256. National Security Council Report1

Supplement to NSC 5718

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, at the 333rd Council meeting on August 1, 1957 (NSC Action No. 1763):

[Here follows NSC Action No. 1763; for text, see footnote 3, Document 253.]

The President has this date approved the above actions. Accordingly, the enclosed revised page 2 of the Supplement to NSC 5718, incorporating the amendment referred to in b above, is transmitted herewith for insertion in all copies, with the request that the superseded page be destroyed by burning, in accordance with security regulations.

In accordance with c above, the Supplement to NSC 5718 is being referred to the Secretary of State for his use in the conduct of future U.S. foreign relations with respect to the Cyprus dispute.

S. Everett Gleason
Acting Executive Secretary

[Enclosure]

SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS DISPUTE

Objectives

1.
Support concept of the attainment by the Cypriots of a government of their own choice in a manner that will protect the legitimate interests of our allies and of all groups on the island.
2.
Pursue policies designed to preserve NATO unity.
3.
Support efforts to retain continued access to NATO members and continued denial to the Soviet Bloc of the strategically important bases on Cyprus.
4.
Avoid involving the United States in a settlement that will require significant U.S. economic or military support.
[Page 494]

Policy Guidance

5.
Keep the primary responsibility for working out a peaceful solution in the hands of the Cypriots and the three countries primarily concerned. Be prepared to support a peaceful and practical compromise solution acceptable to all interested parties.
6.
Support NATO efforts to resolve the problem. Be prepared to use our influence in support of a reasonable solution developed within the framework of NATO good offices.
7.
Encourage some form of direct negotiations among the British, Greek, and Turkish Governments.
8.
Encourage direct negotiations between the United Kingdom and representatives of the Cypriot communities toward self-government.
9.
Encourage interested parties to enlist the support of the Cyprus and Greek Orthodox Churches to any mutually acceptable settlement.
10.
Encourage interested parties to attempt to solve the problem through quiet diplomacy rather than in the UN forums.
11.
Encourage the British to remain as ruling power pending agreement on the ultimate status of the island.
12.
Preserve U.S. Government maneuverability by not freezing our position for the present in favor of any specific formula. If necessary to bring about a solution acceptable to the interested parties, on terms which will strengthen NATO interests in the Mediterranean, be prepared to give serious consideration to participating in arrangements guaranteeing the interim or eventual status of Cyprus.
  1. Source: Department of State, S/SNSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5718 Memoranda. Secret. NSC 5718 is not printed, but see Document 307.