviets may not proceed immediately to use of force but, depending upon attitude Hungarian government, may seek through mixed commission or other device to soften up Nagy and Hungarian Communists with “promises” concerning troop withdrawal in order to induce rebels to surrender arms. If, however, Nagy stands firm it looks at this moment as though Soviet troops would go into action.

Apart from UN action in SC I presume Department has given consideration to some approach here, which, although of doubtful effect if Soviets have made basic decision, might have some value for the record. If any such approach were made it would have to be, I believe, direct to Bulganin in name of President.

Bohlen
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 764.00/11–556. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London and Paris.
  2. Telegram 1044 from Moscow, November 2, stated that Bulganin informed Bohlen that a mixed Soviet/Hungarian Commission would be created to take up the questions of the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary and Hungarian ties to the Warsaw Pact. (Ibid., 764.00/11–256) The next evening Khrushchev indicated to the Ambassador that negotiations were continuing and that it would be straightened out. When asked whether the Soviets were still introducing troops into Hungary, Khrushchev replied that they had enough there but would add more if necessary. (Telegram 1057 from Moscow, November 3; ibid., 764.00/11–356)
  3. Documents 138 and 145.
  4. Marshal Vasili Danilovich Sokolovsky, chief of the Soviet General Staff, Deputy Minister of Defense, and a member of the Party Central Committee.
  5. Telegram 1061 from Moscow, November 3, summarized press reports. (Department of State, Central Files, 764.00/11–356)