NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the
Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 333rd Council meeting on August
1, 1957, adopted the statement of policy on the subject contained in
NSC 5718, subject to the amendment
thereto which is set forth in NSC Action
No. 1762–b.2
An Economic Annex, a Military Annex, and a Financial Appendix are also
enclosed for the information of the Council.3
The enclosed statement of policy, as adopted and approved, supersedes
NSC 103/1.
[Enclosure]
STATEMENT OF US POLICY ON GREECE
General Considerations
Importance of Greece to the United
States
1. Greece is important to the United States because of its strategic
location, its proximity both to the Soviet Bloc and to the Near
East, its membership in NATO, and
its ties to Yugoslavia through the Balkan Pact. Together with its
Balkan Pact neighbors, Turkey and Yugoslavia, Greece forms a land
barrier to Soviet access to the Mediterranean. Also Greece has given
the United States and NATO
extensive base rights. Communications facilities and a USAF support group are maintained in
Greece and are important links in our global network of bases.
International Political
Orientation
2. Greek foreign policy is based on close ties with the United States
and opposition to Soviet Communism. This has been shown by armed
resistance against Communism (1947–49), active participation in the
UN (Greek troops fought in
Korea), and adherence to NATO
(1951) and the Balkan Pact (1954). This Western orientation is based
on its classic tradition and historical, personal and commercial
bonds with the West.
3. As Greek economic strength and political stability have grown,
national self-confidence has increased and Greece has taken a more
independent and nationalist role. Greek nationalism has frequently
sought, often successfully, to bring within Greece’s frontiers,
areas inhabited primarily by ethnic Greeks. This irredentism, behind
which the Greek Orthodox Church has generally been the main driving
force, has found its principal expression recently on the Cyprus
problem and has led to serious inter-allied tensions. These
[Page 587]
nationalist ambitions are
tempered by a deep fear of Russia and distrust of Bulgaria, and a
strong awareness that the United States is the only power which will
protect Greece and not take advantage of it.
Greek Relations with the United
States
4. While most Greeks know that in a real crisis their country must
depend on the United States, their country’s economic recovery has
permitted a sharp reduction in American aid and caused an increased
sense of Greek independence. These developments have been healthy
for Greek-American relations. Greece has been especially anxious to
reduce the appearance of dependence on the United States. Thus on
September 7, 1956, US-Greek status of forces agreements were revised
on a basis more acceptable to Greek sensibilities.
5. Nevertheless, American prestige in Greece is far greater than that
of any other foreign power. The Greeks look to the United States for
leadership in world affairs and for political support, notably on
the Cyprus question. Recent events in the Middle East, especially
Soviet threats at the time of the Suez war, have emphasized the
importance to Greece of its ties with the United States. While
Greece gives general support to American efforts to resolve Middle
Eastern problems and has given clear public endorsement to the
American Doctrine, its attitude toward Middle East questions is
influenced by its suspicions of Turkey and its fear of Turkey’s
entrenching itself as the chosen instrument of US policy in the
area. In addition, the presence of the influential Greek community
in Egypt makes Greece unwilling to oppose Egypt directly.
The Cyprus Problem and its
Consequences5
6. Since 1954 the Greek Government has given active diplomatic
support to the movement on Cyprus of Greek-speaking Cypriots
demanding union of the Island with Greece (enosis). Some 80% of the
Cypriots consider themselves to be of Greek ethnic origin. The Greek
Government supports their claim that the principle of
self-determination should be applicable to Cyprus. The Cypriot
problem has become the dominant issue in Greek politics and foreign
policy. It has absorbed the energies of the Greek Government,
diverted attention from the problems of economic development, and
caused the rigidity of Greece’s foreign policy and serious strains
with its major allies. The Cyprus question, by sharpening Greek-Turk
distrust,
[Page 588]
has been a large
factor in preventing the development of the Balkan Pact among
Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. At present Greece regards the
Alliance as potentially important for both military and economic
reasons, but claims that it cannot be developed until the Turkish
attitude on Cyprus changes. Meanwhile Greek-Yugoslav relations have
continued reasonably close, principally in the military sphere.
Internal Strengths and
Weaknesses
7. By Greek standards there has been unusual political stability
under fairly strong conservative governments since 1952. The Greek
Communist Party is illegal and its underground group is under
effective surveillance. Communism is not now an imminent threat to
political stability. On the other hand, the Cyprus question and a
Soviet friendship campaign in Greece have assisted Communist efforts
to legitimize the Party and have contributed to some “neutralist”
tendencies in Greek public opinion and politics. The extremely
difficult Cyprus problem poses the most immediate threat to Greek
political stability. Progress towards a solution acceptable to the
Greek Government and the Greek Orthodox Churches of Cyprus and
Greece, would facilitate a continuation of rule by the conservative
and moderate groups. Greek frustration over Cyprus and differences
between the Greek Government and the Greek Orthodox Church over the
issue, might lead to a series of less stable governments still drawn
primarily from conservative and moderate groups but subject to a
varying degree of leftist influence.
8. The internal security forces are reasonably capable of handling
Communist subversion inside Greece. The USSR has issued a severe
warning against the stationing of nuclear-capable forces in Greece
which the Greek Government has rebuffed. The USSR has also started a
strong cultural offensive aimed at Greece. In handling Soviet
overtures Greece is concerned by the strength and proximity of the
Soviets. Also there is some feeling in the Greek Government that
Soviet support on the Cyprus question should not be lost. Finally, a
potential security problem is the presence in the Soviet Bloc of
about 50,000 Greeks who left home or were abducted during the
guerrilla war. Many have probably been indoctrinated and Soviet
pressure for the return of all these Greeks would pose problems. So
far only about 3,500 have been allowed to return and they have
caused no serious difficulties.
Economic Problems and US
Aid
9. Greece is poor and has limited natural resources. Half the people
live on the land but only a quarter of the land is fit for
[Page 589]
farming. Industry is small
and inefficient and largely depends on imported oil for power.
Economic development has been retarded by repeated periods of
warfare. Greek defense expenditures are heavy in relation to Greek
resources. There is over-population in terms of the present level of
development with resulting unemployment and underemployment.
10. However, the Greek economy has made a very substantial recovery
since 1947 when Greece was on the verge of economic collapse. Living
standards are now higher than prewar; crop and industrial production
have increased 60% since 1940, while the population has increased
10%. The gross national product increased at an average of roughly
6% annually from 1951 through 1956, and per capita income about 4%.
Currently the rate of increase in GNP appears to be approximately 4%. Greece has recently
followed sound economic policies and has a relatively stable
economy, although it has been running budgetary deficits, partly as
a result of investment expenditures. In recent years, US aid,
including P.L. 480, has enabled
Greece both to finance a balance of payments deficit and to increase
its foreign exchange reserves. Exports and earnings from services
and remittances have more than doubled since devaluation in
1953.
11. Greek recovery since 1947 was made possible by a combination of
substantial US aid and Greece’s own efforts. From June 1947 through
June 1957 expenditures for all forms of US economic aid totalled
approximately $1,491 million (average FY 1948–1951, $261 million; average FY 1952–1957, $74 million). It is
estimated that US economic aid expenditures for defense support and
technical assistance (the only forms of economic aid capable of
current estimate) should be less in FY 1958 than in FY 1957.
Even with recent economic growth at a rate which compares favorably
with other Western European countries, per capita income is about
$240, the lowest in Free Europe except Portugal. A continuing rate
of economic growth is needed for the continuance of pro-Western
Greek governments. External economic aid will be necessary to
maintain such a rate of economic growth so long as the United States
encourages Greece to continue defense expenditures at present
levels. Reduction or elimination of such aid would probably compel a
corresponding reduction in Greece’s defense effort.
12. Greece is a member of OEEC and
has taken an interest in OEEC’s
work in less developed areas. It has unofficially discussed with the
OEEC a five-year development
program. Greece realizes the importance of associating itself with
the European Free Trade Area but as a relatively underdeveloped
country sees basic difficulties in doing so.
[Page 590]
Military Problems and US
Aid
13. Greece has committed its ground and air forces to NATO. Its naval forces, under national
command, will be assigned NATO
missions in time of war. Greece’s primary NATO mission is to provide maximum forward defense
against Soviet attack from the north. Greek forces would also assist
in defending the Straits area and would maintain internal security.
The present strength of the Greek armed forces is: Ground Forces
106,000; Air Force 15,150; Navy 15,500.
14. Department of Defense approved force objectives for Greece are 11
and 13/3 infantry divisions, 1 armored brigade, 12 air squadrons and
54 combatant vessels. These force objectives have been met in terms
of organization, but technical skills are seriously lacking and much
equipment is obsolete. In the case of ground forces, current active
forces provide only one-third of wartime strength and there is no
effective training program for the reserves necessary to meet
wartime strength requirements. The Greeks are good fighters. Greek
forces are capable of maintaining internal security. They could
provide limited defense against a satellite attack, but even if
fully mobilized could provide only a relatively brief delaying
action against a joint Soviet-satellite attack. Military planning
against any Communist attack is, of course, within a NATO context.
15. The cost of Greece’s share in NATO’s defense is beyond Greece’s present ability to
pay. Greece is devoting to defense about 5% to 6% of its GNP. The level of Greek defense
expenditures has not risen as rapidly as GNP. Defense expenditures are about 28% of all
budgetary expenditures (excluding those financed by US aid). The
United States has financed, on the average, 20% of the Greek defense
budget in the last three fiscal years. The US Military Aid Program
provides virtually all of the dollar costs for military maintenance,
replacement and modernization of the Greek armed forces. There is
little likelihood that Greece will assume in the immediate future a
relatively greater defense burden than she is now carrying.
16. US military aid programmed for Greece from 1947 through June 1957
approximated $1,150 million, of which an estimated $970 million was
delivered by June 30, 1957. Compared with the military assistance
program for FY 1957 of $51 million
and deliveries of $60 million, the military assistance program for
FY 1958 is currently estimated at
$110 million and deliveries at $120 million.
17. Although the Greek Government has requested additional equipment
which it believes vital to its defense, the United States has not
yet made a commitment as to any specific future military aid
program. Some consideration has been given to the deployment
[Page 591]
of a US nuclear-capable
task force in the general area, possibly in Greece.
Objectives
18. An independent and stable Greece, cooperating in Free World
defense and maintaining the will and ability to resist Communist
subversion and influence.
19. Access by the United States and NATO to military facilities in Greece, and Greek
cooperation with NATO
countries.
20. Greek armed forces capable of resisting, as part of a concerted
allied defense, direct Soviet or satellite attack.
21. Improvement of Greek-Turkish relations, and Greek participation
in the further development of the Balkan Pact.
22. Settlement of the Cyprus dispute.
23. Lessening of Greek irredentism.
24. A Greek economy which can support reasonable economic development
and assume a larger share of the cost of the Greek defense
establishment.
Major Policy Guidance
General
25. Taking account of other demands on US resources, help Greece to
develop the long-term economic and military strength needed to
assure its independence and resistance to Communist influence and
subversion.
26. Continue to lend reasonable international political support to
Greece, thus encouraging Greek recognition of the mutual benefits of
association both with the United States and with the Atlantic
Community.
Military and Economic
Assistance
27. Continue during FY 1958 to support
currently approved Greek force levels. Consider providing in the
total military aid program for Greece for the period FY 1958–60 appropriate conventional
equipment and recurring maintenance costs; and atomic-capable
weapons systems, predicated upon her desire and ability to absorb,
train with and maintain such systems as are contained in Military
Assistance Programs and, if applicable, upon the granting of atomic
storage rights to the United States. The United States should review
the possibility of achieving a reduction in NATO-approved force levels for Greece and, in phase
with the effective integration of advanced weapons in the Greek
armed forces, appropriately revise Greek force levels in the light
of NATO requirements.
[Page 592]
28. Without prior commitment to the Greeks, be prepared beyond FY 1960 to carry most dollar costs of
military maintenance replacement and modernization of the Greek
armed forces.
29. Make clear to the Greeks that the US military assistance and
defense support programs are based on the assumption that Greece
itself will make efforts to correct the weaknesses and deficiencies
in its armed forces.
30. Limit the number of American official personnel, including
dependents, to an operational minimum in order to avoid frictions
resulting from the presence of large numbers of foreigners in a
small country.6
31. Provide economic assistance (including P.L. 480 assistance) sufficient to aid Greece in
maintaining the military posture outlined in paragraph 27 and in
continuing a modest rate of economic growth.
32. Continue technical assistance to improve productivity and
distribution, focusing on a few long-range projects and utilizing
whenever possible the facilities of established American educational
institutions in Greece.
33. Encourage the Greeks to maintain sound economic policies and
preserve relative economic stability.
International Relations
34. Continue to exert influence on the Greek Government to reach an
accord with the United Kingdom and Turkey for an equitable
settlement of the Cyprus question.7
35. Encourage, as appropriate, Greek initiative in the further
development of the Balkan Pact.
